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Summary 
 
This thesis explores the connection between climate change and human rights 
from a legal perspective. Its starting point is the consideration of the plight of small island 
developing states (SIDS) in light of the adverse impacts of climate change on their territories 
and populations, such as the exacerbation of resource scarcity by climate change. In light of 
this, the thesis focuses on how water is regulated at the regime level by international human 
rights and climate change law and how those laws are implemented on the ground. The thesis 
considers this by asking the question “In what ways might a closer integration of the 
international human rights and climate change legal fields facilitate the enjoyment of water in 
an era of climate change impacts?”. 
In pursuit of answering this question, the submission examines regime level and 
implementation level integration, in Parts One and Two respectively. In Part One the two 
regimes, international human rights and climate change law and how they both address the issue 
of water, are outlined. It is clear that the two regimes interact barely at all despite regulating the 
same subject matter. The need and possibilities for integration are then considered, including 
an analysis of the possibility of the adoption of a new treaty and/or soft law instruments. The 
thesis then moves on to the implementation level aspect of the research question through 
adopting a specific country lens and considers the situation of water scarcity and its 
exacerbation by climate change in Tuvalu in Part Two. Water scarcity is considered from a 
human rights perspective, followed by consideration of if and how international human rights 
and climate change laws are being implemented in the state. It is concluded there is limited 
implementation and it follows that regime level integration may not actually facilitate the 
enjoyment of water in the country. Subsequently implementation level means of integration are 
analysed by considering opportunities under development commitments.  
Finally, by way of conclusion, the thesis summarises the conclusions reached in 
Parts One and Two. The conclusions of the thesis illustrate that there is not only disconnect 
between the two legal fields themselves, but also between the regimes and their implementation. 
The disconnect between the fields could be resolved by regime level integration which would 
ensure coherence of international law. The disconnect in terms of regime and implementation 
may indicate a further need for regime level integration, but it also demands that there is greater 
integration of the two fields at the implementation level. 
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Glossary 
 
Adaptation: “In human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its 
effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, the 
process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects; human intervention may facilitate 
adjustment to expected climate.”1 
Adverse impacts/effects of climate change: “[C]hanges in the physical environment or biota 
resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, 
resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-
economic systems or on human health and welfare.”2 
Climate change: “[A] change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human 
activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural 
climate variability observed over comparable time periods.”3 
Greenhouse gases: “those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and 
anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation.”4 
Mitigation: “A human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse 
gases.”5 
                                                          
1 Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Glossary of terms. in Field CB 
and others (eds), Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change 
Adaptation (Cambridge University Press 2012) 556. 
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 31 March 
1994) 1771 UNTS 107 (UNFCCC) article 1(1). 
3 ibid article 1(2). 
4 ibid article 1(5). 
5 Working Groups I and II (n 1) 561.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
“But afterwards there occurred violent earthquakes and floods; and in a single day and night 
of misfortune all your warlike men in a body sank into the earth, and the island of Atlantis in 
like manner disappeared in the depths of the sea.”6 
- Plato in Timaeus, translated by Benjamin Jowett  
 
1.1. Introduction to the topic 
 
The legend of Atlantis has its written origins in Plato’s work the Timaeus where it was 
said that Atlantis, a powerful island civilisation, disappeared into the sea following the onset of 
floods and earthquakes.7 Questions as to the story reflecting fact or fiction have arisen through 
the years, although it is often panned off as a fictitious story intended to warn of the dangers of 
hubris and greed.8 Regardless of its true reflection of history, the legend may soon be 
reproduced in our modern world. With the onset of climate change and its adverse impacts, 
small island developing states (SIDS) are at risk of physical disappearance due to sea level rise. 
9 At the current rate of climate change impacts, SIDS like Tuvalu may disappear within the next 
fifty years.10 This raises questions as to the fate of SIDS populations, such as where they could 
relocate to, whether relocation would allow their respective cultures and languages to live on, 
whether their governments would cease to exist rendering them stateless, just to name a few. 
However, in researching the above issues, it became clear to the author that the adverse impacts 
of climate change will make SIDS uninhabitable prior to any physical disappearance. The 
islands becoming uninhabitable stems in part from the exacerbation of water scarcity by climate 
change, threatening to render the states without any freshwater almost at all, making it 
                                                          
6 Retelling of Plato’s story of Atlantis found through NS Gill, 'Plato's Atlantis From the Timaeus: Did the city of 
Atlantis really exist?' (ThoughtCo, 24 September 2016) <https://www.thoughtco.com/platos-atlantis-from-the-
timaeus-119667> accessed 19 May 2017. 
7 ibid.  
8 Willie Drye, 'Atlantis' (National Geographic) <http://www.nationalgeographic.com/archaeology-and-
history/archaeology/atlantis/> accessed 19 May 2017. 
9 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 'Climate change is a human rights 
issue' (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 27 March 
2015) <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ClimateChangeHumanRightsIssue.aspx> accessed 21 May 
2017. 
10 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and 
sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque: Mission to Tuvalu’ (17-19 July 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/24/44/Add.2, 15. 
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impossible to sustain life there.11 Multiple SIDS currently experience water scarcity by virtue 
of them not being naturally gifted in terms of freshwater availability on the islands. This scarcity 
is expected to be exacerbated by climate change as the adverse impacts thereof intensify in 
terms of severity and frequency.12 This is problematic, as individuals and entire populations 
residing in SIDS would essentially be forced to relocate unless water scarcity is addressed. This 
is the case despite the individuals living in the states having a human right to water under 
international law.  
In light of the physical disappearance problem, a few legal issues could be considered 
such as the implications of state disappearance on statehood and consequent statelessness, 
whether climate-related migration is regulated by international law, and the applicability of the 
human right to water extra-territorially, among others. Upon researching the problems 
experienced by SIDS in relation to climate change, it became apparent that the issues outlined 
have been the subject of academic research previously and there is a body of analytical literature 
aiming to address and resolve these problems under the law. 13 In relation to the issue of SIDS 
becoming uninhabitable due to water scarcity, however, less academic research has been 
conducted. Greater focus being placed on scientific research establishing the links between 
climate change and exacerbation of water scarcity and how this might impact human rights 
enjoyment14 than on the possible methods of securing water supply through the use of law. 
There are at least two international legal regimes which attempt to secure enjoyment of water 
for individuals, namely the international human rights and climate change legal regimes. The 
two regimes act separately from each other but both regulate water, and climate change law in 
particular regulates climate change which impacts water. Despite regulation, however, water is 
not being enjoyed on the ground in SIDS. If laws are adopted with the intention of securing 
greater enjoyment of water without achieving such enjoyment in practice in states, this indicates 
that there is some flaw in the legal system, either in regards to the laws themselves at the regime 
level or at the implementation level. The laws operate in official isolation from each other, 
despite the interaction between the enjoyment of the right to water with the adverse impacts of 
climate change in practice. The International Law Association (ILA) has highlighted that there 
                                                          
11 Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law (Oxford University 
Press 2012) 124. 
12 Wu Hongbo, 'Mr Wu’s Blog on Water and Sanitation' (Island Voices, Global 
Choices) <http://www.sids2014.org/index.php?menu=1583> accessed 19 May 2017. 
13 See for example, McAdam (n 11) and Mark Gibney and Sigrun Skogly (eds), Universal Human Rights and 
Extraterritorial Obligations (University of Pennsylvania Press 2010). 
14 For example, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change and Water: IPCC Technical 
Paper VI (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2008). 
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is a real risk for norm conflict between the international human rights and climate change 
regimes,15 which makes one wonder whether this might be the cause of limited enjoyment of 
water. 
 The question then arises, would there be greater enjoyment of water if there was closer 
integration between two regimes? Discussions of integration between the two regimes have 
been conducted by scholars, as well as the benefits of adopting a human rights approach to 
climate change.16 These discussions do not however tend to focus on whether integration of the 
two regimes would secure greater enjoyment of water supply specifically, and particularly not 
in SIDS.  
 
 
1.2.  Research question 
 
In an attempt to understand the issue of water scarcity exacerbated by climate change 
discussed above, this thesis aims to answer the following question: “In what ways might a 
closer integration of the international human rights and climate change legal fields facilitate 
the enjoyment of water in an era of climate change impacts?”.  
 
 
1.3. Scope and delimitations 
 
When addressing the research question, the thesis focuses on regime level and 
implementation level integration of the two systems. In examining the possibility of regime 
level integration, focus is placed on the international human rights and climate change regimes. 
Specifically, Part One will focus only on aspects of the two regimes that address water supply. 
Under international human rights law emphasis will be placed on the right to water and thus 
                                                          
15 Shinya Murase and others, 'Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change' [2014] 76(1) International Law 
Association Reports of Conferences 330-386, 371-374. 
16 See for example, John H Knox, 'Climate ethics and human rights' [2014] 5(Special Issue) Journal of Human 
Rights and the Environment 22-34, Ottavio Quirico, Jürgen Bröhmer, and Marcel Sazbó, States, climate change 
and tripartite human rights: the missing link. in Ottavio Quirico and Mouloud Boumghar (eds), Climate Change 
and Human Rights: An International and Comparative Law Perspective (Routledge 2016), Ottavio Quirico, 
'Systemic integration between climate change and human rights in international law?' [2017] 35(1) Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 31-50. 
4 
 
international law regulating that right will be considered. As such the thesis focuses on 
integration of the international law regulating the right to water and not all human rights 
generally. In regards to climate change law, the thesis focuses primarily on adaptation and 
mitigation obligations and less on issues of cost and damage, which are also regulated by 
international climate change law. Furthermore, as with international human rights law, only 
aspects of climate change law relating specifically to water will be considered, not the climate 
change regime in its entirety.  
In pursuit of answering the implementation level aspect of the research question, the 
thesis adopts a country-specific perspective in Part Two. In order to examine how the issue of 
water scarcity is being addressed on the ground, the situation in Tuvalu is considered. Other 
SIDS or national contexts will not be considered, but Tuvalu has been selected as a 
representative example of the situation of SIDS as the issue of water scarcity exacerbation by 
climate change is one applicable to all Pacific SIDS.17 Thus the implementation level 
considerations are limited to the issues experienced in Tuvalu alone.  
 
 
1.4. Aim and rationale  
 
The aim of the study is to gain a greater understanding of why, despite intricate systems 
of international law being developed to regulate water supply, water supply has not been 
secured in SIDS, particularly in light of the adverse impacts of climate change. The reason for 
the pursuit of this knowledge is that water is fundamental to human life and it concerns the 
author that the adoption and interpretation of laws in view of safeguarding human life is being 
given significant attention and effort, yet the efforts are not increasing the enjoyment of water 
in SIDS. As such, the thesis considers whether the issue lies at the regime level and/or the 
implementation level and what ways the issues could be resolved. The hope is that this would 
facilitate greater enjoyment of water for those residing in SIDS even in this era of climate 
change impacts.  
The submission adopts a human rights approach and advocates for the integration of 
human rights and climate change law. Human rights, as a set of principles and their 
                                                          
17 Hongbo (n 12). 
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corresponding laws, provide a lens through which to see the world which comprehensively 
considers all aspects of human life. The system as developed under international, regional, and 
national laws has an unparalleled level of detail and has near universal subscription.18 This 
suggests that the human rights approach, which is that adopted by the United Nations (UN) as 
well, has managed to code the morality of states and their ideas of right and wrong as well as 
their sense of duty and corresponding entitlements. It is preferred to alternative approaches by 
the author in light of these aspects. One particular benefit brought by the human rights approach 
is the significant focus placed on non-discrimination and attention to those most vulnerable in 
society in all aspects of life and the securing of human welfare.19 The human rights approach 
also demands that those affected are given the opportunity to participate in decisions taken 
which affect them, creating a greater sense of autonomy among individuals.20 This appears 
preferable to pro-poor approaches which, while addressing issues of discrimination and equality 
based on economic status, they primarily take into account one dimension of human welfare, 
namely poverty, and focuses primarily on how to address that issue through development and 
economic growth.21 It is also preferred to the needs-based approach by the author as “rights” 
provide enforceable entitlements whereas “needs” may create a sense of revocation of 
autonomy. While needs and poverty are considered admirable and desirable issues for the 
project of international law to address, human rights are considered to offer a more 
comprehensive understanding of water scarcity and how it impacts a multitude of aspects of 
human life by the author. This is partially the case given that the human rights system includes 
a right to water specifically. This contains multiple related state obligations which must be met 
in relation to specified components of the right, while taking into account issues such as non-
discrimination and equality. The human rights approach thus provides a level of detail in 
relation to water specifically taking into account a variety of aspects of the right in question, 
providing an intricate approach to how human welfare is to be interpreted. Moreover, as will 
                                                          
18 Knox (n 16) 24-25. 
19 The right to freedom from discrimination is explicitly included in all core international human rights treaties, 
see, inter alia, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 3 January 1976) 999 UNTS 3 (ICESCR) article 2(2), Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC) article 2(1), and 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, 
entry into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW) article 2, among others. 
20 The for example CRC (n 19) article 12, CEDAW (n 19) article 14(2)(a), among others. Catarina de 
Albuquerque, Realising the Human Rights to Water and Sanitation: A Handbook by the UN Special Rapporteur 
Catarina de Albuquerque: Introduction (Precision Fototype, 2014) 31. 
21 Marta Foresti and others, 'Human rights and pro-poor growth' (Overseas Development Institute (ODI), January 
2010) <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/5631.pdf> accessed 21 
May 2017. 
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be made clear in the following discussion, particularly in Part Two, water scarcity affects more 
persons than just the economically disadvantaged in SIDS. Adopting a human rights approach 
to this allows one to understand what types of inequalities there are in enjoyment of water 
beyond economic status, such as residence location.  
 
 
1.5.  Methods and materials 
 
In pursuit of answering the research question the thesis examines two “levels” of the 
law, namely the regime level and the implementation level. These two aspects have been 
selected given that water scarcity in SIDS persists despite regulation of water supply through 
at least two regimes. The problem may, as such, stem from problems at the regime level itself 
or from the implementation level, if the laws are not being implemented at all or if they are not 
being implemented properly. Given that the two legal fields act separately from each other 
while addressing the same resource, water, from different perspectives, it raises the question as 
to whether a closer integration at the regime level, implementation level, or both, would 
facilitate the enjoyment of water.  
Part One of the thesis examines the regime level through a legal doctrinal approach. In 
adopting this approach, Part One of the thesis examines and interprets the international legal 
regimes in question, namely international human rights and climate change law. In order to 
consider in what ways a closer integration of the two regimes might facilitate enjoyment of 
water, Part One outlines why integration of the two regimes is desirable, why it is necessary, 
and if it is possible. This culminates with the consideration of what means of integration are 
available under international law.  
Part Two of the thesis considers the implementation level through examination of 
international assistance and national methods of mitigating water scarcity in Tuvalu. Tuvalu 
was selected for the implementation level aspect of the question as it experiences water scarcity 
acutely, allegedly already experiences the adverse impacts of climate change on its water 
supply, documentation in English in regards to these issues are available, and aid and assistance 
conducted in the state is relatively well documented. The various projects which are carried out 
in Tuvalu are also considered, focusing primarily on those carried out by external actors. In 
7 
 
outlining the various assistance projects, consideration is made of to what extent human rights 
and climate change laws are being implemented through the projects to indicate what level of 
implementation of law is being conducted. This culminates in a consideration of whether 
integration of the two at the regime level would benefit water scarcity in Tuvalu and considers 
alternative methods of integration which may have greater effect at the implementation level.  
The materials used in the study vary greatly. Part One focuses primarily on legal 
instruments such as international human rights treaties as well as the interpretation of those 
treaties by their respective treaty bodies. The interpretative guidance issued by treaty bodies is 
not legally binding on states and this should be borne in mind, however they are influential on 
states given the authority attached to treaty body status. The ILA is also frequently referenced 
in Part One in regards to their interpretation of international climate change law. The study 
'Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change' by the ILA22 is also not legally binding on states 
but is very comprehensive in regards to material consulted and was conducted by approximately 
30 academics from the climate change field. As such the study in question, while not legally 
binding and should not be assigned as much weight as the statements of the treaty bodies in 
terms of interpretative guidance, nevertheless represents an influential interpretation of the law. 
Part Two focuses heavily on the reports of UN Special Rapporteurs as well as government 
documents from Tuvalu, New Zealand, and Australia on their activities within Tuvalu. The 
Special Rapporteur reports and Tuvaluan government reports are somewhat dated but represent 
the most recent information available on enjoyment of water in the state. Reports of the World 
Bank and various UN agencies have also been consulted in considering the ongoing activities 
in Tuvalu in terms of securing water supply. Few non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
reports have been used, although a report from, inter alia, Amnesty International was consulted. 
It should be noted that NGOs can be biased in their reporting as they may be selective on what 
they do and do not highlight. The majority of the above sources were accessed in electronic 
form. One source, the Joint Commitment for Development between Tuvalu and New Zealand,23 
was acquired by the author through contact with the New Zealand Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
It is presumed that these reports are truthful and reflective of the situation in Tuvalu as well as 
the assistance being provided. Moreover traditional academic sources are consulted throughout 
the text, such as books and journal articles, accessed either in print or electronic form through 
the Lund University databases and libraries. 
                                                          
22 ILA Principles (n 15) Draft Article 4(2).  
23 Joint Commitment for Development (New Zealand-Tuvalu) (no date given). (On file with the author.)  
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1.6.  Structure 
 
The structure of the submission below reflects the two elements in terms of “levels” of 
the law. Part One focuses on the regime level. It is divided into three chapters, with chapters 2 
and 3 outlining international human rights law and international climate change law and their 
regulation of water respectively. This is followed by a consideration of the issue of regime level 
integration in chapter 4. Chapter 4 focuses on why integration of the two regimes is desirable, 
necessary, and possible. This is done by reflecting on the advantages of a human rights approach 
to climate change law, the conflicts which arise due to the separation of the two regimes, and 
the areas in which the two overlap which may enable integration of the two regimes. It 
concludes with a consideration the means of integration available under international law, by 
considering the feasibility and effectiveness of the adoption of a new treaty integrating the two 
systems as well as the issuance of authoritative interpretative guidance by the respective regime 
bodies. Part One concludes that integration of the two regimes is indeed desirable, necessary, 
and possible in theory, but in practice achieving such integration may prove challenging. 
Part Two focuses on the implementation level. It is divided into two chapters. Chapter 
5 outlines general information on Tuvalu, water scarcity there, how water scarcity is expected 
to be exacerbated by climate change in the Tuvaluan context, and how the situation can be 
understood from a human rights perspective. The chapter concludes that water is an ongoing 
problem in the state and this is expected to worsen as climate change impacts progress. This 
may quash the ability of the Tuvaluan state to meet the needs of the people in the state and 
consequently frustrate the realisation of the right to water, as it may become impossible for the 
state to satisfy. Chapter 6 goes on to consider what actions are being taken in view of securing 
water supply in the country. The activities of the Tuvaluan state itself are outlined, followed by 
the activities of external actors attempting to assist Tuvalu, of which there appears to be more. 
The question is posed as to whether regime level integration which was called for in Part One 
would actually alleviate the water scarcity experienced in Tuvalu. It is concluded that it likely 
would not as there is close to no implementation of either sets of laws in the Tuvaluan context, 
as the majority of water-related activities are undertaken pursuant to development 
commitments. However, given the benefits of human rights law in particular, the chapter goes 
on to consider what integration options are available at the implementation level and considers 
development alternatives by considering the right to development, the human rights based 
approach to development (HRBAD), and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  
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The thesis then concludes with a summary of the conclusions reached in Parts One and 
Two, discussing that integration appears to be warranted at the regime level as coherence is 
beneficial for the general project of international law. It is nevertheless recognised that the 
integration of the two regimes may not have a great impact on the enjoyment of water on the 
ground, at least not in Tuvalu. Rather other avenues of integration may be more appropriate, 
such as the integration of human rights and climate change into development work, which is 
done to a great extent in the SDGs. It is concluded that, while physical state disappearance of 
SIDS may not be far off should climate change impacts continue at their current rates possibly 
resulting in the disappearance akin to that of Atlantis, issues of resource scarcity may make the 
states uninhabitable before then, possibly leading to the abandonment of the islands and lost 
civilisations due to dispersion of the populations.  
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Part One. Regime Level 
 
 
Part One of the submission attempts to address the regime-level aspect of the 
research question. Water is regulated by both international human rights and climate change 
law at the regime level in attempts to secure water supply for individuals and/or overall 
populations. Nevertheless, as discussed in the introductory chapter above, there are serious 
concerns which arise in relation to water supply, as SIDS and other states struggle with pre-
existing water scarcity which is being and will be exacerbated by climate change. This section 
thus considers whether a closer integration between the two regimes would facilitate enjoyment 
of water by considering the issues that arise from the current approach of international law 
which separates human rights and climate change aspects of water into two distinct regimes.  
Water supply raises issues in terms of human rights due to the fundamental need for 
water in terms of human survival. Without access to safe and sufficient water, human life is 
seriously threatened both directly and indirectly. Directly, water supply is vital for the 
sustenance of life in terms of the need for direct consumption. Indirectly water supply impacts 
a number of other rights which have impacts on the sustenance of human life, such as the rights 
to health and food.24 For example, it is estimated that 502,000 diarrhoeal deaths each year can 
be attributed to the consumption of unclean drinking water.25 As such, it is clear that the need 
for access to safe freshwater is of fundamental importance for human survival and are thus of 
relevance to human rights law. The availability and quality of water are also undoubtedly 
environmental issues. Water is a natural resource which is inextricably linked to the 
environment. Climate change is expected to impact water supply due to changes in 
precipitation, drought, flood, sea level rise, and the increase in frequency and severity of 
extreme weather events.26 This will in turn have impacts on the enjoyment of water and the 
ability of states to meet human rights obligations under the right to water.  
State action in regard to climate change on the international scene is primarily 
governed by international climate change law whereas international human rights law regulates 
state action in regards to securing water supply for individuals in the respective states. In 
chapters 2 and 3 below how the human rights and climate change regimes address water supply 
                                                          
24 Nandita Singh, Introduction. in Nandita Singh (ed), The Human Right to Water: From Concept to 
Reality (Springer International Publishing 2016) 5. 
25 World Health Organization, 'Drinking-water: Fact sheet ' (World Health Organization, November 
2016)<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs391/en/> accessed 11 April 2017. 
26 IPCC Climate Change and Water (n 14). 
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will be outlined respectively through the adoption of a silo approach. Both sets of laws address 
water either directly or indirectly and thus run alongside each other when regulating state 
obligations. Yet, as will be discussed in the chapter 4, the regimes hardly recognise the existence 
of one other, let alone address how the co-existing obligations interact or should be interpreted 
so as to ensure coherence between the two regimes. This method of regulation creates both 
congruent and conflicting obligations under the respective laws. Chapter 4 will examine why 
integration is advantageous by examining the benefits of a human rights approach. This will be 
followed by a consideration of why integration is necessary as indicated by the norm conflicts 
that currently exist between the regimes. The chapter will then go on to consider areas of 
similarity or congruence which indicate that integration would be possible. It will be concluded 
that integration at the regime level is beneficial, necessary, and possible. Chapter 5 and 
consequently Part One will culminate with a consideration of how integration may be achieved 
at the regime level through consideration of the means available in international law.  
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Chapter 2. Legal Framework: The Right to Water in 
International Human Rights Law 
 
2.1. Introduction: The right to water: an overview  
 
While water is an essential component of human survivability, no explicit 
recognition of it as a free-standing right was included in the International Bill of Human 
Rights.27 As such, the right has had a somewhat unique development in international law as it 
has been developed through expert interpretation and has been incorporated explicitly in more 
recent treaty law.28 While the legal basis of the right is somewhat less clear than the explicit 
rights outlined in the Bill, it will be argued in this submission that there is legal basis for the 
right to water. This argument is based on the interpretation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR), the reports of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human 
rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, and reports and resolutions adopted by the Human 
Rights Council and the General Assembly. It is recognised that these sources are not hard law 
which binds states insofar as they do not constitute part of customary international law. 
Nevertheless, the sources are authoritative interpretations of hard law and stem from 
authoritative and influential bodies, as they all form part of the UN system who have been 
granted their mandate by state consent.29 These interpretations will be treated as instruments as 
soft law, as reports such as General Comments are often regarded as such.30 While no set 
definition of soft law exists under international law and it is beyond the scope of this submission 
to create one, soft law can generally be said to be somewhere between hard, binding law and 
                                                          
27 The collectivity of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 
A(III) (UDHR), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 999 UNTS 3 (ICESCR) is frequently 
referred to as the International Bill of Rights. See Christine Chinkin, Sources. in Moeckli and 
others (eds), International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 106. 
28 CEDAW (n 19) article 14(2)(h), CRC (n 19) article 24(2)(c), and Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3 article 28(2)(a). 
29 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was established and given its authoritative 
interpretation mandate by ECOSOC Res 1985/17 (28 May 1985) UN Doc E/RES/1985/17, the mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation was established by UN Human 
Rights Council Res16/2 (8 April 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/16/2, the Human Rights Council was established 
by the UNGA Res 60/251 (15 March 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/251, and the General Assembly was established 
by Chapter III and IV of the Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945) 1 UNTS XVI. 
30 See for example Kasey L McCall-Smith, Interpreting International Human Rights Standards: Treaty Body 
General Comments as a Chisel or a Hammer. In Lagoutte and others (eds), Tracing the Roles of Soft Law in 
Human Rights (Oxford Scholarship Online 2017) 33-34. 
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principles which are not binding whatsoever.31 Thus soft law has somewhat of a quasi-judicial 
nature.  
A few notes ought to be made regarding the position adopted below. For the 
purposes of this submission, the definition of the right to water adopted will be that adopted by 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its general comment No.15: “[t]he 
human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and 
affordable water for personal and domestic uses.”32 Further, “personal and domestic uses” 
includes “drinking, personal sanitation, washing of clothes, food preparation, personal and 
household hygiene”.33 Pursuant to this definition, the human right to water consists of a number 
of components, namely that water is available, accessible, and of a decent quality and safety.  
The right to water also addresses sanitation. These rights have been developed 
congruently through treaty interpretation due to their inter-relationship. Inadequate sanitation 
is the primary cause of pollution of water sources34 and correlated serious health 
consequences.35 Furthermore the right to water itself covers water for personal sanitation.36 
Despite this intimate link, the submission focuses primarily on the right to water in isolation 
from sanitation, as water supply in anticipated to be severely and more directly adversely 
impacted by climate change, whereas the impact on sanitation will likely be more corollary to 
other impacts, such as sea level rise leading to migration and consequent crowding. Thus, while 
the importance of the connection between water and sanitation is recognised, focus is placed on 
the right to water itself given as the existence of potable water on state territory will determine 
the inhabitability to a degree which is not comparable to the existence of sanitation 
infrastructure or supplies.  
Finally an additional element forms a vital component of all aspects of the right, but 
will not be outlined individually as it pervades all the components. This element is that of non-
discrimination and equality. Non-discrimination and equality is a cornerstone of rights 
                                                          
31 For further discussion of the definition and scope of soft law generally, please see Stephanié Lagoutte and 
others (eds), Tracing the Roles of Soft Law in Human Rights (Oxford Scholarship Online 2017). 
32 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment No.15: The right to water (arts. 
11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (20 January 2003) UN Doc 
E/C.12/2002/11 para 2. 
33 UN Human Rights Council ‘Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural rights, including the right to development: Report of the independent expert on the issue of human 
rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water, Catarina de Albuquerque’ (1 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/24 para 34. 
34 General Comment No.15 (n 32) para 1. 
35 Albuquerque report 2009 (n 33) para 33.  
36 ibid para 34. 
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enjoyment.37 The right to water is universal and thus applies equally to everyone without 
discrimination.38 As such states have an obligation to ensure that there is no discrimination in 
the enjoyment of the right to water. A number of sub-obligations flow from the overall 
obligation, such as allocating appropriate resources to prevent covert discrimination.39 The 
obligation to protect vulnerable inhabitants exists at all times, even when states experience 
severe limitations on available resources.40 Furthermore, states must “provide those who do not 
have sufficient means with the necessary water and water facilities and to prevent any 
discrimination on internationally prohibited grounds in the provision of water and water 
services.”41 Persons living in rural and deprived urban settings can be particularly 
disadvantaged when it comes to water supply and as such states should also pay particular 
attention to meeting their needs. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
particularly stresses that “no household should be denied the right to water on the grounds of 
their housing or land status”.42 These obligations ought to be born in mind when reading the 
submission below as they form part of the components and obligations,43 as state action taken 
to address the components and obligations  outlined below can lead to overt or covert 
discrimination and thus infringes on the aforementioned obligations, without necessarily 
infringing the aspects as detailed below.   
 
 
2.2.  Legal basis of the right to water in international human rights law  
 
The right to water was not one of the rights explicitly included in the International 
Bill of Human Rights. Regardless of the reasoning behind the omission, it became clear that 
freshwater supply was vital for the realisation of a number of the rights explicitly included in 
the Bill such as the right to life44 and an adequate standard of living.45 The importance of water 
as a human right was first recognised in the Action Plan adopted at the Mar del Plata Conference 
in 1977, which explicitly recognised that “all peoples…have the right to have access to drinking 
                                                          
37 Daniel Moeckli, Equality and Non-Discrimination. in Moeckli and others (eds), International Human Rights 
Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 189. 
38 Singh (n 24) 3. 
39 General Comment 15 (n 32) para 14. 
40 ibid para 13. 
41 ibid para 15. 
42 ibid para 16(c).  
43 Albuquerque handbook (n 20) 27. 
44 ICCPR (n 27) article 6. 
45 ICESCR (n 19) article 11. 
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water in quantities and of a quality equal to their basic needs”.46 This recognition was followed 
by explicit acknowledgement of water as a human right in the Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women47 (CEDAW) in 1979, the Convention on the 
Rights of Child48 (CRC) in 1989, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities49 (CRPD) in 2006. As such, the right was granted solid legal basis under a number 
of international and relatively widely ratified treaties, 50 recognised either as a free-standing 
right or as an integral component of other rights.  
The explicit recognition of the right to water in the aforementioned treaties were 
significant milestones in the life of water as a human right. However, the treaties in which the 
right was explicitly recognised cover only a limited set of beneficiaries each. Thus, international 
treaty law only explicitly recognised the human right to water for women, children, and persons 
with disabilities, under the respective conventions. This limitation has been addressed through 
the interpretation of the ICESCR or alternate specific rights by authoritative legal bodies. The 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has been active in developing the 
interpretation of the right to health under article 12 of the ICESCR as containing a right to 
water. In its general comment No. 14 the Committee stated that “the right to health [as defined 
in article 12(1)] embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in 
which people can lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health, such 
as … access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation”.51 Moreover the Committee 
found that not only does access to safe and potable water form an integral part of the overall 
right to health, but it also forms a part of the requirement that “health facilities, goods and 
services must also be scientifically an medically appropriate and of good quality”.52 The 
Committee subsequently went further and recognised the human right to water as a free-
standing right, interlinked with but also independent from other human rights. In its general 
comment No. 15 the Committee referred to “the human right to water” explicitly as a free-
standing, independent human right, but also as “indispensable for leading a life in human 
dignity … [and] a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights”.53 The Committee went 
                                                          
46 UN Water Conference ‘Mar Del Plata Action Plan’ (14-25 March 1977) UN Doc E/CONF.70/29.   
47 CEDAW (n 19) article 14(2)(h). 
48 CRC (n 19) article 24(2)(c).  
49 CRPD (n 28) article 28(2)(a). 
50 Ratification status of the three treaties: 189 ratifications of CEDAW (n 19), 196 ratifications of the CRC (n 
19), and 173 ratifications of the CRPD (n28). 
51 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12)’ (11 August 2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 para 4. 
52 ibid para 4. 
53 General Comment 15 (n 32) para 1. 
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on to define the right to water as entitling everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically 
accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses”.54 It also specified that an 
“adequate amount of safe water is necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the 
risk of water-related disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal and domestic 
hygienic requirements”.55 In light of this the Committee acknowledged the right to water’s 
intricate link with the rights to health, adequate housing and food, and particularly life and 
human dignity.56 The details of the right in terms of components and obligations of the right as 
specified by the Committee will be examined in further detail in the subsections below.  
A number of other authorities followed suit in recognising and an analysing the 
existence of the right to water and its content under international human rights law. The UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, for example, issued a report outlining the content and 
scope of human rights obligations related to safe drinking water under international human 
rights instruments in 2007.57 In the report, the Commissioner found that “specific obligations 
in relation to access to safe drinking water and sanitation have been increasingly and explicitly 
recognized in core human rights treaties, mainly as part of the right to an adequate standard of 
living and the right to health”.58 Moreover the Commissioner held that access to safe drinking 
water is inextricably related to the right to life under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)59 due to the obligation of states to adopt positive measures to “increase 
life expectancy and eliminate malnutrition and epidemics”.60 Given that “dirty water, poor 
hygiene and lack of basic sanitation” has a severe impact on human life,61 access to water cannot 
be divorced from the obligations under the right to life. The Commissioner further found that 
access to safe drinking water formed part of the rights to food and adequate housing.62  
The human right to water was subsequently explicitly recognised by two major UN 
bodies in 2010. In July 2010 the General Assembly adopted a resolution explicitly recognising 
“the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for 
the full enjoyment of life and all human rights”.63 Shortly thereafter, in October 2010, the 
                                                          
54 ibid para 2. 
55 ibid para 2. 
56 ibid para 3. 
57 UN Human Rights Council ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the scope 
and content of the relevant human rights obligations related to equitable access to safe drinking water and 
sanitation under international human rights instruments’ (16 August 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/6/3. 
58 ibid para 6. 
59 ICCPR (n 27) article 6. 
60 High Commissioner 2007 (n 57) para 6. 
61 ibid para7. 
62 ibid para 9-10. 
63 UNGA Res 64/292 (3 August 2010) UN Doc A/RES/64/292 para 1. 
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Human Rights Council adopted a resolution affirming “that the human right to safe drinking 
water and sanitation is derived from the right to an adequate standard of living and inextricably 
related to the right to highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, as well as the 
right to life and human dignity”.64 These resolutions were major milestones, as two bodies with 
significant influence in international human rights law explicitly recognised the existence of 
water as a right. The recognition of water as a human right took another significant leap forward 
in 2011 with the establishment of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights 
to safe drinking water and sanitation.65 
 
 
2.3.  Components of the right to water  
 
2.3.1. Overview of the content of the right to water  
 
 This subsection will outline the core components of the right to water. The 
components are highlighted by the definition adopted of the right, namely that the “human right 
to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable 
water for personal and domestic uses”.66 This is the selected definition for the present 
submission for two reasons. Firstly, it is the most comprehensive definition of the ones 
considered and as such provide the most detail in terms of state adherence. Secondly, the 
CESCR aims to secure the right to water for all whereas the CEDAW, CRC, and CRPD all have 
specified groups of beneficiaries and as such their definitions focus on discrimination or 
equality issues which may not be relevant to all persons who experience water scarcity under 
climate change impacts. The meaning of “personal and domestic uses” is considered to include 
“drinking, personal sanitation, washing of clothes, food preparation, personal and household 
hygiene”.67 
 
 
 
                                                          
64 UN Human Rights Council Res 15/9 (6 October 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/9 para 3. 
65 UN Human Rights Council Res 16/2 (8 April 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/16/2. 
66 General Comment 15 (n 32) para 2. 
67 Albuquerque report 2009 (n 33) para 34. 
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2.3.2.  Availability  
 
Availability of water primarily concerns the existence, quantity, and continuity of 
water. The availability requirement specifies that water supply is sufficient and continuous to 
cover each person’s personal and domestic uses.68 This does not guarantee an unlimited amount 
of water,69 but must be sufficient so as to meet the person’s basic needs and sustain life.70 While 
the exact quantity of water guaranteed per person is not specified in the documents issued by 
the authoritative bodies, they tend to rely on the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) 
Guidelines for Drinking Water.71 The Guidelines specify that 50-100 litres of water per person 
per day is the amount necessary to ensure satisfaction of all aspects of personal and domestic 
use, while 100-200 litres is optimal and 20 litres is the lowest level of access which can still 
maintain life but raises issues in regards to health due to limitations placed on hygiene.72 The 
availability requirement has implications both for the present and future provision of water.73 
The actions taken by states to ensure the availability of water now must not create an inability 
to fulfil the availability requirement in the future and as such states should assess the impact of 
their actions upon water availability and issues such as climate changes.74 As such the 
availability aspect depends both on the environment, as the presence of water is subject to the 
process of the natural water cycle, and on state action, as they can work with the provision of 
water to ensure optimal availability and do so in a sustainable manner so as to avoid inhibiting 
future water availability.   
 
2.3.3.  Accessibility 
 
The accessibility component can be divided into three sub-components, namely 
equitable accessibility, physical accessibility, and economic accessibility. The content of each 
constituent will be outlined in turn below. It is noteworthy that informational accessibility also 
forms part of the component. This sub-component can be summarized as including “the right 
to seek, receive and impart information concerning water issues”.75 Given that informational 
                                                          
68 Singh (n 24) 3-4, CESCR General Comment 15 (n 32) para 12(a). 
69 High Commissioner 2007 (n 57) para 15. 
70 Singh (n 24) 3-4. 
71 World Health Organization, Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality (4th edn, World Health 
Organization 2011). In reports issued before 2011, older editions of the Guidelines were used.  
72 ibid 84, High Commissioner 2007 (n 57) para 15. 
73 Albuquerque handbook (n 20) 33. 
74 General Comment 15 (n 32) para 28. 
75 ibid para 12(c)(iv). 
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accessibility is not heavily impacted by climate change, this sub-component is not of particular 
relevance for the purposes of this submission and will consequently not be considered any 
further.   
Equitable accessibility essentially deals with equality and non-discrimination in 
access to water.76 In order for the right to water to be realized, “water and water facilities and 
services must be accessible to all”.77 Equitable access covers both de jure and de facto 
discrimination and demands that no group is excluded from water access.78 Further, there 
should be no disproportionate expense burden for poorer households as compared to richer 
households in regards to accessing water.79 The principle also dictates that persons who face 
discrimination in their access to water or have no such access should be prioritised when 
distributing public resources.80  
Physical accessibility addresses the ability of beneficiaries to access water in 
practical terms, such as proximity to the nearest water collection point and the safety in 
accessing this point. This aspect is fundamental to the enjoyment of the right to water, as the 
level of cumbersomeness and danger in collecting water will determine the quantity of water 
collected.81 The High Commissioner for Human Rights stresses that access to safe drinking 
water “should be provided within or in close proximity to the home in a way that provides 
regular water and prevents excessive collection time”,82 while the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights states that “water, and adequate water facilities and services, must 
be within safe physical reach for all sections of the population” and stresses that “[p]hysical 
security should not be threatened during access to water facilities and services”.83 Moreover the 
infrastructure of water facilities must be geared towards accessibility so as to avoid creating 
barriers for certain groups such as children or persons with disabilities.84  
Economic accessibility addresses the issue of the affordability of water. This sub-
component demands that water is affordable for all and that no one should be denied the 
realisation of the right to water due to an inability to pay for the costs associated with water 
supply.85 This does not imply that states must provide water free of charge but water must be 
                                                          
76 High Commissioner 2007 (n 57) para 22. 
77 General Comment 15 (n 32) para 12(c)(iii). 
78 High Commissioner 2007 (n 57) para 23-24. 
79 General Comment 15 (n 32) para 27. 
80 High Commissioner 2007 (n 57) para 24. 
81 Albuquerque handbook (n 20) 34. 
82 High Commissioner 2007 (n 57) para 25. 
83 General Comment 15 (n 32) para 12(c)(i). 
84 Albuquerque handbook (n 20) 34. 
85 High Commissioner 2007 (n 57) para 28, Singh (n 24) 5. 
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affordable and water cost must not inhibit the beneficiaries’ opportunity to enjoy other human 
rights.86 States are obliged take action to ensure the affordability of water.87 The affordability 
requirement addresses both direct and indirect costs of water access,88 for example if water 
must be boiled prior to consumption then wood or fuel for burning must also be affordable. 
Affordability of water is of particular concern to poorer members of society and as such there 
should be no disproportionate expense burden for poorer households as compared to richer 
households in regards to accessing water.89 In order to ensure that poorer parts of the population 
have their right to water realised, states can exempt them from paying for the water as needed 
without violating the principle of non-discrimination.90 
 
2.3.4. Quality and safety 
 
Should the quality and safety of water component not be met, serious risks would 
be posed to the health and lives of users and the general public.91 The quality and safety of 
water is defined as “water that does not represent any significant risk to health over a lifetime 
of consumption”.92 The water must additionally be free from micro-organisms, chemical 
substances, and radiological hazards that may threaten human health.93 No universal 
quantifiable standard has been adopted under international human rights law in regard to water 
quality and safety, but the WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality are often referenced as 
a baseline.94 Water quality and safety is also intricately linked with adequate sanitation, as 
failure to ensure this is known to result in widespread water pollution and as such protection of 
water quality demands adequate sanitation systems.95 The quality and safety of water is thus 
measurable in terms of what the water must be free from, yet states ultimately determine 
themselves what the national standards for drinking water are or should be.96 Water must also 
be acceptable in terms of colour, odour, and taste as this will ensure the use of safe water 
sources.97 Furthermore the facilities and services must be socially and culturally acceptable to 
                                                          
86 Albuquerque handbook (n 20) 35, High Commissioner 2007 (n 57) para 28. 
87 A number of examples are provided in para 27 General Comment 15 (n 32). 
88 ibid para 12(c)(ii). 
89 ibid para 27. 
90 Singh (n 24) 5. 
91 Albuquerque handbook (n 20) 35. 
92 High Commissioner 2007 (n 57) para 17. 
93 ibid para 12(b) and 17 and Albuquerque handbook (n 20) 35. 
94 Singh (n 24) 4, High Commissioner 2007 (n 57) para 17. 
95 Singh (n 24) 4. 
96 ibid 4. 
97 ibid, High Commissioner 2007 (n 57) para 12(b), and Albuquerque handbook (n 20) 35.  
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ensure that persons actually use the facilities and services in place.98 The acceptability of 
services and facilities cannot be measured the way quality can and a uniform approach cannot 
be adopted in regards to all societies, but must be tailored to the needs of the community in 
question depending on their social and cultural practices.  
 
 
2.4. State obligations under the right to water  
 
2.4.1. General legal obligations 
 
Human rights represent a vertical relationship between the state and the individual 
in which the individual is the rights-holder and the state is the duty-bearer.99 By virtue of this 
relationship individuals are entitled to having their rights realised by the state. The right to water 
contains a few obligations which are immediately applicable.100 This set of obligations can be 
divided into three obligations in particular. Firstly, states have the obligation to guarantee that 
exercise of the right will be done without discrimination of any sort.101 Secondly, states have a 
duty to take steps towards realisation of the right.102 The realisation of the right to water is 
subject to resource constraints and as such it is acknowledged that this right is to be realised 
progressively.103 The recognition and acceptance of the need for progressive realisation poses 
the risk of states taking no action and legitimising this by arguing that there is no immediacy 
inherent in the right and corresponding obligation. The obligation to take steps circumvents that 
possibility, as it demands that some action must be taken in view of realising the right to water 
fully. States must also aim to move expeditiously and effectively in taking steps aimed at rights 
realisation,104 which ensures that arbitrary steps are not taken merely to pacify the international 
community. Finally, there is a duty of non-retrogression inherent in the right to water.105 As 
such, any progress made is to be maintained and deliberate reversal of the progress will be 
presumed contrary to the right to water.  
                                                          
98 Albuquerque handbook (n 20) 36. 
99 James W Nickel and David A Reidy, Philosophy. in Moeckli and others (eds), International Human Rights 
Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 41. 
100 General Comment 14 (n 51) para 30-32. 
101 General Comment 15 (n 32) para 17. 
102 ibid para 17. 
103 ibid para 17. 
104 ibid para 18. 
105 ibid para 19. 
22 
 
Core obligations of the right to water must always be respected, even under very 
strenuous circumstances such as disaster.106 The core obligations include the following three 
considerations according to the CESCR. Firstly, availability of the minimum amount of 
essential water to prevent disease must be ensured.107 Secondly, non-discrimination must be 
ensured in relation to access to water and corresponding services and facilities.108 In order to 
protect vulnerable groups, states must adopt low-cost targeted water programmes.109 States 
must also monitor the realisation of the right.110 Finally, ensuring an adequate supply of safe 
and potable water forms a core obligation of the right to health111 and as such the core 
obligations of the right to water will also form part of the core obligations of the right to health. 
In relation to disaster specifically, such as those which are more likely to occur more frequently 
in SIDS as a result of climate change, it has been said that temporary camps and shelters and 
permanent relocation sites must have “adequate water … facilities, including water pumps”.112 
 
2.4.2. Respect 
 
 The obligation to respect is a negative obligation. Individuals must have their 
rights respected, which requires that states do not interfere with rights enjoyment. In relation to 
the right to water this entails that states “may not prevent people from enjoying their human 
rights to water”.113 As such, states must not interfere, directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment 
of the right.114 For example, states may not directly diminish or pollute water115 or engage in 
any activity that pollutes water.116 Failure to comply with the obligation to respect the right to 
water will as such stem from action rather than inaction.  
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2.4.3. Protect 
 
 The obligation to protect the right to water is a positive obligation which entails 
ensuring that third parties do not interfere with the enjoyment of the right in any way.117 This 
obligation can be of particular importance for the right to water, should the national water 
supply be managed by private actors. In such an instance states must ensure that the private 
supplier provides “equal, affordable, and [physically accessible] sufficient, safe and acceptable 
water”.118 A number of specific obligations exist,119 but of particular importance for the 
purposes of this submission is that states must ensure that third parties do not pollute water 
resources.120 In order to satisfy the obligation to protect the right to water states must adopt 
“necessary and effective legislative and other measures to restrain [third party interference]”.121 
Thus in order to comply with their obligations states must in fact take positive action.  
 
2.4.4. Fulfil 
 
 The obligation to fulfil the right water is a positive one. Generally, the obligation 
can be said to demand that states ensure that conditions are in place which allow everyone to 
enjoy the right to water.122 In order to create such conditions states must adopt “legislative, 
administrative, policies, programmes, and [other measures]”.123 The obligation to fulfil can be 
divided into three categories, namely the obligations to facilitate, promote, and provide. Each 
form of obligation requires distinct, but related positive action. The obligation to facilitate the 
right to water can be expressed as a requirement upon the state to “take positive measures to 
assist individuals [and communities] to access safe drinking water”.124 In order to satisfy the 
obligation to promote, states must “take steps to ensure that there is appropriate education 
concerning the hygienic use of water, protection of water sources and methods to minimize 
water wastage”.125 While the obligation to fulfil generally does not require that states provide 
services directly,126 there is an exception when individuals are unable to access safe drinking 
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water for reasons beyond their control. In such cases, states have an obligation to provide access 
to safe drinking water by using the means at their disposal.127 The obligation to fulfil can 
consequently be considered the obligation owed by states to ensure that there is some form of 
access to water, while the obligations to protect and respect concern the prevention of 
interferences with pre-existing enjoyment.  
 
2.4.5. Obligations of an extra-territorial nature  
 
 The existence of extra-territorial obligations in international human rights law has 
traditionally garnered great debate.128 The bodies who explicitly recognised the right to water 
that have been under consideration in the present submission have nevertheless detailed that 
certain obligations do exist for states that are applicable beyond their territorial borders.129 
Whether these obligations can indeed be said to have legal validity is beyond the scope of this 
submission and as such the authority of the bodies in question will be relied upon as definitive 
statements of the law, all the while being mindful of the uncertainty surrounding this legal area. 
 The obligations discussed below primarily apply to economically developed 
states who are to assist developing states.130 Generally, the extra-territorial obligations of states 
in relation to the right to water can be derived from the obligation to participate in international 
cooperation and assistance, specified in article 2(1), 11(1) and 23 of the ICESCR.131 All three 
obligations (respect, protect, and fulfil) are said to apply extraterritorially. In relation to the 
obligation to respect the right to water, states must “refrain from actions that interfere, directly 
or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to water in other countries”.132 States must also 
refrain from acting within its own jurisdiction in a way that will hamper the ability of other 
states to realise the right to water within their own jurisdictions.133 Regarding the obligation to 
protect, states must “prevent third parties … from violating the human rights to water and 
sanitation in other countries”, when those third parties are within the jurisdiction of the state 
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concerned.134 In relation to the obligation to fulfil, states are primarily required to facilitate the 
right to water, through inter alia “provision of water resources, financial and technical 
assistance, and [providing] the necessary aid when required”.135 
 States also have extra-territorial obligations in disaster scenarios. In such 
situations affected states have a duty to seek assistance as a component of the satisfaction of 
human rights obligations.136 States not affected have a right to provide assistance to the affected 
state(s).137 In such scenarios when states offer relief assistance for disasters and emergencies 
priority should be given to Covenant rights, including the right to water consistently with human 
rights standards.138 Extra-territorial obligations also extend to state action in their conduct in 
the international sphere. When adopting international agreements or acting in international 
financial institutions states must ensure that the right to water is taken into account and not 
adversely impacted by any action taken.139 States are also encouraged to pursue the adoption of 
further international agreements securing the right to water.140 The right to water thus seems to 
call for a rights based approach to international action, demanding positive action in ensuring 
that rights are not interfered while also actively assisting states who need such assistance in 
realising the right to water for those within their jurisdiction.  
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Chapter 3. Legal Framework: Water in International Climate 
Change Law 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Water supply is intricately and inextricably connected to climate change. Climate 
change is expected to alter rainfall patterns and lead to drought or flooding, an increase in 
incidents and severity of extreme weather events, and sea level rise.141 These will undoubtedly 
affect the enjoyment of human rights, particularly in regards to the right to water in SIDS. The 
international community elected to address the climate change issue collectively through 
adoption of climate change-specific legal instruments. These instruments and their provisions 
and principles will be the focus of the present chapter. In order to examine the aspects of 
international climate change law relevant to the present submission the remainder of the chapter 
is divided into four subsections. These sections will provide an overview of international 
climate change law, the general principles of the regime, and what provisions exist in relation 
to water specifically as well as explicit provisions on small island states in the relevant 
instruments respectively.  
 International climate change law generally outlines mitigation commitments and 
all mitigation of climate change will also mitigate adverse impacts on water supply. Climate 
change is expected to cause changes in weather which impacts water quantity due to less 
rainfall, as well as causing sea level rise and flooding which causes issues in regards to water 
quality due to, inter alia, salinity intrusion. Consequently any mitigation of climate change will 
also lessen the likelihood of those impacts occurring, which will in turn ensure that water supply 
is not diminished. As such, for the purposes of conciseness, all mitigation efforts detailed by 
the climate change regime will not be included in this chapter. Rather, only the particular 
aspects of the climate change regime relevant to the issue of water supply on small island states 
will be incorporated. This includes explicit reference to water and small island states but also 
the general principles of international climate change law as these include human dimensions 
and are as such relevant to the analysis in subsequent chapters. 
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3.2. International climate change law: an overview 
 
International climate change law is comprised primarily of three key instruments, 
namely the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or FCCC), 
the Kyoto Protocol,142 and the Paris Agreement.143 These instruments will be those considered 
for the purposes of this submission as they form the basis of international climate change law. 
The instruments do not regulate a vertical relationship between state and individual like human 
rights law, but rather set out state obligations owed due to the principle pacta sunt servanda. 
The obligations are voluntary commitments that states have accepted by virtue of consent, 
represented by signing and ratifying the treaties. These instruments are hard law as they contain 
binding obligations on their state parties. 144  
The recognition of the importance of addressing climate change on a global level 
led to the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992. The Convention has attracted massive ratification, 
with 195 state parties. As indicated by its name, the Convention sets out a framework within 
which climate change action is to operate. The Convention generally sets out the long-term 
vision for international action in relation to climate change and its adverse impacts. The 
objective is identified in article 2 of the Convention as the “stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system”.145 This goal is also the ultimate goal of any related 
instruments, 146 and it follows, the ultimate goal for any action taken under the international 
climate change law regime. Generally the Convention does not set specific obligations in terms 
of detailed state action. Article 4 of the Convention does outline state obligations, but these are 
obligations of effort, not result.147 It has been argued that the Convention adopts a “soft” 
approach to international law, in that it encourages cooperation among state parties rather than 
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coercing states into taking particular action through threats of sanction.148 While not specifying 
state obligations in regards to mitigation measures, the Convention does establish general 
principles of the regime.149 The general principles, particularly the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC) outlined in Article 3(1) 
FCCC, are of particular importance as they form the basis for all future action within the climate 
change regime. These principles will be considered in further detail in subsection 3.3. below.  
The FCCC also establishes a regime infrastructure in terms of governing bodies.150 
The primary body is the Conference of Parties (COP), established by article 7 of the 
Convention. The COP has the authority to monitor Convention implementation by the state 
parties151 and provides a discussion forum on the topic of climate change,152 which can lead to 
development of amendments and protocols to the Convention.153 The COP can take decisions 
which are not legally binding on the state parties but rather represent expressions of the will of 
the parties. The decisions are, however, backed by benefits to which parties are given access 
upon compliance with decisions.154 The COP also has authority over the Framework’s financial 
mechanism, the Global Environment Facility, in terms of determining the Facility’s “policies, 
programme priorities, and eligibility criteria”.155   
Following the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted 
in 1997. The Protocol was the predecessor to the Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015, and its 
application period has accordingly expired.156 While the Protocol no longer applies, a brief 
overview of the instrument will be provided as it was a significant step in the development of 
climate change law, given that it was the first set of legally binding obligations adopted within 
the regime. Only 40 states accepted binding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions constraints and 
this excluded major emitting countries such as China, India, and the US.157 The Protocol was 
far more detailed in terms of legally binding state obligations to reduce emission of GHGs than 
the UNFCCC. States were subjected to differentiated obligations depending on their 
categorisation as a developed or developing country, based on the CBDRRC principle 
established in the Framework Convention. Developed states were required to meet emissions 
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reduction targets and subjected to specific obligations in view of meeting those targets within 
a particular timeframe, whereas developing states are placed under no obligation to meet 
emission reduction targets.158 The Protocol further required a group of states, the Annex II 
countries,159 to provide financial support to developing countries with the view of reducing 
emissions there.160 The Kyoto Protocol can be said to reflect a “hard” approach to climate 
change, in that Kyoto was prescriptive and contains sanctions for failure to fulfil obligations.161 
The Protocol was backed by a compliance mechanism, unlike the FCCC, which determines the 
consequences for failure to fulfil obligations.162 Pursuant to the achievement of emission 
reduction targets, the Kyoto Protocol established flexibility mechanisms by establishing 
emissions trading,163 joint implementation,164 and the clean development mechanism.165 Thus, 
the Protocol was far more advanced in terms of detail in state obligations than the Framework 
Convention, although state acceptance of those obligations was precarious.  
The Paris Agreement is the Kyoto Protocol’s successor. It was adopted in 2015 and 
is the most recent instrument to be considered in the present subsection. The Agreement has 
been ratified by 160 parties as of yet and has as such entered into force, pursuant to the 
requirements of article 21 of the Agreement.166 The Agreement, like the Kyoto Protocol, sets 
legally binding obligations on state parties, within the framework established by the UNFCCC. 
The Agreement identifies its aim as limiting the increase of the global average temperature to 
1.5°C, with an increase of 2°C as the absolute upper limit of warming (comparative to the pre-
industrial average global temperature).167 This type of target setting represents a shift away 
from the approach adopted in the Kyoto Protocol, where no temperature increase limitation was 
included.168 In order to ensure the limitation of the temperature increase, states have not been 
assigned particular emissions reductions within the Agreement, but were instead asked to 
submit intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs). The INDCs detail the state 
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parties commitments to reduce emissions169 within their national contexts in a comprehensive 
manner. These INDCs are either unconditional or conditional upon financial and/or 
technological assistance. Generally, developing states tended to submit conditional INDCs.170 
INDCs are subject to updating, as new commitments in the form of INDCs are to be submitted 
to the COP every five years.171 In terms of monitoring and continuity mechanisms, the 
Agreement implements a global stocktake to be carried out by the COP.172 The stocktake 
encompasses submission of reports by states on their implementation progress and COP 
monitoring of such progress. Moreover the state parties committed themselves to not only 
undertaking mitigation action, but also adaptation action173 and assistance for vulnerable 
states.174 The details on adaptation are far more extensive than those in the Kyoto Protocol, 
where mitigation appeared to be the primary focus. Accordingly the Paris Agreement, while 
adopting a similar “hard” approach to climate change as that adopted in Kyoto, it appears to 
adopt an entirely different approach to the  state obligations imposed, as targets are not assigned 
but rather voluntarily proposed and undertaken by the states themselves, which become legally 
binding under the Agreement.  
 
 
3.3. General principles of international climate  change law 
 
 International climate change law contains several principles which may form or 
impact state obligations in relation to water and/or small island states. The principles stem from 
the instruments discussed above, yet are not defined in the treaties. In order to provide clear 
definition of the general principles of climate change law, ILA studied the content of the 
principles as addressed by the instruments themselves but also in COP decisions and smaller 
climate change agreements as well as scholarly writings on the content of the principles.175 The 
study led to the adoption of a number of draft articles outlining the content of the general 
principles. These principles are not legally binding upon states but given the comprehensive 
nature of the study conducted, the conclusions drawn by the ILA will be considered 
authoritative here. The ILA outlines eight principles integral to the climate change regime. Not 
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all the principles are of great or direct relevance to water supply, small island states, or human 
rights and as such six selected principles will be considered below as they will inform the 
content of subsequent chapter in terms of parallels and conflicts between the international 
human rights and climate change regimes.  
 
3.3.1.  Equity 
 
 The principle of equity originates from article 3(1) of the UNFCCC, which 
establishes burden sharing for the protection of the climate system on the basis of equity and 
CBDRRC. The ILA identifies the notion of equity as one of inter-generational equity, 
stipulating that the present generation’s access to sustainable development and the future 
generation’s access to the Earth’s resources must be balanced.176 The content of the notion is 
based on the sustainable development principle, which demands that development for the 
present generation must not hamper the needs of future generations being met.177 The ILA 
argues that the explicit reference to future generations in the FCCC indicates that those 
generations have a “legitimate expectation of equitable access to planetary resources” and when 
present generations limit those resources through climate change those legitimate expectations 
are quashed.178 Thus in order to guarantee equity, the international community must mitigate 
the adverse impacts of climate change.179  
 When applying the principle of equity to water supply, it is clear that the issue of 
water supply has inter-generational concerns. The development of past generations which has 
resulted in climate change has already had adverse impact on the availability of fresh water for 
present generations, due to, inter alia, the change in rainfall patterns which is expected to 
continue. Given that water is an Earthly resource and is clearly impacted by climate change, the 
issue of water supply is undoubtedly linked with the notion of equity as defined by the ILA.  
 
3.3.2.  Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities  
 
 The principle of CBDRRC can be found in FCCC article 3(1), the preambles of 
the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, and in article 2(2) of the Paris Agreement. It has been 
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considered a “major expression of equity in the climate change regime”.180 The combination of 
the equity and CBDRRC principles forms the basis for the burden sharing that pervades the 
climate change regime. The instruments contain no definition of the principle but the wording 
suggests that climate change is the common responsibility of the international community but 
that responsibility should be disaggregated between states according to their contribution to the 
problem and their capacity to respond.181 The principle has been used as the basis for developing 
states to argue for lenient treatment due to their limited contribution to the problem whereas 
developed states promulgate the idea that the interpretation of the principle must be dynamic 
and done in light of changing national circumstances.182 The lack of consensus on the content 
of the principle is problematic, as all present and future obligations within the regime must 
comply with the requirements of CBDRRC in order to satisfy the Convention requirements 
under article 3(1).183 The ILA defines the principle through a set of obligations, namely to 
cooperate in achieving the FCCC objective and developing an equitable and effective 
framework to do so,184 and through specifying the grounds for the principle. The grounds are 
identified as the differences in contribution to climate change, capabilities, economic resources, 
and other national circumstances.185 Due to these differences, developed states are to adopt 
more stringent mitigation commitments and to assist developing states, particularly small island 
states, in their adaptation efforts,186 while developing states, particularly small island states, are 
to benefit from assistance and are subject to less stringent mitigation requirements.187 The 
commitments are however, not static. As developing states develop and their capabilities 
increase, possibly along with increase in contribution to the problem, their obligations will alter 
as when differentiation between states disappears, so should the differentiated obligations.188 
  
3.3.3. Special circumstances and vulnerability  
 
 Articles 4(4) and 4(8) of the UNFCCC explicitly recognise that certain countries 
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, such as small island 
                                                          
180 ibid 341.  
181 Carlane (n 144) 15.  
182 Rajamani (n 144) 209. 
183 ILA Principles (n 15) 345. 
184 ibid Draft Article 5(2). 
185 ibid Draft Article 5(3). 
186 ibid Draft Article 5(3)(a). 
187 ibid Draft Article 5(3)(b). 
188 ibid Draft Article 5(4) and corresponding commentary 350-351. 
33 
 
(developing) states and least developed states. The ILA thus adopted a draft article enunciating 
the following obligation: “States shall take full account of the special circumstances and needs 
of developing countries particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, specifically but 
not limited to the Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States.”189 The 
remainder of the paragraphs of the draft article articulate the rights of vulnerable states to less 
stringent climate change obligations and rights to assistance from develop states, reflecting the 
obligations under CBDRRC discussed in the previous subsection.  
 
3.3.4.  Prevention and precaution 
 
 The principle of prevention stems from customary international law190 whereas 
precaution stems from the instruments of international climate change law.191 Prevention 
obliges states to ensure that “activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, 
including damage through climate change”.192 This definition of the principle is deemed a well-
established principle of customary international environmental law and failure to satisfy this 
obligation gives rise to state responsibility for the action, which can be disaggregated between 
multiple responsible states where the damage is serious or irreversible.193 The obligation 
contains a due diligence sub-obligation to prevent damage caused by climate change, 
particularly through the adoption of GHG emission reduction measures and adaptation 
measures.194  
 Precaution, while related to prevention, contains a different set of obligations. The 
obligation exists where “there is a reasonably foreseeable threat of serious or irreversible 
damage, including serious or irreversible damage to States vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change, measures to anticipate, prevent or adapt to climate change shall be taken by States 
without waiting for conclusive scientific proof of that damage”.195 A threat will be deemed 
“reasonably foreseeable” when there are “plausible indications of potential risks”, even when 
there is insufficient scientific evidence to prove such risks.196 The notion of “serious or 
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irreversible damage” is not exhaustively defined but includes, inter alia, loss of human life and 
substantial property damage.197 The precaution principle thus operates in advance of 
prevention, as it is anticipatory in nature with lower demands of scientific certainty.198 Where 
the conditions of precaution are satisfied, states must take proactive measures to mitigate 
anthropogenic climate change.199  
 The chain of causation between climate change and water scarcity, while backed 
by scientific evidence, is a loose one and as such may not satisfy the requirements to trigger 
prevention obligations. The precautionary principle, however, demands that states take positive 
action to quash serious threats stemming for their actions through mitigation measures. The 
depletion of water resources in small island states may constitute serious damage, given the 
severe implications it has on human health and consequently the sustenance of human life. As 
such, major emitting states can be said to owe an obligation to SIDS and other affected states 
to mitigate their climate impact in view of securing water supply under international climate 
change law.  
 
3.3.5. International cooperation 
 
 The international climate change regime contains an obligation of international 
cooperation derived from the notion that climate change is a common concern of humankind200 
and constitutes a general principle of international law201 whereby states are to “cooperate with 
each other and competent international organisations in good faith to address climate change 
and its adverse effects”.202 This cooperation is to be undertaken where states are unable to 
address an issue, such as climate change, on their own.203 When acting in international 
cooperation states must do so in good faith, in a manner that reflects the CBDRRC and other 
principles, on the basis of scientific knowledge, and with monitoring of obligation 
compliance.204 States must particularly cooperate in disaster response where “a disaster 
attributable to climate change exceeds a state’s response capacity”.205 Any response effort must 
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be in conformity with, inter alia, principles of non-discrimination and humanity.206 States must 
also continue to develop international climate change law to ensure its adequacy in addressing 
climate change and its adverse impacts.207  
 Generally, the obligation of international cooperation can be expressed as 
recognition that individual states cannot, regardless of their ambition, resolve the climate 
change issue on their own. Should the mitigation and adaptation efforts under the current 
climate change regime fail in safeguarding the needs of humanity, the duty of international 
cooperation may guide the international community in how to approach concerted action to 
address the issue.208 This is of particular relevance to the water issue, as water depletion in SIDS 
is one of the most imminent threats of climate change and, while participation of SIDS in 
international cooperation to mitigate the impacts of climate change might be minimal due to its 
limited contribution to the issue, the cooperation of the international community is vital for the 
prevention of the state becoming uninhabitable due to extreme water scarcity.  
 
3.3.6.  Inter-relationship 
  
 The final principle to be considered is that of inter-relationship between regimes 
between international climate change law and other relevant spheres of international law, which 
stems from UNFCCC Article 3(5).209 The ILA holds that states must “formulate, elaborate and 
implement international law relating to climate change in a mutually supportive manner with 
other relevant international law”210 and as such specifically attempts to prevent fragmentation 
of international law. The principle demands that, if possible, all complementary obligations 
should be interpreted so as to constitute one set of obligations, as well as requiring further 
elaboration of existing law in a manner avoiding norm conflict.211 The inter-relationship 
between international climate change law and international human rights law is specifically 
mentioned in Draft Article 10(3)(b). The inter-relationship between them demands that 
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international human rights obligations are to be respected and all peoples’ rights are to be 
protected when developing and implementing climate change policy and actions.212 The inter-
relationship is complex as GHG emissions can result in human rights interferences domestically 
but the causation is often indirect and the extra-territorial nature of human rights obligations 
are controversial.213 Moreover, mitigation and adaptation actions themselves can lead to the 
interference with the enjoyment of human rights, including the right to water. This will be 
considered in further detail in chapter 4 below as it is indicative of norm conflict between the 
two regimes.  
 
 
3.4. Water in international climate change law 
 
 This submission focuses on the overlap between international human rights law 
and climate change law through the lens of one particular resource, namely water. It is thus 
important to examine whether the climate change regime addresses water explicitly or adverse 
impacts of climate change which have implications for water supply in particular, such as 
drought or floods, rainfall or precipitation, sea level rise, or extreme weather events. This 
subsection will outline the provisions which explicitly mention any of the above or issues such 
as health or food, as these are intricately related with water supply.  
 It is noteworthy that the instruments only occasionally touch upon water as a 
resource explicitly. This is relatively striking given the severity of the impacts climate change 
is anticipated to have on water and the significance of water supply for the sustenance of human 
life. In fact, the word “water” itself is mentioned only once in the three agreements,214 in article 
4(1)(e) of the UNFCCC. The article obliges states to “[c]ooperate in preparing for adaptation 
to the impacts of climate change; develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for … 
water resources and agriculture”. The article also explicitly mentions Africa as affected by 
drought and floods. Given that SIDS are also vulnerable to drought and floods and that this 
vulnerability is expected to be exacerbated by the adverse impacts of climate change, it is 
surprising the SIDS are not explicitly considered in the paragraph the way that Africa is. 
Nevertheless, the only obligation that arises in relation to water supply specifically in any of 
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the instruments is an obligation of cooperation in relation to adaptation effort, and is subject to 
the CBDRRC principle.  
 There are numerous articles which have implicit reference to water or water-
related issues. In articles 4(8)(d) and 4(8)(e) UNFCCC explicit reference is made to natural 
disasters215 and drought. These two issues have clear implications for water supply, as discussed 
in chapter 2. The articles oblige parties to the Convention to bear in mind what actions are 
necessary to meet the needs of developing parties, particularly in regards to, inter alia, drought 
and natural disasters, when implementing their commitments under the Convention. As 
discussed in the previous subsection, the Convention primarily contains obligations of effort 
rather than result, which is clearly reflected in the article 4(8) obligations.  The provisions do 
not demand state action in relation to mitigating the effects of or adaptation to the impacts of 
climate change, but merely require parties to the Convention to give the needs of developing 
parties consideration, with particular concern for drought and natural disaster.  
 The Paris Agreement includes consideration of natural resources in a manner 
relevant to water supply. In article 7(9)(e) of the Agreement, parties are required to “engage in 
adaptation planning processes and the implementation of actions, including the development or 
enhancement of relevant plans, policies and/or contributions”. This is phrased as an obligation. 
The article goes on to say that “[b]uilding the resilience of socioeconomic and ecological 
systems, including through … sustainable management of natural resources”. Thus in order to 
fulfil the article 7(9) obligation, parties can sustainably manage natural resources, but are not 
required to do so and is as such optional. 
 What is noteworthy is the integral nature of the notion of health to the climate 
change regime. The UNFCCC definition of the “adverse effects of climate change” as “changes 
in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant 
deleterious effects … on human health and welfare.”216 The Convention further states that 
parties are to aim to minimise the adverse impacts of climate change on public health when 
adopting relevant social, economic, and environmental policies and actions.217 Furthermore, the 
right to health is explicitly recognised in the Preamble of the Paris Agreement, where the right 
to health obligations are to be promoted and respected when parties take action to address 
climate change.218 It is thus clear that the international community recognises the importance 
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and relevance of health in the climate change context. The notion is not only acknowledged, 
but incorporated into the very definition upon which the Convention and consequently the entire 
regime is based. Given that health and water are inextricably linked, the inclusion of health in 
the instruments can be interpreted as a recognition of the relevance of water in the climate 
change context and that water supply is a common concern of humankind. The provisions in 
question do not set out specific state obligations, particularly not obligations of result, however 
all obligations based on the phrase “adverse effects of climate change” contain health 
considerations and consequently considerations of water.  
 Water is also intricately related to food supply.219 It is noteworthy that food is, 
like health, ascribed particular importance under the climate change regime. This is particularly 
visible in Article 2 UNFCCC which outlines the objective of the regime, which is to stabilise 
GHG concentrations to ensure that “ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure 
that food production is not threatened”.220 The Paris Agreement further specifies that its aim to 
“strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change” by, inter alia, increasing climate 
resilience and adaptation ability “in a manner that does not threaten food production”.221 The 
Agreement also recognises that the adverse impacts of climate change are of particular concern 
to food production.222 As with the inclusion of health in the regime, the provisions touching 
upon food do not contain substantive obligations. Nevertheless, ensuring food production is 
integral to the regime as it forms part of the long-term objective set out by the UNFCCC and 
the aim of the Paris Agreement. As such, all action taken within the international climate change 
framework should aim to secure the continuation of food production. Given that this issue, like 
health, has direct relation with water, these provisions can, by extension, be considered 
recognition of the importance of water and the vulnerability of water supply to climate change, 
albeit indirectly.  
  
 
3.5. SIDS in international climate change law 
 
 As will be discussed in Part Two below, Tuvalu is recognised as being particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse of impacts to climate change due to a number of national 
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circumstances that are common to SIDS generally, such as its small size and population, its 
vulnerability to extreme weather events, and its substantial reliance on weather to sustain life. 
The international climate change agreements do not consider individual states explicitly, yet 
they do include certain categories of states in some considerations. Given that the present 
submission includes study of Tuvalu as a representative of SIDS, the explicit consideration of 
SIDS in the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement will be outlined here.  
 Small island states are mentioned repeatedly in the instruments. The UNFCCC 
explicitly recognises that “small island countries … are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change” in its Preamble. It further specifies that the necessary actions to meet 
needs of developing state parties should be considered by Convention parties when 
implementing their commitment, with particular attention paid to small island countries.223 
Unsurprisingly, neither of the Convention provisions includes any substantive obligations in 
terms of the needs of small island states. No explicit references were made to small island states 
in the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol does, however, include a provision ensuring financial 
assistance for “developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects 
of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation”.224 Given that the UNFCCC classed small 
island states as particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, the aforementioned provision 
is interpreted as intended to include small island states. The Paris Agreement makes numerous 
references to small island states by granting them flexibility in terms of their GHG emission 
development,225 stating that their priorities and needs must be borne in mind when financing 
mitigation and adaptation measures,226 and specifying that capacity-building should “enhance 
capacity and ability of … small island developing states, … to implement adaptation and 
mitigation actions. The “special situation/circumstances” of small island developing states are 
mentioned repeatedly in the Agreement and primarily specifies the relevant provisions 
primarily address adaptation assistance. These provisions, in contrast to the UNFCCC 
provisions, do contain legally binding obligations that states are to satisfy. The instruments 
never identify what makes small island developing states particularly vulnerable to climate 
change and as such it is presumed that one of the issues is the vulnerability of their water supply, 
given the problematic nature of the issue in a small island state like Tuvalu, which is discussed 
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in detail in Part Two below. As such, water can also be said to be considered by the international 
climate change regime through the recognition of the vulnerability of small island states.  
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Chapter 4. Regime Level Integration 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Upon considering the two regimes above it becomes apparent that the two regimes 
operate in isolation from each other. The two sets of laws hardly interact in their regulation of 
water. In regards to the right to water, climate change is mentioned only once. The CESCR 
recognizes that state parties should adopt strategies and programmes in order to secure water 
while taking into account the impacts of climate changes on water availability.227 This 
recognition is couched in very loose terms and indicates that, while climate change will impact 
water, human rights law may be sufficient in addressing issues of scarcity on its own without 
including obligations relating to the adaptation to and mitigation of climate change. In more 
recent years, however, the human rights regime has begun recognising the impact that climate 
change will have on human rights generally as well as the right to water specifically.228 There 
thus appears to be an increased recognition within the human rights context that there is overlap 
between the two regimes in subject and there should at least be recognition of climate change 
within human rights, if not closer cooperation between the regimes. Nevertheless, this 
recognition operates on a level that is not binding, although the documents in which the 
recognition of the relationship is done may amount to soft law and thus be, at least, influential 
on state action. This appears to be some attempt at integration but may also merely reflect an 
attempt to achieve coherence between the laws. 
Despite this recognition of the interaction of the two regimes in the human rights 
field, the climate change regime has been less forthcoming. Human rights are mentioned only 
once in the major climate change conventions, in a preambular statement in the Paris 
Agreement. This inclusion was achieved following significant advocacy efforts to secure 
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recognition of human rights in the climate change regime.229 Despite massive advocacy efforts 
a binding obligation to secure the tripartite structure of human rights within climate change 
efforts was not secured, but was instead included as a preambular statement, without inclusion 
of the full tripartite structure of human rights obligations. While the statement does not create 
binding obligations, it does impact the interpretation and implementation of the Paris 
Agreement obligations.230 This thus encourages congruency between regimes, but does not 
necessarily integrate them into each other.   
It is clear that the two regimes operate in silos with the occasional recognition of 
the other. The limited interaction between the two regimes may call for closer integration 
between the two in order to achieve enjoyment of water. In order to consider this, this chapter 
will consider how the two regimes, international human rights and climate change law, interact 
with each other, thus reflecting the inter-relationship principle discussed above. Based on the 
ILA’s interpretation of the general principles of international climate change law, the inter-
relationship between the regime and other spheres of relevant international law is a general 
principle encouraging congruence in international legal obligations. The ILA specifically 
singled out international human rights law in its draft articles and stated that human rights law 
obligations are to be protected by states when acting under the climate change regime. The 
principle encourages congruence and the avoidance of norm conflict between obligations 
stemming from the two different regimes. This is, of course, significant. The two regimes will 
inevitably interact as they both address issues relevant to human life. Nevertheless, the principle 
may be of less importance for this submission than one can imagine. The principle merely 
demands that norms which can be interpreted in conformity with each other should be 
interpreted accordingly but does not demand any actual integration or greater cooperation 
between the two regimes. This principle thus merely reflects commitments under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) to avoid norm conflict.231 The discussion in the 
following subsections considers to what extent the inter-relationship principle appears to be 
adhered to in the respective regimes and how this can be supplemented by integration. 
This examination will be conducted through the consideration of arguments in 
favour of integration by considering the benefits of adopting a human rights approach to climate 
                                                          
229 Center for International Environmental Law, 'Hundreds of civil society groups demand human rights are 
enshrined in 2015 climate agreement' (CEIL , 10 December 2014)<http://www.ciel.org/news/hundreds-of-civil-
society-groups-demand-human-rights-are-enshrined-in-2015-climate-agreement/> accessed 9 May 2017. 
230 By virtue of VCLT (n 210) article 31(2), originally found in Benoit Mayer, 'Human Rights in the Paris 
Agreement' [2016] 6 Climate Law 109-117, 113. 
231 VCLT (n 210) articles 30 and 31. 
43 
 
change regulation. This will be followed by a consideration of areas of conflict between the two 
regimes to highlight the need for closer integration. Subsequently each regime will be 
considered individually in order to highlight where principles from the other regime might have 
counterparts in the other. In order to consider the synergy, or rather lack thereof, between the 
two regimes, both explicit references to the other will be considered as well as provisions or 
principles which bear similarity to the other or open up for congruent interpretation of the 
principles from the different regimes. Similarities between the regimes indicate the possibility 
for increased integration, as the existence of similarity suggests that the two regimes are not so 
different so as to make closer integration impossible. It will be concluded that integration would 
be desirable in order to achieve clarity and congruence in the law which might facilitate state 
implementation of the law and consequent heightened enjoyment of water. Pursuant to this 
conclusion, the available means of integration and their effectiveness and likelihood of 
implementation will be considered.  
Prior to the consideration of the interaction of the two regimes, it is noteworthy that 
there is an inherent difference in regards to the types of obligations imposed by the respective 
regimes. The international human rights law regime regulates the vertical relationship between 
individual and states, where the obligations are owed by the state to the individual. There are 
no individual beneficiaries under international climate change law who have standing to claim 
that obligations have been breached and consequently trigger responsibility for failure to fulfil 
obligations. 
 
 
4.2. Benefits of integration: arguments for integration of the two regimes  
 
 This subsection will outline general arguments in favour of integration of the two 
regimes. Multiple benefits exist in terms of integrating human rights into the climate change 
regime. These are outlined aptly by the Special Rapporteur on human rights and the 
environment, John H. Knox.232 He argues that the human rights regime contains an unparalleled 
level of detail that can guide the implementation and development of international climate 
change regulation in a more forceful manner than any other area of the law given that there is 
generally wide subscription to human rights among the international community and 
collectivity of states. Additionally the obligations and the interpretations of those legal norms 
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are widely accepted by states and are integral to the UN system and are backed by accepted 
enforcement methods and as such their application in the climate change regime would provide 
multiple benefits in terms of state consideration for human dimensions of climate change law.233 
Moreover adopting a human rights approach to climate change law would give the cause a 
human face, triggering a sense of empathy among states and an increased desire to take action 
to prevent damage done to human life.234 Further the human rights approach ensures the 
enhancement of the standard of living for all individuals, rather than the overall population or 
the collective.235 Given that the human rights regime requires non-discrimination and equality 
in the pursuit of realisation of human rights, adopting a human rights approach to climate 
change would ensure that climate change action would leave no one behind in their vulnerability 
to climate change impacts. The adoption of a human rights approach to climate action could be 
done through integration of the human rights regime into the climate change regime by 
including right to water obligations into climate change mitigation and adaptation obligations. 
This would secure long-term water enjoyment, securing water availability in the future, as well 
as ensuring access to water for all immediately without discrimination.  
 Integration could also be conducted in the inverse, by integrating climate change 
obligations into the human rights regime. Given the general state and international acceptance 
and acknowledgement of the importance of human rights obligations as well as the constantly 
evolving nature of the content of the rights through interpretation methods, and the fact that the 
system is backed by enforcement mechanisms,236 this option may in fact be more useful in 
practice in terms of state compliance. The pre-existing state acceptance of human rights may 
result in a greater desire for states to implement climate change obligations as it would merely 
form part of the system with which they have already been compelled to comply for 
approximately half a century.237  
 There are also particular benefits of adopting an integrated approach of the two 
regimes in regards to the situation of small island developing states. The existence of a human 
rights framework is weak in the Pacific region238 and as such they have urged the international 
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community to adopt climate change action in a manner including the “human dimension” of 
climate change.239 This is, of course, significant as it is explicitly recognises the monumental 
impact that climate change is expected to have on human rights in their states in a way that has 
not been done by the international community or other states. The Malé Declaration on the 
Human Dimension of Global Climate Change advocates for the interaction of the two respective 
regimes by calling for the cooperation between the COP and the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the Human Rights Council in examining the impacts of 
climate change on human rights.240 This is a significant step in two regards. Firstly, employing 
human rights terminology in its pleas for climate action could perhaps garner more state 
acceptance of a legal responsibility under human rights law, as opposed to only a moral 
responsibility for a “human dimension” of climate change. As Knox outlined, the human rights 
regime is widely accepted among the international collectivity of states and the UN system 
itself,241 and as such appealing to states through the use of human rights terminology and 
advocating for the integration of the two regimes might garner a greater willingness of states to 
adopt a human rights approach to climate change action. Secondly, the Malé Declaration 
directly calls for an increased interaction between the two areas of law at the regime level. 
Allegedly this request is what triggered the Human Rights Council initiatives in delineating the 
connection between climate change in a number of resolutions and human rights as well as lead 
to the recognition of human rights in the Preamble of the Paris Agreement.242 Thus there is a 
clear desire by small island states for there to be an increased integration of the two regimes 
and the call for such integration has indeed resulted in some positive action from the human 
rights bodies in particular. This indicates that there is a willingness among the human rights 
bodies to integrate the two regimes and potentially subsume climate change obligations into 
human rights obligations.  
 A penultimate benefit of the integration of the two regimes is that the adoption of 
a human rights approach to climate change action might make the climate change regime more 
effective. The release of GHG emissions by one state has implications on the enjoyment and 
realisation of rights for individuals within other state territory. Implementing a human rights 
approach to climate change could create a diagonal responsibility for such actions, creating a 
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rights-duty relationship between individuals and third party states.243 This would reinforce the 
notion of extra-territorial obligations under the human rights regime which remain 
controversial.244 Adopting a human rights approach in the climate change legal field would 
necessitate the acceptance of horizontal obligations by states as the trans-boundary element of 
climate change is undeniable and of fundamental concern to the adoption of adaptation 
measures in particular. Should such horizontal obligations be enforced this would have the 
potential of having great impact of the realisation of rights to water for all, particularly in small 
island states where the states themselves are responsible for a negligible portion of GHG 
emissions245 yet are disproportionately impacted by the adverse effects of climate change.  
 
 
4.3.  Need for integration: conflict between the international human rights and 
climate change regimes 
 
This subsection highlights why integration between the two regimes is necessary at 
the regime level, namely to avoid norm conflict. There are areas of conflict between the two 
regimes, where fulfilment of an obligation in one may interfere with obligations in the other. 
This indicates norm conflict, where the two systems regulate the same subject matter 
incoherently, in a manner that makes satisfaction of both obligations simultaneously 
impossible.246 This type of conflict is exemplified by three areas of the international laws 
considered in this text, namely the practice of carbon outsourcing, the production of biofuels to 
reduce GHG emissions, and the principle of inter-generational equity. These three issues will 
be considered in turn below.  
 
4.3.1. Carbon outsourcing 
 
The first area where inconsistency between the regimes is exemplified is in the 
phenomenon of carbon outsourcing. The practice entails developed states attempting to meet 
their climate change obligations under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce GHG emissions by 
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outsourcing activity which represents a large portion of their carbon emissions to developing 
countries with less stringent emission reduction obligations, such as China and India.247 This 
practice meant that developed countries met their obligations under the climate change regime 
as regulated by Kyoto, yet did not actually contribute to the mitigation of climate change 
whatsoever, as the carbon emissions would remain at the same levels totally and thus the 
adverse impacts would not be thwarted or warded off. This would mean that the fulfilment of 
human rights obligations to water would be made practically impossible in the future. Without 
appropriate mitigation measures being adopted by reducing GHG emissions in developed 
countries the exacerbation of water scarcity by climate change impacts in small island states is 
bound to continue, creating an inability for those governments to actually fulfil their rights 
obligations. Thus it is of crucial importance that states actually adopt mitigation measures which 
have the potential to actually reduce the adverse impacts of climate change.  
The implementation of carbon outsourcing schemes has led directly to human rights 
violations in practice. One example from Uganda stands out in particular. In the 1990s and 
2000s a Dutch electricity company implemented a programme which aimed to plant 25,000 
hectares of trees in an area called Mount Elgon in Uganda under the carbon credits scheme. 
This programme led to the eviction of approximately 6,000 people, including indigenous 
peoples, from their homes in the area concerned. The evicted persons attempted to continue to 
use the land in question to continue their sustenance farming which led to the outbreak of 
violence between them and the park rangers.248 Claims have been made that this activity 
violated the evicted persons’ human rights, without specifying which rights in particular.249 
Presumably, given that they were evicted from their land the rights to housing, food, and by 
extension possibly water were likely interfered with. The violence that ensued may have also 
triggered rights violations related to rights to life and cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment.250 Thus the implementation of climate change obligations was conducted without 
consideration for related human rights concerns, resulting in serious issues arising with their 
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enjoyment. As such, in practice, a conflict between the two obligations arose, as one could not 
be fulfilled upon the fulfilment of the other when the latter was fulfilled through carbon 
outsourcing. 
The conflict here is traditional; the fulfilment of one obligation frustrates the 
fulfilment of another or even directly violates other obligations. When states fulfil their climate 
change obligations to reduce emissions through carbon outsourcing this perpetuates climate 
issues resulting in inability of other states to satisfy their human rights obligations. The conflict 
could also, of course, be avoided if mitigation obligations were complied with without the use 
of outsourcing in ways which actually have a positive impact on climate change. States were 
not required to carbon outsource as this was likely not the intended purpose of the carbon 
trading provision, yet that is how the fulfilment of the obligation partially manifested. This may 
or may not have been resolved under the Paris Agreement. The Agreement does not assign 
emission reduction targets and no emissions trading system is included. The Agreement rather 
allows countries to cooperate in meeting their respective INDC commitments. 251 Whether that 
cooperation will actually result in a second wave of outsourcing or some other form of 
compliance in contradiction with human rights obligations remains to be seen, as the Agreement 
is, at the time of writing, still relatively new and the first set of state reporting on their 
compliance has not yet been conducted or received.  
 
4.3.2. Biofuel production 
 
A second area in which norm conflict arises between the two regimes is through the 
production of biofuels. Biofuels are an alternative energy source to fossil fuels which are 
renewable and emit less GHGs.252 Thus the production of such fuels has been sought by states 
wishing to meet their climate change obligations to reduce GHG emissions and hamper the 
adverse effects of global warming.253 This results in a conflict with human rights, including the 
right to water as the production of biofuels has negative consequences for the enjoyment of 
human rights. The Special Rapporteur on the right to food highlighted the negative impact that 
biofuel production can have on the right to food, which included food prices rising, increased 
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competition for land, and, most importantly for this submission, an increase in water scarcity.254 
The Rapporteur stated that “production of biofuels will require substantial amounts of water, 
diverting water away from the production of food crops”.255 If water becomes scarcer as a result 
of biofuel production, this would also frustrate the fulfilment of the right to water itself, as the 
availability component could not be met. This highlights the possibility for norm conflict 
between the two regimes. The meeting of one set obligations under the climate change regime 
would frustrate the satisfaction of obligations under the right to water emanating from the 
human rights regime. 
Palm oil is one example of a biofuel and its use has been heavily criticised, recently 
by human rights NGOs in particular.256 Amnesty International exposed issues regarding human 
rights violations in relation to unfair conditions of labour for women in particular as well as 
frequent use of child labour on palm oil plantations in Indonesia.257 The demand for palm oil 
has also led to mass deforestation is being carried out in the Borneo rainforest, the home of 
Malaysian indigenous groups, thus interfering with the rights of indigenous people.258 The 
implementation of climate change obligations can thus, in practice, result in an array of human 
rights violations when done in a manner that does not take into account the impact of biofuel 
production on local populations.  
 
4.3.3. Intergenerational equity 
 
Finally, the principle of intergenerational equity may be an area of contention. 
Arguments can be proposed that intergenerational equity is reflected in both the international 
human rights and climate change regimes and is as such a possible area of coherence (for a 
consideration of this argument see subsection 4.4.2.2 below) but the international legal 
                                                          
254 UNGA ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food’ (22 August 2007) UN Doc A/62/289 para 35-
42.  For in depth analysis of the relationship between biofuels and the human rights to water and food see Hans 
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Food and the Human Right to Water' [2010] 28(1) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 39-61, for further reading on 
human rights and biofuels generally see Roht-Arriaza (n 253) 599. 
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clear human rights-oriented agenda.  
257 Amnesty International, 'The Great Palm Oil Scandal: Labour Abuses Behind Big Name Brands – Executive 
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discourse on this is not settled. The applicability of intergenerational equity in human rights 
law remains contentious among scholars. The central argument against the applicability of 
intergenerational equity to human rights law is that the concept of rights cannot apply to future 
generations as members of those generations are not yet alive and as such cannot have rights 
conferred unto them.259 The argument is aptly summarized by Joel Feinberg, who states that 
“[t]he rights that future generations certainly have against us are contingent rights: the interests 
they are sure to have when they come into being (assuming of course that they will come into 
being) cry out for protection from invasions that can take place now. Yet there are no actual 
interests, presently existent, that future generations, presently nonexistent, have now.”260 If this 
approach is adopted to human rights this may lead to norm conflict between the two regimes. 
Human rights would, under this approach, only demand that action taken aimed at the 
realisation of rights for current generations. In relation to the climate change phenomenon this 
would then primarily demand that adaptation measures are adopted rather than mitigation, as 
adaptation would have immediate effect on the rights enjoyment at present whereas mitigation 
measures primarily reduce of adverse impacts on future generations. Climate change law, on 
the other hand, primarily addresses issues of mitigation, although some adaptation concerns are 
also included. This creates a conflict as the actions states would be obliged to take within the 
climate change context would diverge, as one would essentially demand only adaptation action, 
unless mitigation action could be shown to remedy the adverse impacts of climate change for 
the present generation in their lifetime. The other set of obligations would however demand 
priority for future generations and thus mitigation measures is given priority over adaptation. 
States could, of course, take both adaptation and mitigation measures but given that states have 
limited resources allocated to their climate change action, it may be difficult to satisfy a 
heightened demand for adaptation action as well as complying with stringent mitigation 
obligations. Thus, while not necessarily leading to a norm conflict in theory, it might cause 
problems in practice in practice by inadvertently requiring states to choose which set of 
obligations to comply with. 
 
 
                                                          
259 Wilfred Beckerman and Joanna Pasek, Justice, Posterity, and the Environment (Oxford University 
Press 2001) 14-16. 
260 Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations in William T Blackstone (ed), Philosophy & 
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4.4. Possibility for integration: climate change principles in the international 
human rights regime 
 
This and the following subsection (4.5.) will consider what similarities exist 
between the two regimes. Similarities are interpreted to indicate possibilities for integration as 
they suggest that the regimes are similar enough so as to allow integration. This subsection will 
consider to what extent principles emanating from the climate change regime are included in 
the international human rights law regime. This will include both explicit recognition and 
underlying similarities between the regimes which can be interpreted as indicating some form 
of synergy between them. The explicit recognitions will be considered first, followed by the 
similarities that might imply an underlying synergy between the approaches of the two regimes. 
The examination will primarily focus on what recognition of climate change is included in the 
human rights law discussed in the foregoing chapters in relation to the right to water.  
 
4.4.1. Explicit recognition of climate change in the right to water  
 
As discussed previously, the realisation of the right to water is dependent on the 
actual physical existence of the resource in the state territory in question. Water availability is 
anticipated to be impacted by climate change, particularly in small island states. Despite this 
actual interaction in the physical world, in the legal world there is little inclusion of climate 
change obligations under the human rights law applicable to the right to water. With the 
exception of the reports of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water 
and sanitation, which feature heavily in Part Two given the country-specific focus, climate 
change is addressed hardly at all by the relevant bodies in their publications on the right to 
water.  
In the documents considered in chapter 2, climate change was addressed only once. 
This recognition was discussed briefly in subsection 4.1. above. The concept was addressed in 
paragraph 28(e) of General Comment 15 by the CESCR. In the paragraph the committee 
specified that “[s]tates parties should adopt comprehensive and integrated strategies and 
programmes to ensure that there is sufficient and safe water for present and future 
generations”.261 The Committee went on to exemplify the types of strategies or programmes 
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that could be adopted and included the assessment of climate changes on water availability.262 
In specifying this the Committee also made explicit reference to the UNFCCC. Given that the 
climate change phenomenon will indeed entail changes in the climate, such as rise in average 
global temperature and subsequent changes in rainfall patterns, floods and droughts, etc., the 
plural “changes” employed by the CESCR will not be considered to have a meaning other than 
the traditional notion of climate change. Furthermore the reference by the Committee directly 
to the UNFCCC indicates the intention that this phrasing is intended to reflect the climate 
change phenomenon. The approach adopted here, with explicit reference to the UNFCCC, 
could be considered reflective of the inter-relationship principle stemming from international 
climate change law, possibly in an attempt to satisfy VCLT interpretation guidance. The 
paragraph thus indicates coherence between regimes by encouraging the right to water 
obligations to be read in light of UNFCCC obligations and may open up for the possibility of 
increased integration between the two regimes. 
 
4.4.2. Elements of climate change reflected in human rights law  
 
While the international human rights law applicable to the right to water mentions 
climate change as a part of human rights obligations only once explicitly, the regime does 
address matters directly related to climate change. This is done in two ways. First, pollution is 
explicitly deemed relevant to the right to water. Secondly, the approach taken to the right to 
water incorporates several of the general principles of international climate change law, namely 
the intergenerational equity, international cooperation, and the prevention principles.  
 
4.4.2.1. Pollution 
 
Water pollution has clear links to climate change in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
increase in “water temperatures, higher or lower groundwater levels, floods and droughts raise 
the threat of heightened micro-organisms, chemical substances and radiological hazards in 
drinking water”.263 Secondly, salinity intrusion in groundwater attributable to climate change 
induced sea-level rise is expected to increase bacterial and fungal content in groundwater and 
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foster algal bloom.264 Finally, droughts and floods are expected to “exacerbate many forms of 
water pollution such as sediments, nutrients, organic carbon, pathogens and pesticides, and may 
distribute human excreta”.265 Given that climate change is expected to increase the incidents of 
flood and droughts, increased water pollution is expected to follow. 
The issue of pollution in relation to the right to water is brought up repeatedly in 
different sources delineating the content of the right to water, both in treaty form and in the 
form of documents intended to provide authoritative interpretation. The CRC includes the issue 
of pollution as a consideration inherent in the right to health. The article specifies that, in 
pursuing the realisation of the right to health, states must combat disease and malnutrition, 
which includes taking into consideration the dangers and risks posed to health by environmental 
pollution.266 The state obligation to respect the right to water has also generally been considered 
to demand that states refrain from directly polluting water267  or engaging in any activity that 
pollutes water.268 Furthermore states must ensure that third parties do not pollute water 
resources as part of the obligation to protect the right to water.269 States are also required to take 
positive action by adopting policies aimed at reducing and eliminating water pollution in view 
of minimizing environmental health hazards.270  
Given the great deal of impact that climate change is expected to have on water 
quality through pollution, it seems logical to consider that the pollution-related provisions in 
human rights law contain considerations of climate change by extension. The content of the 
right to water discussed above are phrased in terms of obligations placed on the duty-holders, 
namely states. The various authorities consider that the obligations to respect and protect the 
right water demand that states refrain from pollution of water resources, either directly or 
indirectly through “any activity”. These obligations should then extend to prevention of GHG 
emissions to an extent to prevent the adverse impacts of climate change, such as increased 
incidents of floods or doughts, as GHG emission should satisfy the “any activity” requirement. 
The emission of GHGs and water pollution may be considered a tenuous connection and not 
contain enough clear causality for the standards of human rights law, should human rights 
litigation be raised on this basis. Nevertheless, the link between climate change and water 
quality is significant and the inclusion of concrete state obligations in relation to prevention of 
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water pollution within the human rights regime does appear to open up the possibility for greater 
integration between the two regimes.  
 
4.4.2.2. Intergenerational equity  
 
As discussed above, the applicability of intergenerational equity in human rights 
law is contentious. It is however arguable that the right to water does reflect considerations of 
intergenerational equity. The intergenerational equity principle is not explicitly recognised by 
the bodies issuing legal interpretations of the right to water, yet upon reading the comments, 
there are clear parallels between human rights obligations and the principle. The CESCR 
namely states that the realisation of the right to water for present generations, and the actions 
taken pursuant to that realisation, must not inhibit the realisation of the right in the future 
generally. This is of particular concern in relation to the availability component of the right to 
water.271 Additionally the facilities used to satisfy current water availability requirements 
should also meet future needs.272 By requesting that states take sustainable action which does 
not hamper future realisation of the right to water, the Committee implies that the principle of 
intergenerational equity is integral to the human right to water. It would be logical that these 
provisions indicate that any action taken to fulfil the right to water now should not result in 
GHG emissions which would result in exacerbation of water scarcity for future generations. 
This connection might be considered too tenuous to form part of the obligations to secure future 
availability of water, yet the convergence of the two regimes here does open up for the 
possibility of integration of the two regimes. However the causality issue here is a contentious 
area of international human rights law is and has not garnered consensus.273 Moreover, as was 
illustrated by subsection 3.3., while this area might be one of convergence it may also be one 
of conflict. This dichotomy highlights the need for clarification of the relationship between 
these laws, as there is confusion as to the content and scope of the respective obligations. Such 
clarification could be achieved through integration. 
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4.4.2.3. CBDRRC and international cooperation  
 
Interestingly, the notion of international cooperation exists in both international 
human rights law and international climate change law. The content of the notion in 
international human rights law is reminiscent of both the CBDRRC and international 
cooperation principles in climate change law. In international human rights law the principle is 
considered, by the CESCR, to form the basis for extra-territorial obligations.274 These 
obligations demand that states refrain from actions which interfere with the right to water in 
other states,275 prevent third parties within their state from interfering with the right to water in 
other states,276 and to provide water resources and assistance or aid when necessary.277 These 
obligations form part of the obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil (facilitate) respectively. 
The fulfil (facilitate) obligation is that most similar to the notions of CBDRRC and international 
cooperation found in international climate change law, which demand that developed states 
assist developing states through the provision of financial and/or technical resources in adapting 
to the adverse impacts of climate change. This part of the CBDRRC and international 
cooperation principles thus appears to be mirrored by the human rights obligation to fulfil 
(facilitate) the right to water. It follows that there is, in fact, a congruent obligation in the two 
regimes in this regard. The content of the obligation to assist may differ slightly between the 
regimes, as the obligation under human rights law requires that the components of the right to 
water are prioritised in assistance budgets whereas the climate change obligation requires 
prioritisation of climate change adaptation and mitigation but does not adopt a human rights-
based approach. This could be harmonised through integration. 
 Under international human rights law states are under an obligation to realise 
human rights with the maximum available resources. The notion of maximum available 
resources is considered to include an obligation on states to seek assistance in order to meet 
their obligations if necessary,278 which stems from the international cooperation principle. This 
obligation appears to mirror the CBDRRC principle whereby developing states are to receive 
assistance under international climate change law. The human rights obligation expresses the 
requirement for states to seek such assistance, whereas the climate change obligation requires 
that such assistance is granted by developed states to developing states. It is presumed that the 
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human rights obligation applies to all states, although it will be practically applicable primarily 
to developing states that are subject to resource constraints. Thus these obligations can also be 
seen as running parallel to one another, providing opportunity for greater integration. 
 
4.4.2.4. Prevention principle 
 
The climate change principle of prevention is also reflected in the human right to 
water. The principle is echoed in the obligations to respect and protect the right to water. Under 
the human rights law regime, the obligations to respect and protect the right to water have an 
extra-territorial dimension, as states must themselves not interfere with the right to water of 
people in other countries as well as preventing third parties from interfering with the enjoyment 
of the right to water in other countries.279 This notion is akin to the prevention principle under 
climate change law, whereby states must not cause environmental damage in the territory of 
other states. While the damage in question differs between the two obligations, the prevention 
of causing damage beyond one’s borders is included in both regimes. Damage caused by 
climate change prevented by the prevention principle could very well relate to the right to water 
and as such fall within the both categories of obligations. The applicability of human rights 
obligations extra-territorially is debatable and remains a contentious issue in human rights 
law.280 The congruence between the two regimes could reinforce the applicability of such 
obligations in international human rights law, as the prevention principle under international 
climate change law is less contested. Alternatively, integration of the human right to water as a 
consideration in the damage to be prevented under the prevention principle under climate 
change law could secure and safeguard the extra-territorial application of the human right to 
water which may ensure greater enjoyment of water. 
 
4.4.2.5. Obligation to adapt to climate change 
 
The obligation upon states to adapt to climate change is also reflected in the 
human rights law regime through the obligation to protect the right to water domestically. Under 
the UNFCCC states are expected to adapt to climate change, both through individual action and 
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through seeking assistance for adaptation.281 Adaptation in regards to climate change effects on 
water ensures the inhabitability of the territory in question. Adaptation to climate change 
impacts essentially demands the protection of individuals from the impacts of climate change, 
partially or almost entirely caused by third party actors, depending on the state territory in 
question. This in akin to the obligation to protect the right to water which demands that states 
protect individuals from third party interference with the right in question. Inherent in both 
regimes is a notion that individuals are or the population overall is to be protected from the 
actions of others on their quality of life and the inhabitability of the state territory. This indicates 
further congruence and coherence between the two regimes.  
 
 
4.5. Possibility for integration: human rights principles in the international 
climate change regime 
 
This subsection will follow the format of the previous, by examining the explicit 
recognition of human rights principles in the climate change regime and subsequently the 
implicit similarities. The international cooperation principle will not be discussed individually 
below given that it is considered above. The examination will include general human rights 
considerations inherent in the right to water. It is noteworthy that the inclusion of human rights 
in the climate change regime is far less extensive than the inverse discussed above. 
 
4.5.1. Explicit recognition of human rights in international climate change law  
 
Human rights are explicitly mentioned only once in the climate change regime, 
namely in the Preamble of the Paris Agreement, as discussed in subsection 4.1. above. The 
preambular statement specifies that in taking action to address climate change, states should 
“respect, protect, and consider their respective human rights obligations”.282 This inclusion is 
significant, as it is the first and only recognition of the relevance of human rights to the work 
carried out to combat climate change in the major climate change agreements. The statement 
does not itself create binding obligations on the state parties, but does impact their interpretation 
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and implementation of the obligations imposed by the Agreement.283 Furthermore, the 
Preamble specifically states that the right to health is to be respected, protected, and considered 
in taking action aimed at combating climate change. This is of particular significance for the 
right to water, as it has its original legal basis as a component of the right to health. As such the 
obligations imposed under the Paris Agreement must be complied with in a manner which does 
not violate human rights obligations.  
It is noteworthy that the tripartite structure of rights obligations was not included as 
the traditional “fulfil” was replaced with “consider”. This may indicate an unwillingness to 
include obligations of a far-reaching nature as the obligation to fulfil is arguably the most 
demanding since it requires states to provide resources if individuals are unable to enjoy their 
rights without such provision.  If the language used in the Preamble, particularly the words 
“respect” and “protect”, are interpreted through a human rights lens, these have particular 
implications for state action. If states are to respect human rights and the right to health in their 
climate change action, they must ensure that they do not interfere with those rights, including 
the right to water, either domestically or extra-territorially. The obligation to protect human 
rights and the right to health demands that states ensure that third parties do not interfere with 
enjoyment of rights, including the right to water, when taking action aimed at addressing 
climate change. Thus the inclusion of human rights in the Preamble may indicate the beginning 
of an increased integration between the two regimes. However, given that, at the time of writing, 
the instrument is still relatively new, whether or not human rights will be incorporated to any 
greater extent remains unknown and uncertain, particularly given that the provision in which 
the notion was included does not contain any legally binding obligations by itself. As such the 
provision is reservedly promising in that it indicates a possibility for greater integration between 
the two regimes but does not create any binding obligations including both human rights and 
climate change concerns, particularly in relation to the water issue.   
 
4.5.2. Elements of human rights reflected in climate change law  
 
4.5.2.1. Food and health 
 
The significance of the inclusion of food and health in the climate change regime 
in relation to the right to water was discussed briefly in chapter 3. The human right to water has 
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its origins in the right to health in terms of recognition as a legally enforceable right and is 
considered fundamental to the right to food. The climate change regime recognizes the 
importance of food by specifying that part of the objective of mitigation of climate change 
impacts is securing future food production.284 The importance of health is recognised in the 
definition of “adverse effects of climate change” which includes considerations of the impacts 
of climate change on human health.285 The inclusion of food and health are not couched in 
human rights terminology, except for the Paris Agreement provision,286 but their importance is 
still recognised and as such displays at least an acknowledgement of the adverse impacts that 
climate change is anticipated to have human wellbeing and life and that such impacts should be 
avoided. This suggests that there is possibility for human rights to be integrated into the climate 
change regime in the future in view of securing the overall objective of the battle against climate 
change.  
 
4.5.2.2. Non-discrimination and attention to vulnerable groups  
 
The principle of non-discimination is integral to the human rights system and 
pervades all components and obligations of the right to water. Related to this principle is the 
idea that attention should be paid to vulnerable groups when attempting to satisfy rights 
obligations.287 These principles are arguably reflected in the climate change regime as the 
climate change regime does include considerations akin to these principles. This is particularly 
the case in the international cooperation principle in relation to disaster response, where any 
response effort must be in conformity with principle of non-discrimination.288 This indicates an 
opening for interpretation of the obligation in conformity with human rights principles in case 
of disaster. The notion is also reflected in the recognition of the importance of gender sensitivity 
in relation to adaptation action and capacity building in the Paris Agreement.289 Gender 
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perspectives are integral to the notion of non-discrimination290 and as such there does appear to 
be an overlap in terms of the approaches adopted by the two regimes respectively. 
A possibly more tenuous parallel between approaches is reflected by the special 
treatment afforded to SIDS under international climate change law. The special circumstances 
of small island states are repeatedly mentioned in the climate change agreements and have even 
resulted in a separate principle of the law. This special treatment is akin to the aspect of the 
non-discrimination principle regarding paying attention to vulnerable groups. Small island 
states and least developed states are considered those most vulnerable in relation to the adverse 
impacts of climate change and as such they are given special treatment, in that they have more 
lenient mitigation commitments and are to receive adaptation assistance from developed states. 
This treatment is similar to the notion in international human rights law, where, when realising 
rights, states are to pay special attention to those most vulnerable in society to ensure that also 
their rights are realised. Thus while the special treatment of small island states does not include 
human rights obligations or principles explicitly, there does appear to be an overlap in terms of 
attention that is to be paid to vulnerability and addressing such vulnerability.   
 
 
4.6. Reasoning in favour of integration in light of subsections 4.2. to 4.5.  
 
In light of the above it is apparent that the two regimes both run parallel to each 
other in congruence as well as conflict. There appears to be a need for greater harmonization 
between the two regimes. The two regimes both dictate what states are to do in relation to water 
supply. One focuses directly and indirectly on water through the right to water and other related 
rights, dictating what components are relevant for the resource as well as specifying a tripartite 
structure of obligations states owe to their populations in relation to the resource. The other 
discusses matters relating to water supply indirectly, as it focuses on the climate change 
phenomenon which is expected to negatively impact water supply, particularly in small island 
states, and imposes obligations on states aimed at ultimately preventing the adverse impact of 
the phenomenon on food availability, which itself is connected with water. The obligations 
which conflict cause issues in relation to state action as they demand two different courses of 
action, where complying with one obligation may interfere with or violate obligations stemming 
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from the other regime. In order to avoid such norm conflict, there must be increased 
harmonization between the two regimes. This harmonization could be achieved through greater 
integration of the two regimes. If one set of water-related obligations were integrated into the 
other, the conflicting components would need to be addressed through interpretation of the 
content of one consistently with the content of the other. This would thus both resolve norm 
conflict as well as facilitate adherence to the systems as this might create greater clarity in terms 
of the normative content of obligations.  
Areas of coherence could also be ones of conflict, such as the notion of 
intergenerational equity, due to a lack of clarity of the obligations under the human rights 
regime in particular. Nevertheless there is indeed some congruency between the two regimes in 
terms of foundational principles and attached obligations. This compatibility indicates that there 
is definite possibility for integration of the two regimes into each other, one into the other, or 
the creation of a new regime composed of both sets of obligations. In light of the existing 
compatibility and the obligations running parallel to one another, it appears that integration of 
the regimes would be beneficial given that it would streamline the obligations placed on states 
and may provide clearer guidance on how they are to be implemented in practice. Given that 
the laws converge and govern the same issue, namely water supply, creating a streamlined, 
single set of obligations in this regard would allow states to take concerted action, satisfying 
multiple obligations simultaneously as opposed to taking several actions under each individual 
obligation. Integration would create a greater degree of clarity in regards to the content of the 
respective obligations as any process of integration would likely demand the issuance of 
authoritative interpretation guidance on the content of climate change and human rights 
obligations by the respective authoritative bodies.291 Given that both systems address the issue 
of water, integrating the two systems even where they are already congruent, would create one 
single set of state obligations aiming to secure water supply rather than multiple and would as 
such allow states to take concerted action to satisfy all obligations relating to water at once 
rather than separate action under each regime.  
Under the current approach the two systems must mutually accommodate each 
other292 which may result in neither set of obligations being implemented in full force and thus 
diluting the effect of the law. If the Paris Agreement and principles of prevention and precaution 
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do imply deference to human rights law in cases of conflict, this would necessarily entail the 
prevention of full implementation of climate change obligations. Given that the fulfilment of 
climate change obligations in view of mitigating the adverse impacts of climate change are 
crucial for the future fulfilment of human rights obligations, such deference is a double edged 
sword since it may secure human rights in the short term but not the long term. As such to 
ensure the realisation of rights, climate change obligations must be complied with, yet not in a 
way which itself interferes with human rights. An integrated system of regimes would likely 
resolve this issue, as consistency would be read into the system itself explicitly. Thus an 
integrated system at the regime level may allow for greater congruency and ease in 
implementation for states.293 Methods of achieving such integration are considered in the 
following subsection. 
 
 
4.7. Prospective means of integration  
 
4.7.1. A new treaty  
 
One possibility for integration is the adoption of a new treaty integrating the two 
systems at the regime level. This would allow states to adopt an entirely new convention, 
creating a single set of obligations integrating the two sets of law. Given that states would still 
be bound by their pre-existing obligations under international human rights and climate change 
law respectively, the new treaty would need to respect both sets of laws.294 This would 
encourage the resolution of norm conflicts at the drafting stage in order to ensure the coherence 
of the treaty itself and would ensure state acceptance of the selected norm interpretation. This 
would be an ideal solution in terms of resolving the norm conflict at the regime level. The 
content of a treaty might take three forms within this field. First, the treaty might address 
integration of the two regimes in general. This would require all human rights to be considered 
in light of all climate change obligations and all climate change obligations to be considered in 
light of all human rights obligations. This would require extensive consideration similar to that 
                                                          
293 It is stressed that this submission only examines these two areas of the law in relation to their discussions of 
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294 VCLT (n 210) article 30 particularly (3) and (4).  
63 
 
done above, but examining all rights rather than just one. This could prove to be a demanding 
process as, if the water issue considered above is indicative of the status of the law in terms of 
congruency between the regimes, there will likely be many other norm conflicts or possibilities 
for conflict between the two. In order to resolve such incongruence states would need to reach 
agreement on what the meaning and content of the obligations are in their treaty negotiation in 
order to resolve norm conflicts at the regime level. An analysis of how the two regimes might 
be integrated in whole is beyond the scope of this submission and as such it is merely noted that 
this is a possible option when integrating the principles emanating from the two regimes in 
relation to water supply. Nevertheless, the adoption of a treaty integrating the two systems may 
prove beneficial in terms of practicality as it would ensure coherence between the two regimes 
in their totality and avoid norm conflict between the two regimes in any regard. It would further 
streamline the obligations stemming from the two regimes even in areas where the obligations 
do not necessarily conflict.  
Such a treaty could also integrate rules relevant to water supply alone. This would 
require the issues outlined above in terms of norm conflict in relation to water to be addressed 
in the new treaty. This may be beneficial in two regards. Firstly, as with the first option outlined 
above, it would ensure greater cohesion between the two regimes, avoiding norm conflict and 
creating a single set of obligations calling for concerted rather than separate action. Secondly, 
this approach would be particularly beneficial in relation to water as it would grant the right a 
solid legal basis that currently does not exist under international law. It would enshrine the right 
to water in hard law in the form of a treaty, confirming its legal status which is currently 
somewhat uncertain as it is partially recognised in treaty law in relation to particular groups of 
beneficiaries and partially in soft law in relation to all humans. The adoption of a treaty with an 
integrated human rights and climate change approach on the right to water itself would create 
both norm coherence and streamlined obligations as well as establishing a hard law basis for 
the human right to water. This could, of course, also be done through the first approach 
integrating all obligations in human rights and climate change law, provided that the right to 
water would be explicitly included in such a treaty, rather than subsumed by the rights to food, 
health, and housing. This approach might thus prove beneficial both in terms of greater 
integration between regimes as well as creating greater clarity on the content and legal basis of 
the human right to water.  
 The third approach that could be envisaged is through the creation of a new right 
altogether encompassing the integration of the two sets of obligations relating to water, as well 
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as obligations relating to other relevant issues. This might be done through the development of 
a human right to environment. This would necessarily enshrine both components in question, 
human rights law by virtue of the creation of a new right, and climate change by virtue of the 
content of the right relating to environment. The existence or creation of such a right has been 
a topic of debate in the past. In the hard, black-letter international human rights law under the 
core human rights treaties no substantive right to environment is explicitly included as a free-
standing right. References to the natural environment do exist in the treaties, yet none explicitly 
establish a free standing right to environment.295  A substantive right to a clean environment 
can be seen in some regional treaty law as well as in individual national legislation, indicative 
of willingness of at least some states to recognise such a right as forming part of the human 
rights structure.296 Generally three camps can be said to exist in this regard. The first position 
is that there is a right to environment under human rights law or at the very least that human 
rights law contains environmental obligations. A number of obligations have been set out and 
are considered to apply to all types of damage caused to human rights by environmental harm.297 
The second position adopted is that there is no human right to environment in international law 
itself, but that there might be one in theoretical or moral terms and therefore there should be 
one in the law itself. In purporting this argument Ken Conca postulates that a healthy 
environment is fundamental to sustainable livelihoods and adopting a human rights based 
approach to environment would ensure access to resources, securing equality in that access, and 
providing a method of holding states accountable for their actions.298 The third and final camp 
adopts the approach that there is no right to environment and/or that one should not exist. 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice adopts this position and argues that, while regional laws may include a 
substantive human right to environment, these are not implemented or complied with by states, 
thus their limited use is argued to represent a non-existence of the right in reality. Further 
                                                          
295 See ICESCR (n 19) article 12(2)(b), CRC (n 19) articles 24(2)(c) and 29(1)(e). 
296 Regional treaty recognition of the right includes African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (adopted 27 
June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 Article 24, 
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights "Protocol of San Salvador" (adopted 17 November 1988, not yet in force) A-52 Article 11, and the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) Articles 2, 8, 10, and 1 of 
Protocol 1 through the interpretation of those rights by the European Court of Human Rights. These are derived 
from Malgosia Fitzmaurice, A Human Right to a Clean Environemnt: A Reappraisal. in Giuliana Ziccardi 
Capaldo (ed), The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2015 (Oxford 
University Press 2016) 222-223. For explanation of the right to environment under regional and national law, 
please see pages 222-225 of Fitzmaurice.  
297 Knox (n 16) 29. 
298 Ken Conca, 'A healthy environment is a human right' (The Guardian, 1 October 
2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/01/a-healthy-environment-is-a-human-
right> accessed 9 May 2017. 
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Fitzmaurice argues that, even if such a right does exist, it is ineffective in securing human rights 
in relation to environmental harm as very restrictive approaches are adopted by the regional 
judicial authorities.299 Thus whether a right to environment does or does not already exist under 
international human rights law remains a topic of debate, as does the desirability of the adoption 
of such a right, should it not exist. Nevertheless, the integration of the human rights and climate 
change regimes in regards to water could, in theory, be done through the creation of a new right, 
adopted in treaty form. This would allow states to resolve the norm conflicts discussed above 
while taking a human rights based approach explicitly and would thus serve as integration of 
the climate change regime into the human rights regime, thus forming part of the human rights 
framework and its accountability mechanisms. Integration of climate change into the human 
rights framework has been attempted to a degree previously through the issuance of 
authoritative statements by human rights bodies,300 yet apparently with little effect in light of 
the considerations outlined in above. This indicates that the employment of climate or 
environmental considerations in the human rights regime may indeed be ineffective.  
The question does arise as to whether there would in fact be negative impact on 
rights enjoyment as a result of a new human right to environment or any other form of 
integration at the treaty level. Fitzmaurice outlines the regional approaches to human rights and 
environment and considers their effectiveness and concludes that the provisions themselves are 
ineffective,301 yet does not conclude that they are in fact harmful to or undermine the enjoyment 
of rights. Given the potential benefit of regime congruency stemming from integration at the 
regime level it is difficult to envisage a scenario where integration would harm or undermine 
the enjoyment of rights, unless the interpretation of the new right dilutes the content of the right 
to water so as to offer less protection, codified in hard international law. This would, of course, 
depend on the actual outcome of any new treaty negotiation. Thus the appropriateness of the 
integration at the regime level in terms of securing greater realisation of the right to water would 
depend on the content of the new treaty. As such, while there may be benefits of formal 
measures of integration through treaty adoption, such an approach would need to be adopted 
with caution, ensuring that the high standard of human rights protection read in to the right to 
water is maintained.  
                                                          
299 Fitzmaurice (n 296) 222-224. 
300 For example, High Commissioner 2015 (n 228), High Commissioner 2010 (n 228), HRC 
A/HRC/26/L.33/Rev. (n 228), among others.  
301 Fitzmaurice (n 296) 222-224. 
66 
 
Regardless of the possible benefits and drawbacks of the adoption of a new treaty 
integrating the two regimes, the likelihood of such adoption should also be considered. States 
are encouraged to adopt international agreements securing the right to water under the human 
rights regime302 which may provide an impetus to adopting a new treaty. While the explicit 
recognition of human rights in the climate change regime itself is limited to the preamble of the 
Paris Agreement, even achieving this recognition was in and of itself, a challenge. As 
previously discussed, the Paris Agreement was the first explicit recognition of the notion of 
human rights in the climate change regime and was the result of long-term advocacy of 
academics and international organisations.303 Civil society has advocated not only for the use 
of stronger human rights language in the climate change framework generally but also, inter 
alia, the right to water specifically. 304 This advocacy has been massive, with over 200 groups 
joining forces to advocate for human rights inclusion.305 The international human rights bodies 
also called upon a greater recognition of human rights in the new agreement306 and have 
generally themselves been recognising the correlation between the two regimes.307 This 
advocacy preliminarily appeared to have significant impact as the draft version of the treaty 
contained reference to the tripartite structure of human rights for all in article 2. This was later 
deleted during negotiations, leaving only the preambular reference to human rights representing 
the relationship between the two spheres.308 This dilution of the human rights recognition within 
the regime despite the massive concerted efforts between civil society actors is indicative of the 
resistance existent in the international community to additional human rights influence. There 
appears to be a desire to limit the application of human rights obligations to the international 
human rights legal regime itself. Thus while the above methods of treaty adoption may be 
beneficial in terms of coherence and rights realisation, the likelihood of such an integrated treaty 
being adopted and universally ratified, with high human rights and climate change standards 
                                                          
302 General Comment 15 (n 32) para 35. 
303 Sumundu Atapattu, 'Climate Change, Human Rights and COP 21: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back or 
Vice Versa?' [2016] 17(2) Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 47-55, 49. 
304 CIEL (n 229), Megan Rowling, 'Lima marchers, experts want climate deal to respect rights' (Reuters, 10 
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Effects of Climate Change on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights' (Climate Vulnerable Forum, 30 April 2015) 
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appears slim. Given that states have recently resisted the integration of human rights into the 
climate change regime despite significant pressure from civil society in a way that creates 
binding obligations, this indicates that states would also be unwilling to adopt any other hard 
law integrating the two systems in a way preserving meaningful content of both regimes.    
 
4.7.2. Soft law methods  
 
Given the challenges of introducing hard law integrating the two regimes and the 
potential drawbacks of such integration, adopting a soft law approach might be more plausible 
as well as effective. This could be done through the issuance of statements containing 
authoritative interpretation of the laws, which has been done previously by human rights bodies, 
by outlining the correlation between human rights and climate change.309 This has even 
extended to the establishment of a Special Rapporteur mandate on human rights and 
environment who issues reports on the inter-relationship between the spheres.310 Special 
Rapporteurs with a particular thematic focus or on specific geographical areas also integrate 
climate change considerations into their reports.311 It is thus clear that there is consideration of 
the relationship between human rights and climate change in soft law instruments, yet these do 
not appear to integrate the actual obligations of the climate change regime into the human rights 
obligations. Furthermore the climate change regime seems to look past the issue of human rights 
and focuses solely on climate change obligations in isolation from rights. In order to achieve 
integration of the two regimes on a soft law basis the respective authoritative bodies, primarily 
the COP and the CESCR (in the water context), could issue decisions or reports on the 
relationship between the two sets of obligations, reading one set into the other. The preambular 
statement of the Paris Agreement explicitly recognising human rights and their relevance to the 
climate change regime might serve as a legal basis for the COP issuing an interpretation of the 
climate change obligations containing human rights obligations. The relevant human rights 
bodies, such as the CESCR, could also issue reports on the matter, similar to those that have 
been adopted in the past but with greater focus on the content of climate change obligations and 
how they might form part of human rights obligations, rather than climate change generally 
                                                          
309 For example, High Commissioner 2015 (n 228), High Commissioner 2010 (n 228), HRC 
A/HRC/26/L.33/Rev.1, among others. 
310 Special Rapporteur mandate on human rights and environment currently held by John H Knox. 
311 For example in SR Tuvalu (n 10).  
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affecting or impacting human rights enjoyment and realisation. Alternatively, the bodies from 
the respective regimes could attempt to issue a joint statement on the interpretation of the law. 
The issuance of joint statements on human rights matters from bodies with mandate emanating 
from two separate systems has taken place at the regional312 and international313 levels, with 
recommendations as to future action in relation to particular legal issues. Such a joint statement, 
between the COP and the CESCR for example, could be released addressing how the two sets 
of obligations are to inform each other or how one informs the other.  
Three issues arise in regard to these possibilities. Firstly, this approach employs soft 
law methods and would as such not be legally binding on states. The statements would be 
influential on the interpretation and application of the legal norms, perhaps particularly so if a 
joint statement were released as this may hold unique significance given that such a statement 
would emanate from two entirely separate disciplines and would represent a significant 
development in the law and perhaps indicate an increased likelihood of formal integration of 
the regimes. Nevertheless, without being formally adopted as a new treaty or protocol to their 
respective treaties or crystalising into customary international law, the integration advocated 
for by the authoritative interpretations would not form part of binding law on states. 
Furthermore it may not be a particularly effective method. This is exemplified by the outcomes, 
or lack thereof, of the human rights bodies and their attempt at limited integration of climate 
change into the human rights regime. This does not appear to have had great impact in terms of 
state acceptance of integration, as further integration in terms of normative obligations was 
resisted during the Paris negotiations so as to prevent such integration being included in the 
Agreement itself.  
Secondly, the likelihood of the above approaches being adopted appears low. As 
discussed, there appears to be an unwillingness among states to formally include human rights 
obligations under the international climate change regime which is reflected by the international 
laws themselves. This has resulted in the climate change regime, and thus the COP, essentially 
looking past relevant human rights and addressing only environmental considerations with 
                                                          
312 For example the joint statement on EU accession to the ECHR by the respective presidents of courts, Jean-
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human corollary but not concerning itself with the human aspects directly. It appears unlikely 
that the COP would change its course of direction suddenly, particularly so soon after the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement where formal integration of human rights obligations was 
resisted by states. Such a change of approach would likely be controversial among state parties 
given this recent history. Thus it appears that the chances of COP recognition of human rights 
obligations either through an individual or a joint statement with human rights bodies are slim.   
Finally, the adoption of a joint statement in particular appears slim, especially if it 
would include the integration of one regime into the other as this would require the regime 
becoming integrated essentially subordinating itself, and thus subordinating its governing 
bodies, to the other. This would likely be considered undesirable for the bodies themselves as 
it would entail a loss of at least a degree of autonomy. Furthermore such subordination may not 
be compatible with the mandates of the respective bodies as this would impact the 
accountability structure of the respective regimes in a way which was not provided for by the 
treaties from which their mandate stems. An alteration of this nature would likely require more 
thought and analysis in terms of the repercussions on the organisational structures in place. As 
such, even if this would be an effective method of integration, which it does not appear to be, 
the likelihood of the adoption of soft law measures to integrate the obligations appears unlikely, 
at least in relation to the COP itself or jointly between the two regime bodies.  
 
 
4.8. Conclusion  
 
At the regime level there does appear to be benefits of, a need, and possibility for 
a greater integration between international human rights and climate change law. There appears 
to be benefits to be gained from integrating the two regimes given the significant advantages 
offered by the human rights system, given that it has an unparalleled level of detail that can 
guide implementation and development of climate change law. Furthermore the human rights 
approach is generally accepted by the international community and an integrated approach is 
already being advocated for by SIDS. As such, integration of the two regimes may garner more 
enthusiasm by states to implement climate change obligations as most states are bound by 
human rights to at least some degree. Adopting an integrated approach might reinforce the 
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notion of extra-territorial obligations, making the two regimes more effective in addressing 
water scarcity exacerbated by climate change on the ground.  
Integration also appears to be needed. This is indicated by the norm conflict that 
arises between the two sets of obligations. The opportunity for norm conflict in practice is 
exemplified by the phenomena of carbon outsourcing/emissions trading and biofuel production. 
There are also fundamental differences between the two regimes in terms of the application of 
intergenerational equity, given that the human rights law approach to the principle is not settled. 
Integration of the two regimes would resolve the norm conflict and clarify the content of the 
obligations which might facilitate state implementation of the laws in practice. Should 
integration be pursued, the potential norm conflicts would have to be addressed at the stage of 
integration through congruent interpretation of the normative content of the respective 
obligations in question. This would ensure that human rights violations like those experienced 
in relation to carbon outsourcing in Uganda and biofuel production in Indonesia and Borneo 
would be avoided.  
The two regimes both regulate water supply and frequently overlap in that 
regulation. The instances in which they overlap in congruent manners and consequently impose 
coherent obligations indicate that there is the possibility for integration of the two regimes. In 
other words, the coherence of some obligations indicates that the two regimes are not so 
fundamentally different so as to clash to such a great degree that integration would be made 
impossible. Integration of the coherent obligations may facilitate state implementation of the 
obligations in question, as the two sets of obligations would be streamlined into one which 
could allow for concerted action in implementation. Integration would also require some 
issuance of interpretative guidance on how the two sets of obligations influence each other and 
how they are to be interpreted in light of their inter-relationship.  
As such, there are clear benefits of, need, and possibility for integration of the two 
regimes. Integration at the regime level could be achieved through two methods, the adoption 
of a new treaty or through the issuance of authoritative interpretative guidance. In light of the 
struggle to achieve inclusion of human rights at all in the Paris Agreement, the adoption of a 
new treaty integrating the two regimes into one appears unlikely. It also raises concerns 
regarding effectiveness given historical reluctance among states to accept integrative efforts 
derived from the international human rights framework. The issuance of authoritative guidance 
on this issue, however, may be preferable. Such authoritative guidance would not be legally 
binding on states and may not result in a great degree of implementation, if the previous 
acceptance of such guidance in regards to human rights and climate change is any indication. 
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Furthermore, while the adoption of this method appears somewhat more likely than the treaty 
option, the likelihood still appears relatively slim. Thus integration is certainly beneficial, 
needed, and possible, yet may be a struggle to achieve in practice in terms of regime-level 
adoption. 
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Part Two. Implementation Level 
 
 
This part of the submission aims to answer the implementation-level aspect of the 
research question. It is clear from the foregoing considerations in Part One that there is 
disconnect between human rights and climate change laws and that this results in an overlap 
between the laws, which creates similarities as well as possibilities for conflict between the two 
regimes. The question arises as to whether this disjointed quality of the law impacts the 
enjoyment of water on the ground level. Both human rights and climate change law attempt to 
address the issue of water scarcity, either directly or indirectly. As such if the two regimes are 
functioning properly at the ground level there should be universal enjoyment of water. In order 
to examine whether or not this is in fact the case, the national situation of Tuvalu will be 
considered. Adopting a country-specific lens allows one to not only see how climate change 
can exacerbate the physical issue of water scarcity, but also how this impacts human life through 
the lens of human rights components and obligations in practice. The country context also 
illustrates how the state itself and external actors attempt to address water scarcity through the 
implementation of various projects. When examining the projects implemented in Tuvalu, 
consideration will be made of to what extent human rights and climate change obligations are 
implemented. Whether or not the obligations are actually implemented through the programmes 
indicate whether or not a regime-level integration solution as that discussed in Part One above 
would also resolve the water scarcity problems on the ground in Tuvalu. If the laws are not 
actually being implemented in the national context, this suggests that regime-level integration 
would not create any greater enjoyment of water on the ground level. It will be concluded that 
the majority of the implementation level work being carried out focuses on development 
commitments as opposed to the fulfilment of either human rights or climate change obligations. 
As such solutions aimed at human rights and climate change integration into development 
methods might be more appropriate in terms of securing actual enjoyment of water for 
Tuvaluans. Part Two concludes with discussions of what types of development measures might 
be most appropriate in attempting to address the water scarcity issues experienced on the ground 
in Tuvalu.  
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Chapter 5. Country Context: Water Supply in Tuvalu 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
 Water scarcity is not a new phenomenon in Tuvalu but the consequences of 
climate change such as changes in rainfall patterns and sea level rise are expected to place 
additional stress on the water supply. This chapter is divided into several subsections which 
will outline country information, an overview of the current state of freshwater availability, the 
anticipated exacerbation of climate change on water scarcity, and an interpretation of the 
situation in Tuvalu from a human rights perspective. It will be concluded that the already 
stressed water supply in Tuvalu will worsen with the onset of climate change impacts. The 
current state of water shortage combined with the exacerbation of the issue by climate change 
poses serious challenges to Tuvalu in terms of the state satisfying its human rights obligations 
in ways that actually realise the right to water for those living in the state.  
 
  
5.2. Tuvalu: country information 
 
Tuvalu is a small sovereign state in the South Pacific made up of nine small islands. The 
estimated population is just under 11,000 and the majority of these people live either on the 
islands Funafuti or Vaitupu,314 with approximately 42% of the population residing in Funafuti, 
the state’s capitol and only urbanized area.315 Given the state’s small physical size the 
population invariably lives in coastal areas.316 Tuvalu is among the smallest sovereign nations 
in the world, being third smallest by population and fourth smallest by land area,317 with its 
total land area measuring at approximately 26 km2.318 The small physical size has resulted in 
overpopulation and crowding.319 The state is deemed “extremely vulnerable to the adverse 
                                                          
314 AC (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 800517-520 para 6-8. 
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impacts of climate change, variability, and extreme weather events”,320 partially due to its small 
size but also its low level of land elevation. The highest point of elevation is 4.6 metres above 
sea level.321 These physical features make the state particularly vulnerable to sea level rise, as 
it poses threats of inundation and saltwater intrusion.322 The threat is so significant that the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other experts have concluded that with 
the current rate of rising sea levels, Tuvalu might disappear entirely within the coming 50 years 
and will likely become uninhabitable before then, partially due to lack of potable water 
sources.323  
The population’s livelihood is intimately linked to the physical attributes of the territory, 
as the country experiences a wet season, which causes damage to agriculture and food sources, 
and a dry season, which has negative implications on freshwater resources.324 The state also has 
the smallest gross domestic product (GDP) of any sovereign state325 and is categorized as a least 
developed country.326 Unemployment is rampant among the population, with only 
approximately 30% being employed.327 Tuvalu relies heavily on imported fuel and food, which 
makes the country vulnerable to price fluctuations on those goods.328 Furthermore, it relies on 
foreign aid to a great degree, partially due to the low employment rates329 and partially given 
that the primary economic activities are fishing and subsistence farming,330 which are impacted 
by environmental variability. Given this limited economic capacity, Tuvalu is vulnerable to 
adverse impacts of climate change that have economic repercussions, such as damage to 
infrastructure due to climate change-related cyclones. Thus, Tuvalu is dually vulnerable to 
climate change, both to the likelihood of severe impacts of climate events due to its small size, 
low level of land elevation, and heavy dependence on weather for the sustainability of life, but 
also to economic repercussions of climate events. Ironically, despite being particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, Tuvalu makes a negligible contribution to 
the phenomenon, as it is reportedly responsible for less than 0.000005% of global GHG 
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emissions.331 The particular vulnerability of Tuvalu in regards to climate change, particularly 
concerning freshwater resources, will be considered in further detail in section 5.4. below.  
In regards to international commitments, Tuvalu is a UN member. However, of the core 
human rights treaties Tuvalu has only ratified the CEDAW and the CRC. As such the state has 
refrained from ratifying the core covenants332 but is bound human rights norms which form part 
of customary international law and must respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.333  
 
 
5.3. Freshwater in Tuvalu at present  
 
Availability of freshwater is vital for the sustenance of life in any nation. It is crucial 
not only for purposes of direct consumption but also for hygiene and food production and 
preparation, among others. Tuvalu experiences significant challenges in regards to freshwater 
availability, particularly in terms of quantity and quality. This sub-section will provide an 
overview of what these challenges are and the reasons behind their existence.  
Tuvalu has not been naturally gifted in terms of freshwater resources. The state has no 
surface water whatsoever334 and as such the main source of freshwater is rainwater.335 The 
reliance on rainfall makes the country vulnerable to prolonged periods of low rainfall days or 
drought, as this impacts the quantity of freshwater available. This vulnerability to weather 
patterns is problematic, as droughts of up to three months or longer are not rare, particularly in 
the northern Tuvaluan islands.336 Not only are droughts not uncommon, but they have in the 
recent past formed the basis for the government issuing declarations of state of emergency. 
Groundwater was previously used a secondary source of non-potable freshwater, however 
saltwater intrusion caused by rising sea levels337 and pollution from poor waste management338 
has spoiled the groundwater as a viable alternative. Unfortunately this means that rainwater 
now constitutes the only viable source of freshwater directly available to the Tuvaluans. The 
depletion of the groundwater source is problematic for direct consumption as well as food 
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availability and related economic opportunity in the state as groundwater is the primary 
freshwater source for agricultural activity.339 The limitation placed on food productivity in this 
regard has led to greater reliance on food import, which again makes the state vulnerable 
economically to price fluctuation.340 The availability of freshwater is also negatively impacted 
by cyclones and hurricanes, which are not uncommon in the state.341  
The freshwater facilities on Tuvalu are not centralized. Harvesting and storing 
freshwater is the responsibility of individuals themselves and is done by private households for 
their own consumption.342 Water is collected through catching systems installed on iron house 
roofs and stored in external tanks.343 The harvesting and storing is done either privately per 
household or communally, but is arranged by individuals themselves regardless.344 The 
harvesting system is problematic in a number of ways. Firstly, the success of the system in 
providing individuals with a sufficient quantity of freshwater depends entirely on the amount 
of rainfall in a given period. Secondly, the method cannot be used on outer islands where 
thatched roofs as opposed to iron roofs are used, which makes them unsuitable for harvesting 
potable water,345 thus the outer islands struggle with low capacity to harvest and store water.346 
Furthermore, given that the harvesting and storing system is not centralized, maintenance of the 
systems is an individual responsibility. Maintenance of the system demands funds which may 
exceed the financial capacity of many, which in turn leads to the mechanisms breaking and not 
being fixed, being disconnected, or being mounted improperly.347 The harvesting system also 
results in unequal enjoyment of freshwater as the harvesting system depends on roof size. This 
essentially results in poorer persons who tend to live in smaller houses in larger numbers are 
able to harvest less water than richer persons who tend to live in bigger houses in smaller 
numbers, as the size of the roof depends on the size of the house.348 As such, the system 
currently in place results in inequality due to economic circumstance or geographical residence 
(outer or inner islands) in practice. Moreover, the water collected and stored is not directly 
potable, but must be boiled in order to be appropriate for consumption.349 This also has 
economic implications as not everyone has the financial resources to pay for fuel or wood to 
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boil the water collected.350 Finally, the system is reportedly not at full capacity and as such 
people’s needs are not being fully met, even when there is sufficient rainfall in Tuvalu to meet 
those needs.351 
The harvesting and storing system currently in place is vulnerable to a heightened 
demand for water resources, as the system itself is flawed in a number of ways and an increased 
demand would stress the already pressured system. Population growth would increase the 
demand on the already limited supply of freshwater in the state.352 Unfortunately, the state is 
indeed experiencing an increase in public need due to population growth, with an annual 
population growth of 0.2%.353 Not only does population growth increase demand for freshwater 
but also results in the “over pumping of groundwater, excessive damming … and increasing 
pollution” which increases the strain placed on the resources.354 Water quality, as well as 
quantity, might also be impacted by population growth as this leads to an increase in waste 
production, which might contaminate the available freshwater. Poor water quality in turn leads 
to health risks as it contributes to water-borne illnesses.355 Funafuti experiences water scarcity 
both in the wet and dry season,356 thus the demand there is particularly high. Unfortunately the 
demand is further exacerbated by population drift357 which is currently taking place due to 
limited agricultural opportunities and consequentially increased reliance on imported foods,358 
resulting in persons moving from the outer islands to Funafuti. This has resulted in 
overcrowding and an increase in squatter settlements in the capitol and consequent stresses on 
water resources.359 This issue is difficult to address as there is reportedly no spare space on 
Funafuti to install more water tanks and as such the city is at maximum capacity in physical 
terms.360 The state does have water reserves which are stored in major public buildings, 
however due to the public demand and the failure of the harvesting and storing systems to 
adequately meet people’s needs, these reserve resources are distributed daily.361 Furthermore, 
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desalinsation technology was introduced in the country in order to address drought disasters, 
which was effective in meeting the public need previously, but with the increasing urbanization 
of Funafuti, this will be insufficient in meeting the increased demand.362 An additional issue in 
this regard is that the desalinated water is sold by the Ministry of Public Utilities at United 
States Dollars (USD) $15 for 10,000 litres,363 which may not be affordable to all.  
It is clear that there are multiple issues in regards to the availability of freshwater in 
Tuvalu. These issues partially stem from the physical attributes of the country in that the state 
has no surface water and salinity intrusion and other pollution depletes groundwater resources, 
resulting in dependence on rainwater. However, some issues are governance-related. By not 
having a centralized water system, poor waste management resulting in contaminated 
groundwater, and failure to secure a harvesting and storing system that satisfies public need, 
there are significant gaps in Tuvaluan governance which negatively affect the availability and 
quality of the freshwater resources.  
 
 
5.4. Exacerbation of water scarcity by climate change  
 
Water scarcity already constitutes a significant challenge in Tuvalu and any additional 
stress on the resource is likely the last thing that the country needs. Nevertheless the state’s 
particular vulnerability to climate change will likely exacerbate the situation. While not all the 
challenges posed to water availability are attributable to physical attributes of the state territory, 
some are, and these will likely be impacted by climate change. Due to the natural aspect of 
water shortage in Tuvalu, this section will consider what the future is expected to hold for 
Tuvalu in light of climate change impacts. Many of the impacts will affect water scarcity 
directly, in terms of physical phenomena such as drought or extreme weather events, but some 
will also affect water scarcity indirectly by impacting the state’s adaptability to new 
environmental circumstances. Thus, both physical and governance-related impacts of climate 
change on water availability will be considered below.  
Tuvalu is “extremely vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, variability, 
and extreme weather events”.364 A number of aspects make the state particularly vulnerable, 
including growing population, depletion of groundwater as a freshwater source, and the 
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inadequacy of water services.365 The state is additionally vulnerable due to its small physical 
size and low level of land elevation of the islands. This results in a threat of a fundamental 
nature to the actual existence of the state territory, as rising sea levels threatens complete 
submergence of the state territory. As such climate change is identified by the state as “the 
greatest threat to the physical state and its population”.366 The grave nature of the threat is also 
acknowledged by the IPCC, by recognising the real risk of physical state disappearance within 
50 years.367 Given the nature of the threat, the government identifies mitigation as their primary 
interest in climate change work.368 In working with climate change mitigation, reaching an 
international agreement to cut GHG emissions is identified as pivotal in securing Tuvalu’s 
development and ability to survive.369 As such, Tuvalu acknowledges the pressing need for 
mitigation measures to be adopted, both by the state itself and by the international community 
and collectivity of states.  
Despite the emphasis placed on mitigation, the state recognizes the need for adaptation 
measures given the significant threat of climate change on the inhabitability of the state. One 
of the key areas of vulnerability for Tuvalu in regards to inhabitability is the already limited 
freshwater supply. The limited water supply will likely be exacerbated by the impacts of climate 
change370 and, given the crucial importance of freshwater availability to human life, this poses 
a significant challenge in terms of climate change adaptation for the state. The seriousness of 
the threat to freshwater availability is reflected by the fact that water quality is categorized as a 
priority area for climate change adaptation in Tuvalu.371 The state calls for international 
cooperation in regards to adaptation, as well as mitigation, by arguing that the state needs help 
in becoming resilient to climate change and achieving sustainable development in light of the 
challenges of climate change,372 but does not specify what particular support is needed from the 
international community.   
As stated above, Tuvalu will be impacted in a number of ways by climate change. One 
impact is the depletion of freshwater resources due to physical attributes of the nation rendering 
the state vulnerable to climate change. It is noteworthy that it has been recognized by Tuvalu 
that the effects of climate change need to be studied further in order to be certain of the expected 
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impacts of climate change on the territory, but from current predictions the consequences of 
climate change on freshwater availability outlined below can be deduced.373 There are two ways 
in which freshwater availability will be impacted in the state, namely by impacts on rainwater 
and impacts on groundwater. As such the effects of climate change on the two sources will be 
considered in turn.  
Rainwater is the primary source of freshwater in Tuvalu. As discussed in subsection 5.3. 
above, individuals harvest and store rainwater for personal use, primarily for direct 
consumption, cooking, and hygiene-related needs. Due to the reliance on rainwater any 
fluctuation in weather patterns resulting in variation in the number of rainfall days will have a 
negative impact on water availability in the country. Climate change is anticipated to increase 
precipitation variability.374 This increase in variability is expected to result in increased 
incidents of flooding in some parts of Tuvalu and droughts in others which will threaten 
freshwater supply.375 Funafuti currently experiences drought periodically. Climate change is 
expected to exacerbate this, as Funafuti is anticipated to experience an increase in low rainfall 
days and prolonged drought.376 This will have a significant impact on the population as a large 
portion of the population resides in the capitol. Not only those living in Funafuti will be affected 
as the severity and frequency of drought is expected increase in Tuvalu generally as a result of 
climate change,377 particularly for the northern islands.378 Of particular concern is the 
anticipated coincidence of climate change-induced drought and the El Niño period. Tuvalu 
frequently experiences water shortage during the El Niño period, which has resulted in droughts 
so severe so as to warrant declarations of national emergencies in the past.379 The exacerbation 
of climate change on the limited rainfall of said period will likely result in prolonged and severe 
water shortage in the nation.380 Furthermore the rainfall patterns are expected to become more 
inconsistent with climate change which will adversely impact the ability of individuals to plan 
their freshwater consumption and use.381 This unpredictability will undoubtedly have negative 
impacts on availability of freshwater.382 Furthermore cyclones can have adverse impacts on 
freshwater quality which poses a significant threat to freshwater supply in Tuvalu, as the 
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frequency and severity of cyclones is expected increase as a result of climate change.383 These 
predicted impacts of climate change will, in sum, have serious consequences on the availability 
and quality of freshwater in the state, which is stressed even without climate change 
exacerbating the issue. A decrease in rainfall and consequently freshwater supply will have 
negative impacts on, inter alia, human health and agriculture and food security.384 
Groundwater has previously been used as a secondary source of non-potable 
groundwater and as the primary water source in agriculture.385 As discussed above, groundwater 
has been spoiled as a freshwater source due to saltwater intrusion in the soil and pollution from 
poor waste management. The saltwater intrusion and consequent depletion of the freshwater 
lens is linked to rising sea levels as an adverse consequence of climate change.386 It is 
anticipated that this intrusion will continue to accompany rising sea levels.387 This intrusion has 
negative impacts on food productivity in the state, due to the challenges that saltwater intrusion 
in groundwater and soil pose to agriculture,388 and consequently leads to heavier reliance on 
imported food.389 An additional stress on groundwater as a source for freshwater is the increase 
in seriousness and danger of storm surges which appears to be occurring, which leads to 
groundwater contamination.390   
Weaknesses in the economic and institutional capacities of the state will likely worsen 
the effect of the physical adverse impacts of climate change in the state. As stated above, more 
severe weather events, such as cyclones, are expected to occur as a result of climate change. 
These weather events are expected to stress water infrastructure.391 Infrastructure in the state 
was, for example, severely damaged as a result of Cyclone Pam in early 2015.392 Addressing 
the damage caused by such events is costly, as illustrated by the cost of the damage done by 
Cyclone Pam which was estimated to amount to 30% of Tuvalu’s GDP.393 It is clear that the 
state would be unable to cover such costs repeatedly with more frequent occurrences of extreme 
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weather events, given that the state was unable to cover the cost of just one extreme event 
themselves and was as such awarded a USD $3 million grant by the World Bank to address the 
damage done by Cyclone Pam.394 Furthermore, individuals would likely be unable to address 
their personal costs of repairing and damage done to private infrastructure, given that many 
people already struggle with maintaining and repairing their water harvesting and collecting 
systems due to financial limitations. The state’s approach to water availability as a private rather 
than public responsibility may furthermore be a sign of limited institutional capacity in the 
country, which is identified as one of the key vulnerabilities of Tuvalu to climate change.395 An 
additional, related key vulnerability is limited national economic resources.396 Heavy reliance 
on natural resources, high unemployment rates, and income inequality have been identified as 
factors which render economies vulnerable to natural disasters,397 all of which are attributes of 
Tuvalu. The magnitude of costs of infrastructure repair and settlement protection which will be 
needed as a result of climate change impacts will pose significant challenges for Tuvalu due to 
these limited economic resources.398 The combination of limited economic resources and 
limited institutional capacity will likely make it difficult for the state to adapt to climate change 
and address damage done by weather events, as it will be too costly and difficulties will arise 
in terms of organizing response. Furthermore development in the country, which would address 
the issue of limited national economic resources, will likely be hampered by climate change.399 
The issues faced are therefore cyclical. Measures aimed either at adaptation or at mitigation 
might help break the cycle and allow the state to escape its economic and institutional 
vulnerability to climate change. However, it appears that Tuvalu cannot adopt these measures 
on its own but needs assistance from the international community. To what degree helpful 
assistance is being provided will be discussed in the following chapter.  
It should be noted that climate change is not only viewed as a threat to the future of 
Tuvalu by the state and the stakeholders, but it is also considered a present reality.400 Although 
stakeholders in the state tend to have limited knowledge of climate change itself, they report 
that climate change is a reality in Tuvalu at present and that the impacts are worsening.401 They 
report that they have experienced changes in rainfall patterns which has led water shortage,402 
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food shortage, and land loss.403 Stakeholder accounts also highlight the increase in prevalence 
and frequency of extreme weather events, such as drought.404 There appears to be a consensus 
in the country as a whole, both among the population and the state, that climate change is a real, 
present, and pressing threat, and that it has serious impacts on freshwater supply. The state’s 
approach in its National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) reflects this 
acknowledgment, as it identifies water shortage as a vital climate change vulnerability and sea 
level rise and saltwater intrusion as the key stresses and risks in this regard.405 Additionally, 
while the state identifies mitigation as its primary priority,406 it stresses the need for adaptation 
measures in light of the climate change threat to, inter alia, freshwater sources.407 In light of the 
foregoing it is clear that climate change poses a significant threat to not only to the continued 
existence of the nation’s territory, but to the inhabitability of the country. It is also clear that 
this threat is not abstract and distant but real and current.   
 
 
5.5. The human rights lens: human rights applied to water in Tuvalu  
 
 If states comply fully with their obligations under international human rights law, 
in theory there should be universal enjoyment of all components of human rights. Whether this 
is in fact the case in light of the new circumstances emanating from the adverse impacts of 
climate change will be examined through a consideration of the realisation of the right to water 
in Tuvalu. Should the right to water not be realised in Tuvalu partially due to the adverse 
impacts of climate change, this may be an early indication of the failure of the two regime’s 
abilities to protect individuals from dangerous interference with the sustenance of life. This 
subsection will examine whether Tuvalu is complying with its human rights obligations and 
what the consequences are of the obligations not being satisfied. This consideration is being 
carried out as the application of a human rights approach to country contexts can highlight 
fundamental issues in terms of human life that other approaches may not. It highlights, in 
particular, issues of de facto discrimination and inequality in the enjoyment of water. 
Furthermore the human rights framework is a generally accepted approach of understanding the 
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nuances of human existence, given its level of detail in terms of content and the almost universal 
acceptance of at least some human rights obligations.408 Thus the text below is intended to 
highlight the issues in regards to Tuvaluan water scarcity as exacerbated by climate change as 
they affect human life. 
 One of the primary concerns in relation to the right to water in Tuvalu is the 
availability of freshwater. As discussed above, freshwater is a scarce resource in the state. The 
ability of the Tuvaluan government to satisfy the availability requirement, which demands a 
sufficient quantity and continuity of water for personal and domestic uses, is being quashed by 
climate change. Changes in rainfall patterns as well as sea level rise, believed to be caused by 
climate change, and related internal migration has led to an increased burden placed on 
freshwater resources which have consequently been depleted in the state overall but particularly 
in Funafuti. This will have impacts on the enjoyment of the right to water in the state among 
individuals as the quantity of water is being depleted, which will frustrate the state’s ability to 
fulfil the quantity component of the right to water.  
 The quality of the right to water is also being severely impacted by climate 
change. Sea level and temperature rise is expected to detrimentally impact the quality of water 
in Tuvalu as it is anticipated that these will result in increases in water- and vector-borne 
diseases.409 As discussed previously water quality is expected to worsen due to pollution 
stemming from increase in floods, droughts, and salinity intrusion into groundwater as climate 
change progresses.410 As such climate change threatens not only availability of water but also 
the quality of water in Tuvalu.  
 The depletion of quantity and quality of water resulting from climate change 
raises concerns in relation to the state’s ability to satisfy its obligations to protect and fulfil the 
right to water. Climate change can be attributed primarily to third parties, as Tuvalu itself 
contributes only marginally to the climate change phenomenon.411 Given that climate change 
is exacerbating the water scarcity already prevalent in Tuvalu, as well as threatening the water 
quality in the country, it appears logical that the Tuvaluan state has an obligation to prevent 
third parties from contributing to climate change. Tuvalu can itself, of course, not prevent 
anthropogenic climate change from taking place as this is entirely beyond any one nation’s 
control. As such if the obligation to protect the right to water is to apply in light of climate 
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change circumstances, the state must attempt to prevent third parties, such as other states and 
private parties, from contributing to climate change. This is, of course, also beyond the control 
of a third party state, as it does not have the mandate to dictate what other states can and cannot 
do. As such, the obligation to protect the right to water in light of climate change must be 
interpreted to demand that Tuvalu attempts to use its influence to encourage other states to 
mitigate their release of GHG emissions. Tuvalu’s attempt to do so is indicated by its 
membership in the international climate change instruments. It is furthermore indicated by 
Tuvalu’s membership to the Alliance of Small Island States which has traditionally advocated 
for the goal of climate change mitigation to be limiting global warming to 1.5° Celsius above 
pre-industrial levels as an absolute maximum.412 Additionally the state’s call for international 
cooperation in regards to adaptation and mitigation in its INDC413 indicates an attempt to satisfy 
the obligation to protect the right to water. Whether or not the commitments undertaken by the 
parties to the instruments will be successful in minimising the adverse impacts of climate 
change on water scarcity in Tuvalu is yet unknown.  
The success of the Tuvaluan state in satisfying the obligation to protect the right 
to water depends on whether the obligation is considered an obligation of conduct or result. The 
obligation of conduct is satisfied given the effort to secure mitigation and adaptation exercised 
by the Tuvaluan state. Nevertheless, climate change is currently impacting the realisation of the 
right to water in terms of depletion of the freshwater resource in terms of quantity and quality. 
Thus, despite the state taking steps to ensure that GHG emissions are reduced, water is still not 
being enjoyed fully by Tuvaluans. Thus it appears that should the climate change regime be 
unsuccessful in mitigating the adverse impact of climate change, Tuvalu will be unable to fulfil 
its obligation to protect the right to water in its territory rendering individuals unable to access 
sufficient quantity of water of an acceptable quality. 
 Tuvalu further has an obligation to fulfil the right to water in the state. The 
obligation can be disaggregated into three sub-obligations, namely to facilitate, promote, and 
provide. The obligations to facilitate and provide are arguably of the greatest importance in the 
Tuvaluan context in light of climate change. The obligation to facilitate demands that positive 
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measures are taken to ensure that individuals and communities gain access to water, for example 
by building appropriate infrastructure.414 Given that climate change has resulted in the depletion 
of groundwater as a viable source of freshwater, the Tuvaluan population now relies solely on 
harvesting rainwater. As such water harvesting systems are needed in order to secure the 
availability of water. With the assistance of the international community, water harvesting 
systems were installed. Issues arose in their installation as it resulted in de facto inequality, as 
poorer households, who tend to live in smaller houses in greater numbers, are unable to harvest 
as much water as richer households, as harvesting was based on house and roof size.415 
Additionally those living on the outer islands were unable to enjoy the harvesting systems due 
to a difference in material used between the inner and outer islands, resulting in a de facto 
inequality of water enjoyment between rural and urban dwellers.416  
Issues also arose in relation to the affordability of the water harvesting systems in 
relation to both water availability and quality. The maintenance of the systems was left to 
individuals, who cannot always afford to repair the systems when they break, resulting in an 
inability to harvest water through the system at all.417 Furthermore, the tanks provided do not 
sanitise the water harvested and the water must, as such, be boiled prior to consumption. The 
resources necessary for boiling the water are not always available to individuals, resulting in 
their ability to harvest water but not being able to boil it to make it potable.418 As stated in 
chapter 2 above, under international human rights law inequality in enjoyment of the right to 
water due to housing or land status, including due to financial considerations and location (i.e. 
rural vs urban) is to be avoided.419 These issues that arose highlight the importance of a 
comprehensive plan taking into account all aspects of the right to water when implementing 
assistance projects. Without taking into consideration those most vulnerable in society, such as 
the poor or those living in rural settings, when designing and implementing a strategy aimed at 
securing water supply, issues of inequality are bound to arise. Adopting a human rights-based 
approach in project planning would resolve such concerns and ensure that water supply is made 
available to all.  
 The obligation to provide also raises concern in relation to water scarcity in 
Tuvalu. Generally the obligation to fulfil does not demand that states provide services directly, 
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but if individuals are unable to access safe drinking water for reasons beyond their control states 
have an obligation to provide access to safe drinking water by using the means at their 
disposal.420 This is not too problematic at present, however it is not difficult to envision a future 
where it will be. Should the adverse impacts of climate change persist and worsen, it is entirely 
possible that Tuvalu will periodically experience droughts resulting in no rainwater being 
available whatsoever, as well as sea level and temperature rise and flooding polluting 
groundwater. This would mean that, within the state territory itself, no freshwater would be 
available to provide to the population. As such, the government would need to request 
international assistance periodically in order to satisfy the obligation to fulfil the right to water. 
The provision of resources by the international community is, however, entirely subject to their 
own volition. The third party states are said to have human rights obligations that apply extra-
territorially, yet their applicability remains contested.421 Thus Tuvalu could argue that it is 
entitled to assistance from the international community by virtue of the extra-territorial 
applicability of the obligation to fulfil the right to water, whereby the collectivity of states must 
provide water resources and other assistance when necessary.422 Given the contested nature of 
such obligations, the success of such an argument is questionable. As will be discussed in the 
following chapter, states have a tendency to prefer provision of assistance under their 
development commitments rather than their human rights or climate change obligations. As 
such Tuvalu could request development assistance in view of satisfying its obligations to 
provide the right to water. This would render Tuvalu and its population entirely dependent on 
third party states willingness to assist them and might, if a human rights approach is not adopted 
to non-discrimination and attention to vulnerable groups, result in perpetuation of the unequal 
enjoyment of water. Such dependence would make the state vulnerable to the whims of others 
and there would be no guarantee that water would be made available to the Tuvaluan people, 
leaving their right to water unrealised.  
 
 
5.6. Conclusion  
 
 Water scarcity is an ongoing problem in Tuvalu. This scarcity stems primarily 
from environmental factors, namely the non-existence of surface water on the state territory as 
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well as limited rainfall and saltwater intrusion in groundwater. However, the scarcity also 
partially stems from the limited water infrastructure in place in the country. The water supply 
is not centralised but water is collected on a private basis through harvesting and storing systems 
based on roof size and building material. The maintenance of the systems is subject to individual 
responsibility, which results in sub-par maintenance due to limited financial and skill capacity. 
Climate change is anticipated to exacerbate water scarcity through greater uncertainty regarding 
rainfall patterns, flooding and inundation, sea level rise resulting in saltwater intrusion in 
groundwater, and an increase in incidents of extreme weather events which adversely impacts 
water supply itself and water availability by causing damage to infrastructure. Tuvalu itself 
contributes only marginally to anthropogenic climate change yet is experiencing the adverse 
impacts of the phenomenon already and this is anticipated to worsen in time. Despite its 
marginal contribution to climate change, the impacts of the phenomenon are already posing 
serious challenges as to the satisfaction of its obligations under the right to water and these are 
expected to persist and worsen over time. The quantity and quality of water in Tuvalu is 
expected to be depleted by climate change, making it essentially impossible for the Tuvaluan 
government to protect and fulfil the right to water. If the ability of the state to satisfy its 
obligations under the right to water is rendered impossible due to climate change impacts, the 
right to water cannot be enjoyed by the individuals residing in Tuvalu. This leaves the 
population in a precarious position as the state is unable to meet its obligations without external 
assistance and thus cannot be considered to have breached its human rights obligations due to 
impossibility, yet individuals will still not enjoy water. Provided that assistance is granted by 
the international community, this precarious situation can be avoided, however this is not 
guaranteed. This raises the question as to whether greater integration of climate change laws 
into the human right to water obligations at the regime level might address the water scarcity 
issues experienced in Tuvalu. Consideration of this issue is done in the following chapter in 
light of the activities carried out by Tuvalu itself and external actors in Tuvalu aimed at 
addressing water scarcity.  
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Chapter 6. Implementation Level Integration  
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In light of the information outlined in the foregoing chapter, it is clear that 
measures must be adopted in order to secure freshwater supply in Tuvalu. It is also clear that 
Tuvalu cannot address this issue on its own given that it needs assistance in getting access to 
great enough quantities of water to meet the needs of the population. This chapter will provide 
an overview of which measures are being adopted by national and external actors in addressing 
freshwater shortage in Tuvalu. It will further examine to what extent human rights and climate 
change considerations, particularly in relation to water are acknowledged in the assistance work 
in question. Presumably the reasoning behind adopting international laws on rights and climate 
change generally, and water in particular, stems from a common concern for humanity and a 
desire to safeguard human wellbeing in practice. As such this chapter considers whether those 
laws are being applied in practice by considering the activities undertaken in the Tuvalu context 
or if a different approach is adopted in the projects. Upon examination of the activities it will 
be clear that there is a tendency among actors to implement their activities under the 
development category as opposed to either the human rights or climate change regimes. It will 
be concluded that this tendency indicates that the laws themselves are actually not being 
implemented at all on the ground level and consequently an increased integration at the regime 
level discussed in Part One above would not alleviate the concerns currently prevalent in Tuvalu 
in relation to water supply. Instead alternative courses of action could be adopted to address the 
current inadequacy of the methods adopted by the external actors, namely through the 
integration of human rights and climate change principles into development sector methods.  
 
 
6.2. Activities adopted by Tuvaluan state  
 
First the measures adopted by Tuvalu itself will be considered. It is noteworthy 
that much of the available information on measures adopted by Tuvalu stems from the country’s 
NAPA, which was adopted in 2007. A new NAPA was intended to be released in 2016 but this 
has not yet been issued. As such, new projects in mitigation and adaptation may be adopted 
soon. Nevertheless, the 2007 NAPA provides an insight into what measures have been adopted 
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to address the water scarcity experienced by the state and is as such still of value in giving 
insight into the type of activities implemented.  
 
6.2.1. Mitigation measures 
 
Tuvalu has committed itself to the battle against climate change under the Paris 
Agreement by submitting an INDC. The INDC focuses on mitigation action, to which Tuvalu 
can, in the grand scheme of the issue, not contribute a great deal given its limited current and 
historical contribution to the climate change phenomenon itself.423 The emissions of GHGs by 
Tuvalu stem primarily from the energy, waste, and agriculture sectors.424 In relation to 
mitigation Tuvalu has committed itself to energy-sector related contributions alone. The stated 
mitigation aim is to replace current energy source, imported petroleum products,425 with 
renewable energy sources entirely by 2025.426 In order to achieve the aim the state implemented 
the 1000 Solar Roof Programme in 2011 which aims to secure electricity generation through 
renewable sources.427 This is to be done through the installation of photovoltaic arrays on roofs 
in Funafuti and on the ground as well as roofs on the outer islands, as well as the installation of 
wind turbines to secure energy stemming from wind generation.428  The renewable electricity 
project is discussed in further detail in 6.3.1. since the project was donor funded.  
The country further aimed to secure energy efficiency through introducing 
national legislation to that effect,429 which was done in 2016.430 The Act’s stated purpose is to 
“promote, in Tuvalu, energy efficiency, energy conservation and to give effects to certain 
obligations that Tuvalu has under the Climate Change Conventions and related conventions.”431 
This is done primarily through regulating electrical appliances in regards to the standards which 
they must meet, in view of fulfilling the country’s obligations under the international climate 
change framework.432 The Act does not address human rights at all, but does demand that the 
precautionary approach is applied by persons with obligations under the Act in view of 
                                                          
423 Tuvalu’s emissions are said to make up less than 0.000005% of global emissions, see INDC Tuvalu (n 318) 4.  
424 ibid 5. 
425 ibid 5. 
426 ibid 4. 
427 ibid 7. 
428 ibid 7.  
429 ibid 9.  
430 Energy Efficiency Act, Act No.0003 of 2016.  
431 ibid article 5. 
432 ibid article 5. 
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safeguarding Tuvalu’s natural resources and human health.433 This phrasing accordingly 
indirectly takes into account issues of water supply, as water is a natural resource and is integral 
to the sustenance of human health. This does not, however, indicate an inclusion of human 
rights obligations or considerations, but merely addresses issues of common concern to both 
human rights and climate change. Given that the climate change regime also addresses natural 
resources and human health, the provision is likely simply a reflection of climate change 
obligations to adhere to the precautionary principle in order to secure the objective of the 
climate change regime, rather than a reflection of human rights obligations. Furthermore the 
effectiveness of the legislation overall in securing water supply for citizens does appear 
relatively low as the Act addresses standards of electrical appliances and as such its link to 
water supply is tenuous at best. As such there is explicit implementation of climate change 
obligations but no implementation of human rights obligations under the right to water. 
 
6.2.2. Adaptation measures 
 
Despite the state identifying mitigation as its primary priority, Tuvalu has also 
adopted plans for adaptation projects. In the 2007 NAPA the state adopted a project profile 
aimed at reducing water shortages “through increasing household water capacity, water 
collection accessories, and water conservation techniques”.434 The project identifies two 
objectives. Firstly, to increase “household water storage capacity and water collecting 
accessories” and secondly, to increase “use of water conservation technologies”.435 The 
objectives are intended to be achieved through capacity building, both through training 
plumbers in fixing water infrastructure and training experts in conservation technologies.436 
Furthermore, material help in terms of providing water harvesting and storing structures and 
distribution of those structures will be used in order to achieve the objectives.437 The plan does 
not address either human rights or climate change at all, either in general terms or in terms of 
obligations. As such the project does not appear to implement either set of international laws.  
 
                                                          
433 ibid article 6. 
434 NAPA Tuvalu (n 334) 45. 
435 ibid 45. 
436 ibid 45. 
437 ibid 45. 
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6.3. Mitigation and adaptation measures adopted by external actors  
 
In this context, “external actors” is defined as any actor which is not the Tuvaluan state 
itself, and as such includes inter alia NGOs, other states, or intergovernmental bodies. It should 
be noted that only activities relating to freshwater supply will be outlined, however given that 
mitigation activities will by extension positively impact freshwater supply, some mitigation 
measures will be outlined as well. The activities of the national and external actors will be 
considered in turn below followed by reflection on whether human rights and climate change 
considerations are included in the activities implemented by the actors. 
 
6.3.1. World Bank 
 
While the Tuvaluan state does take action to address water shortage itself, this is 
done with a budget that is primarily donor funded.438 The state itself specifies that the plans 
require international support439 and external actors have been forthcoming in providing support, 
primarily in regards to adaptation and emergency response funds. For example, following the 
devastation caused by Cyclone Pam in 2015 the World Bank granted the state USD $3 million 
for recovery efforts.440 The World Bank has also been active in providing financial support 
outwith the context of disaster response, through providing Development Policy Operations 
(DPOs) funds which are designated for the improvement of essential services, including water 
supply.441 Climate change considerations are included in the project documentation as strategic 
focus areas.442 Human rights, on the other hand, are left out of the documentation entirely, as is 
the right to water specifically. However the DPOs fall under the development category rather 
than climate change or human rights and does accordingly not emanate from either of those 
regimes.  
The implementation of the 1000 Solar Roof Programme is being carried out in 
conjunction with the World Bank, New Zealand, the European Union, and the United Arab 
                                                          
438 UPR Tuvalu (n 386) 9. 
439 INDC Tuvalu (n 318) 10. 
440 WB Cyclone Pam (n 392). 
441 ibid. 
442 The World Bank, 'Report No 108535-TV: Program Document for a Proposed Development Policy Grant in 
the Amount of Equivalent to US$33 Million to Tuvalu for the Third Development Policy Operation' (The World 
Bank, 10 November 2016) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/787411481770846487/pdf/1481770841589-000A10458-PD-
Tuvalu-SECPO-Edit11-10-16-11162016.pdf> accessed 15 May 2017 para 24, Box 2 point 1.  
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Emirates.443 While the project forms part of the INDC, its implementation began prior to the 
adoption of the INDC. The INDC does not address human rights generally or the human right 
to water specifically, it focuses only on actual action to be taken rather than the consequences 
of inaction on water supply. While the energy project itself adopts a gender mainstreaming 
approach by acknowledging the importance of electricity in achieving gender equality444 and 
includes a Gender Action Plan,445 it does not explicitly recognise human rights. As such there 
is similarity in regards to approaches between that adopted by the external actors here and that 
demanded by human rights in terms of attention to vulnerable groups and gender equality, yet 
there is no actual implementation of human rights obligations. The project does, conversely, 
implement climate change obligations as the project forms part of Tuvalu’s INDC under the 
Paris Agreement. As such there is implementation of one of the regimes (climate change) but 
not the other (human rights) in the renewable energy plan.  
The World Bank also works with the Pacific Islands generally through the Pacific 
Possible programme, which encompasses Tuvalu. The programme consists of multiple 
components, one of which relates to climate change preparedness, but none specifically relate 
to human rights. The programme analyses vulnerabilities of the pacific countries and issues 
recommendations for SIDS action to address future risks of adverse impacts on the region 
within the context of climate change and disaster response. Freshwater availability was included 
within the programme, as were considerations relevant to Tuvalu specifically.446 The 
programme does not appear to implement climate change obligations under the UNFCCC but 
rather focuses on climate change as a scientific phenomenon which must be adapted to and as 
such sets out a platform of action upon which SIDS like Tuvalu can base their future adaptation 
plans. While the programme does not recognise human rights, it does discuss the impact that 
climate change has on water as well as human health.447 As with the energy plan discussed 
above, there are overlapping concerns between the World Bank approach and human rights law, 
                                                          
443 The World Bank, 'Tuvalu Set for More Efficient and Renewable Energy' (The World Bank, 26 January 2015) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/01/26/tuvalu-efficient-renewable-energy> accessed 20 
March 2017. 
444 The World Bank, 'Report No: PAD662: Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of 
SDR 48 Million (USD 7 Million Equivalent) and a Proposed Small Island Developing States Initiative Grant in 
the Amount of USD 21 Million to Tuvalu for an Energy Sector to Tuvalu for an Energy Sector Development 
Project ' (The World Bank, 30 December 2014) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/519561468102907968/pdf/PAD6620PAD0P140010Box385398B0
OUO090.pdf> accessed 15 May 2017 6. 
445 ibid Annex 9. 
446 The World Bank, 'Climate and Disaster Resilience: Pacific Possible' (The World Bank, July 
2016)<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/720371469614841726/PACIFIC-POSSIBLE-Climate.pdf> accessed 3 
April 2017.  
447 ibid 15. 
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yet the organisation does not implement human rights law in the Pacific Possible programme. 
As such the World Bank does not attempt to implement either human rights or climate change 
law through the Pacific Possible programme, but appears to consider issues relevant to both 
topics as part of development work.  
Interestingly, the World Bank, at the time of writing, has an active programme 
named the Pacific Resilience Programme under which the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
loaned $2.2 million USD from the Bank. No documents are available under the programme so 
what is actually being carried out and if Tuvalu is one of the countries involved remains 
unknown, although it is presumed that Tuvalu is involved given that it is a member of the 
Forum. In light of the limited information available, it is not possible to examine the inclusion 
of any human rights or climate change obligations concerns in the project. Nevertheless, if the 
projects considered above are any indication, the project likely also does not contain any 
reference to human rights in particular. Should references be made to climate change these 
likely relate more to the phenomenon of climate change rather than the obligations imposed by 
the UNFCCC. The project does, however, appear to focus on the water, sanitation, and food 
protection sector, as 42% of the funds are placed within that sector.448 As such the project will 
likely have at least some positive impact on water supply in the Pacific island countries like 
Tuvalu. The content and impacts of the project will nevertheless remain unknown until further 
documentation is released and as such the interaction of the project with human rights and 
climate change obligations cannot be assessed.  
 
6.3.2. Australia 
 
Individual states have also supported Tuvalu in securing freshwater supply 
through their aid programmes. Australia has been particularly active in supporting Tuvalu both 
in terms of development assistance but also directly in relation to adaptation capacity in 
securing freshwater supply through their AusAid programme. As to the development assistance, 
approximately $2.5 million Australian dollars were granted to Tuvalu for an environment and 
climate change initiative between 2011 and 2016.449 Moreover in 2016 and 2017 an estimated 
                                                          
448 The World Bank, 'Pacific Resilience Program' (The World Bank, 19 June 2015) 
<http://projects.worldbank.org/P156335/?lang=en&tab=overview> accessed 15 May 2017. 
449 Australian Government, 'Environment and Climate Change in Tuvalu' (Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade) <http://dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/development-assistance/Pages/objective-3-environment-and-climate-
change.aspx> accessed 3 April 2017.  
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$9.2 million Australian dollars will be granted in official development assistance (ODA), where 
approximately 4% will go towards the agriculture, fisheries and water sectors.450 The 2016-
2017 grant targets three SDGs but fails to include SDG 6 on water. SDG 13 on climate resilience 
and disaster risk management is however a prioritised area which is, in Tuvalu’s case 
particularly, intimately linked with freshwater scarcity. Australia also provides financial 
assistance by contributing significantly to the Tuvalu trust fund which enables the government 
to fund the gap between state’s available financial resources and its expenditure and enables 
the state to undertake development projects.451  
In terms of increasing Tuvalu’s adaptation capacity, Australia funded Tuvalu’s 
NAPA, which was also supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
The NAPA prioritised water resource management and its implementation has lead to an 
increase in water storage capacity on four Tuvaluan islands.452 The state has also directly 
supplied water infrastructure. In conjunction with the European Commission, Australia 
provided individual households and schools with rainwater tanks, which ensured that all 
households on Funafuti were provided with one 10,000 litre tank each.453 Pursuant to the 
maintenance of the water tanks, Australia also funded a review of the water tanks on Funafuti 
which formed the basis upon which subsequent maintenance and purchase of additional 
equipment could be undertaken.454 Furthermore Australia funds the maintenance of three 
desalination plants and the training of local staff to increase capacity to carry out maintenance 
themselves in cooperation with the UK and US.455 In addition to development and adaptation 
support, Australia has also been supportive in providing funds for disaster response. For 
example, following Cyclone Pam Australia granted approximately $1 million Australian dollars 
and collaborated with the Red Cross by directly providing water supplies, deploying experts in 
water sanitation, and has supported long-term recovery efforts.456 In 2011 Australia was also 
                                                          
450 Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Tuvalu: Aid Fact Sheet' (Australian 
Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, October 2016) <http://dfat.gov.au/about-
us/publications/Documents/aid-fact-sheet-tuvalu.pdf> accessed 3 April 2017. 
451 Australian Government, 'Tuvalu Country Brief' (Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade) <http://dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/Pages/tuvalu-country-brief.aspx> accessed 3 April 2017.  
452 Yusuke Taishi, 'Adapting to Climate Change in Tuvalu' (UNDP, 11 September 2013) 
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climate-change-in-tuvalu-yusuke-taishi.html> accessed 3 April 2017, Australian DFAT (n 449) 7. 
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helpful in providing water tanks to the outer islands, in response to the drought which triggered 
the declaration of a state of emergency.457 
The assistance provided by Australia stems from development assistance rather 
than any funds explicitly set aside for satisfying climate change or human rights obligations.458 
Climate resilience is identified as a strategic objective in the assistance provided, yet this 
identification stems from the commitments under SDG 13459 rather than any obligations 
stemming from the climate change regime. Human rights are not addressed anywhere in the 
documents issued by the Australian government on the assistance provided to Tuvalu. Water is 
generally recognised as a key concern in development assistance,460 but it is not couched in 
human rights terms. The Australian government’s contributions to the Tuvaluan NAPA focused 
primarily on water management and food security, which does indicate prioritization of the 
water scarcity issue. Nevertheless, this was done within the context of the UNDP initiative, 
which of course has a specific development focus rather than a human rights focus. The NAPA 
does prioritise a number of climate change concerns yet these appear to stem from development 
considerations as well as opposed to obligations under the UNFCCC. As such it does not appear 
as though the Australian government intended to satisfy obligations stemming from either the 
human rights or climate change regimes in the development assistance granted to Tuvalu. As 
such Australia does not seem to be implementing either set of law in its development work. The 
development approach is inextricably linked with similar considerations as the climate change 
and human rights regimes461 and as such allows for the implementation of projects that facilitate 
the enjoyment of water but the adoption of the development approach does not entail the 
implementation of human rights or climate change laws.   
 
6.3.3. New Zealand  
 
New Zealand has also been a major contributor to Tuvalu’s development, adaptation, 
and disaster response capacities. The New Zealand and Tuvaluan government have an intimate 
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458 Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Australia and Tuvalu' (Australian 
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link in terms of development assistance, as they have signed a Joint Commitment for 
Development, upon which ODA between the states is based. The agreement outlines the priority 
areas of the aid programme and details the type of assistance that New Zealand will grant. 
Generally New Zealand commits itself to supporting the development of Tuvalu in terms of 
prosperity, resilience, health, and education. One of the identified priority areas is strengthening 
water security by improving “access to safe, reliable and affordable water” and improving 
“resilience to the adverse impacts of disaster risk, climate vulnerability and climate change”.462 
In order to achieve the outcomes, the two states committed themselves to taking cooperative 
action. New Zealand committed itself to supporting Tuvalu’s “efforts to manage its water 
resources sustainably” and investigating “options for rehabilitation of Tuvalu’s Borrow 
Bits”.463 Tuvalu’s responsibilities were identified as leading “the coordination of donor support 
for water security projects and [developing] strategies for the improved maintenance by 
communities and households of existing water systems” and adopting appropriate management 
plans and policies aimed at proactively managing water.464 Thus the Joint Commitment does 
specifically address water supply in Tuvalu and details that support ought to be provided in 
regards to access to water and sustainability of such access. However, details on exact funds 
are not included, nor the particular activities which will be undertaken. Nevertheless, it is 
apparent that New Zealand is granting significant support to Tuvalu, as $15 million New 
Zealand dollars were granted to Tuvalu in assistance in 2015 and 2016. The improvement of 
water and sanitation was included as a priority in the aid programme.465 New Zealand is also a 
major contributor to the Tuvalu trust fund, along with Australia and the UK, which, as discussed 
above, enables development programmes to be implemented in the state. Japan and the 
Republic of Korea have also been smaller contributors to the trust fund. New Zealand has also 
been active in disaster response, as it provided a desalination plant and containers of freshwater 
to Funafuti in response to the 2011 drought emergency.466  
As the name suggests, the Joint Commitment for Development falls under the 
development assistance category and as such appears not to stem from climate change or human 
rights obligations. The agreement does not discuss human rights explicitly, but does identify 
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access to safe, reliable, and affordable water.467 While not phrased in human rights terms, it 
does include aspects of the right. The term “safe water” figures frequently in the human rights 
regime and could be interpreted to imply the quality component of the right to water. The 
reliability mentioned in the agreement is reminiscent of the availability component of the 
human right to water whereas the affordability requirement suggests connection with economic 
accessibility under the right to water. Thus while not explicitly referring to realizing the right 
to water as a priority in the agreement, the wording indicates some overlap or similarities 
between the approach adopted by New Zealand in its development assistance and the human 
rights regime. Accordingly there seems to be similarity rather than implementation of human 
rights laws in New Zealand’s activities, and as such the Joint Commitment for Development 
can likely not be interpreted as a method of implementation of human rights obligations.  
In view of strengthening water security, the agreement also addresses climate 
change concerns as securing resilience to the impacts of climate change is identified as a 
priority. The agreement does not specify how this will be done other than through New 
Zealand’s financial support and Tuvalu’s effort to develop and implement national plans to 
achieve the priorities. As such whether the commitments in question can be traced to the 
fulfilment of the state’s climate change obligations is unknown. Given that New Zealand is an 
Annex I country and is as such required to assist developing states, such as Tuvalu, in their 
adaptation efforts to climate change, this commitment may indeed fulfil those obligations with 
or without the intention for them to be satisfied through the agreement. However considering 
that the projects explicitly fall within the Joint Commitment for Development, this indicates 
that the projects are adopted in pursuit of the satisfaction of development commitments rather 
than the implementation of climate change law. In light of the foregoing it appears that New 
Zealand certainly is not implementing human rights law in its development work and is likely 
not directly implementing climate change law either. 
 
6.3.4. Other actors 
 
Other external actors have also been forthcoming in supporting Tuvalu in terms 
of adaptation and disaster response. For example, the 10th European Development Fund 
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enabled the distribution of 10,000 litre tanks in Funafuti in 2009.468 In response to the 2011 
drought emergency the Japan International Cooperation Agency provided desalination plants 
to the state.469 The European Union simultaneously provided additional water tanks to the outer 
islands in response to the drought.470 These projects were adopted primarily in relation to 
disaster response rather than any right to water or climate change obligations and as such cannot 
be considered to implement either sets of the law.   
 
 
6.4. Would integration at regime level facilitate enjoyment of water in Tuvalu?  
 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that external actors have been active in assisting 
Tuvalu with securing water supply. The approaches adopted range from direct intervention 
through provision of supplies to financial aid or development assistance, where funds are 
supplied generally or for specific projects. The approach of external actors in their aid 
programmes has been criticised by the Special Rapporteur on the right to water and sanitation, 
as the assistance projects were deemed to be off-budget. The Special Rapporteur argued that 
providing on-budget funds would support sustainable development and human rights realisation 
in a way that would create ownership of the solutions471 and would have real impacts on 
everyday life in Tuvalu.472 As such, she argued, the assistance provided is necessary but could 
be optimized in order to secure freshwater supply and actual realisation of the right to water. 473 
External actors are attempting to assist Tuvalu and its people but are doing so under a 
development assistance approach rather than either a climate change or human rights approach. 
This has resulted in a de facto inequality in the enjoyment of the right to water for the poorer 
people in Tuvaluan society as they are unable to maintain and repair their harvesting systems 
and cannot make the water potable due to the cost of boiling materials. Furthermore outer 
islanders are unable to benefit from the water harvesting systems implemented due to their use 
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of different building materials, creating an urban versus rural divide in terms of water 
enjoyment.  
It is noteworthy that the implemented programmes tend to refrain from addressing 
human rights at all in their documentation. In regards to water supply specifically, the actors 
tend to avoid referrals to water as a human right and only refer to human need or public demand 
for freshwater peripherally. This is exemplified through the World Bank’s approach in the 
Pacific Possible programme in particular, where the analysis and suggested actions taken are 
primarily based upon financial and scientific considerations, with no reference to the human 
element of climate and disaster resilience.474 This indicates that there is reluctance among actors 
to carry out the actions in question with explicit recognition of human rights or climate change 
obligations. What the reluctance stems from is unknown. A few possibilities seem to exist in 
this regard. Firstly, the reluctance may stem from a perceived inability to implement human 
rights and climate change obligations due to the risks posed by the potential norm conflicts at 
the regime level highlighted in chapter 4 above. A second explanation might be that there is a 
perceived lack of clarity in terms of what the climate change and human rights obligations entail 
or demand at implementation level. Thirdly there might be state refusal to accept the existence 
of extra-territorial human rights obligations and as such, while states might be willing to assist 
Tuvalu in their struggle they may not want to do so in a manner that legally binds them to carry 
out such assistance in the future. Finally, the explanation may be that the actors do not find the 
respective laws helpful in guiding their assistance efforts.  
Without consultation with the relevant actors, the reasoning behind the non-
implementation remains unknown and this submission will not carry out a speculative exercise 
in order to gauge this reasoning. Instead it is merely concluded that there is no real 
implementation of the two regimes in the Tuvalu context by external actors and, to an extent, 
even by the Tuvaluan government itself. Almost all the activities undertaken which address 
water scarcity in Tuvalu are adopted under development commitments and do not purport to 
implement the international human rights or climate change laws. Many of the activities 
reference climate change as relevant considerations or aim to combat the impacts of climate 
change, as well as addressing the issue of water scarcity in some capacity. This is unsurprising 
given that both climate change and water are intricately linked with development, as reflected 
by the fact that there are individual SDGs for both issues, namely SDGs 13 and 6 respectively.  
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This indicates an overlap between the three areas in question, as all the spheres attempt to 
address concerns of water scarcity and climate change but through the adoption of somewhat 
different approaches. This overlap does not necessarily mean that the external actors are 
implementing either human rights or climate change law but rather that they are merely 
implementing their respective development commitments. As such it seems that there is 
actually little to no implementation of the climate or human rights regimes by the external actors 
in Tuvalu.  
The limited implementation of the two regimes in Tuvalu indicates that the 
discordance between laws at the regime level is not the root cause of the limited enjoyment of 
water in Tuvalu. Given that the laws are not being implemented almost whatsoever in the 
projects attempting to address water scarcity, creating a greater synergy between the two 
regimes will likely not have any tangible effect on the enjoyment of water for those residing in 
Tuvalu. While the increased synergy between the two regimes may be beneficial for the general 
project of international law as the existence of coherent as opposed to contradictory obligations 
is generally desirable, as discussed in Part One, such a synergy would likely not have much 
effect on those living in Tuvalu in terms of water supply. It may, rather, be more beneficial in 
terms of actual enjoyment of water to seek integration of the two regimes into implementation-
level methods rather than regime-level integration. Given the heavy focus of the actors on 
development as opposed to either human rights or climate change, integrating principles from 
the two sets of laws into development methods might be more effective in practice. The 
possibilities in this regard are considered below. 
 
 
6.5. Prospective means of integration  
 
Given that external actors tend to act under the development umbrella when assisting 
Tuvalu with their water supply, it appears that integrating the human rights and climate change 
obligations into development commitments might be the most effective in terms of integration 
at the implementation level. If states are bound both by international climate change and human 
rights law, implementing them simultaneously through their pre-existing development 
commitments would simplify the satisfaction of a multitude of obligations through coordinated 
action addressing obligations stemming from both regimes. This would result in greater 
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integration between the two sets of obligations at the implementation level, although it would 
leave the regime level fragmented. In order to consider the possibilities for integration within 
the development field, three options in this regard will be considered below, namely integration 
through the right to development, the human rights based approach to development (HRBAD), 
and the SDGs. These will be considered in terms of effectiveness and likelihood, as the options 
considered in chapter 4.7. 
Prior to the consideration of the integration possibilities in the development field, a 
question must first be answered. Namely, does fragmentation at regime level matter if the 
implementation level is coordinated and coherent? Fragmentation at the regime level may 
confuse states in their implementation activities given the potential for norm conflict. The areas 
in which norm conflict might arise identified in Part One above certainly have the potential for 
causing issues at the implementation level, but the materialization of a conflict could also be 
avoided through strategic implementation. For example, neither carbon outsourcing nor biofuel 
production is demanded by the climate change regime. Carbon outsourcing is a GHG emission 
reduction strategy adopted by states aimed primarily at formally meeting GHG reduction targets 
rather than actually mitigating climate change impacts. The production of biofuels, however, 
does actually have a positive impact on GHG emissions given that it emits far less GHGs than 
fossil fuel use. Biofuels fall within the category of renewable resources, which are demanded 
to make up part of new energy strategies by Annex I countries.475 These strategies have the 
potential of adversely impacting human rights realisation and interfering with human rights 
obligations. Should states cease their use of such strategies and adopt strategies coherent with 
the ultimate goal of the climate change regime and their obligations under international human 
rights law in relation to the right to water, the conflict could be avoided at the implementation 
level. While the use of fossil fuels is to be replaced through the use of renewable resources, 
states are not required to use biofuels as their renewable resource and as such research could be 
done on other resources which have smaller impact on the right to water which could then be 
produced. It thus appears that these two conflicts in particular arise more at the implementation 
level rather than the regime level.  
The conflict in relation to inter-generational equity, however, stems from a 
fundamental difference in approach as well as long-term goals of the respective regimes. The 
human rights regime aims to secure the dignity and welfare of people existing on the planet 
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now rather than future generations, whereas climate change law has a longer term perspective 
as the repercussions of climate change will only intensify over time and likely create very 
difficult conditions of life for future generations. In practice this may manifest in a conflict at 
the implementation level in regards to prioritization of resource allocation. The human rights 
regime would call for the prioritization of adaptation efforts and primary resource allocation to 
such measures in order to immediately secure and realise rights for all. The climate change 
regime does not look past adaptation efforts as it does contain obligations in relation to 
international cooperation in adaptation assistance, but the focus is clearly placed on mitigation. 
This calls for the prioritization of resource allocation to mitigation efforts as opposed to 
adaptation, as that required by the human rights regime. As such implementation-level conflicts 
may arise when states allocate their resources, which must be resolved at the regime level. The 
question arises as to whether states would be considered to have violated their obligations under 
either regime should they prioritise mitigation over adaptation or vice versa, given that both 
form part of the climate change regime and will likely impact the realisation of the right to 
water positively. Thus formally there is the potential for conflict but resource allocation may 
not be all too contentious in practice, provided that there is some balance between mitigation 
and adaptation measures.  
 
6.5.1. The right to development  
 
The right to development originates from the Declaration on the Right to 
Development (DRD or ‘the Declaration’), adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 
41/128.476 The content of the right itself will not be considered in too much detail here but 
overall it can be said to attempt to address the unfairness of the international economic order, 
the difference in state resources, and imposes an obligation on the collectivity of states to ensure 
that the development of some states does not hamper the development of others. The right 
attempts to address unfairness by creating a collective responsibility for development of 
developing countries, essentially imposing extra-territorial human rights obligations in this 
context. The right forms part of the human rights regime and as such demands that human rights 
are integrated into all development efforts.477 The Declaration is a soft law instrument; it is not 
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unanimously adopted by states and does not legally bind them as it is merely a declaration rather 
than a treaty. The right itself, however, has contested legal validity as some states consider that 
it is a core human right whereas others refuse to accept its status as a right at all.478 Furthermore 
the fact that states and UN bodies repeatedly reference the right to development or the DRD 
suggests that there is at least some level of acceptance of such a right in the international 
community. Some argue that this repeated reference to the right is indicative of the right 
becoming a norm of customary international law, however there is no consensus in this 
regard.479  
Given the heavy focus of external actors in their assistance efforts in Tuvalu on 
development assistance, it is relevant to consider whether integration of the international human 
rights and climate change regimes could be done through the use of development mechanisms. 
The right to development might be a useful avenue in this regard. The right to development 
already adopts a human rights approach and as such integration of the right to water would 
likely not require particularly extensive or strenuous effort. The focus in terms of integration 
would instead be on the integration of climate change obligations into the right itself. The 
question does, however, arise whether or not this method would be effective in securing water 
supply. In their development assistance documentation in the Tuvalu context the external actors 
tend to not refer to the right to development specifically. Instead the actors tend to class the 
assistance as ‘official development assistance’ but do not relate this to the right to development 
explicitly. Furthermore given the uncertain legal status of the right and the soft law nature of 
the DRD, its use in reinforcing another soft law construction, namely the right to water, appears 
somewhat weak, particularly given the resistance that some states express to the existence of a 
right to development. This avenue may as such not have much effect in practice as states do not 
seem to tend to concern themselves with the right to development when implementing their 
development assistance programmes.  
The likelihood of this approach being adopted also seems minimal. The DRD was 
adopted in 1986, just over 30 years ago, and the right still does not appear to have taken off in 
terms of state acceptance of the right and its implementation. Other avenues in terms of 
development have been pursued since the adoption of the DRD which appear to be accruing 
greater success. These methods will be considered in the following subsections. In light of the 
limited legal validity and its consequent limited effectiveness in integration at the 
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implementation level in conjunction with the low likelihood of its employment, the right to 
development is likely not an optimal opportunity for integration of the two regimes.  
 
6.5.2. Human Rights Based Approach to Development  
 
A second option for integration in the development field is integrating climate 
change into the HRBAD. The approach attempts to move from a needs and charity approach to 
development to an approach based on right claims and corresponding duties and creating 
accountability for the satisfaction of those duties.480 The approach further advocates for any 
development work to be adopted in light of human rights principles such as participation in 
decision-making, non-discrimination, and equitable distribution of development project 
gains.481 The reasoning behind the adoption of the approach is that human rights law provides 
a set of principles which can create coherence in and guide development assistance in terms of 
priorities, obligations, and evaluation.482 The HRBAD has become popular among NGOs and 
donor countries483 as well as becoming the default approach adopted by the UN itself. The UN 
has adopted a common understanding of the meaning of the HRBAD, setting out that 
development programmes should aim to further the realisation of human rights, that such 
programmes should be guided by human rights standards and principles, and that the duty-
bearer and rights-holder dynamic also applies in development co-operation.484 This approach 
is, as such, widely used in regards to development and may provide a viable avenue for the 
integration of climate change obligations at the implementation level of development 
assistance. Human rights is already inherent in the human rights based approach and right to 
water considerations should thus be firmly taken into consideration in any development 
assistance adopted employing the HRBAD.  
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The ODA documentation considered in subsection 6.3. above in relation to 
assistance in Tuvalu does not tend to discuss the HRBAD or human rights whatsoever. As such, 
the question does arise as to whether such an approach is indeed adopted by the external actors 
involved in Tuvalu. It is possible that the actors adopt an HRBAD when planning, 
implementing, and evaluating the projects themselves but that this is not explicitly reflected in 
the documents outlining the assistance to be granted. The application of a HRBAD would likely 
not result in inequality in water provision, which has been prevalent in Tuvalu, and as such it 
appears somewhat unlikely that a comprehensive HRBAD has been adopted in the country 
context, at least in the past. However, given that there does appear to be enthusiasm regarding 
the approach from NGOs, states, and UN agencies, this might prove an optimal integration 
avenue. This method would only require the integration of the climate change obligations, 
rather than both human rights and climate change obligations, and would as such likely require 
less effort than the creation of a new integrated regime or treaty for example. This approach has 
the same benefits as those outlined in relation to the right to development, as both adopt a human 
rights perspective. Contrary to the right to development, however, the HRBAD appears to have 
garnered greater enthusiasm among development donors and recipients. As such integration of 
the regimes in the HRBAD appears to be both more likely to gain state acceptance as well as 
being more effective in terms of implementation.  
 
6.5.3. Sustainable Development Goals  
 
The third and final integration method under the development umbrella to be 
considered is through the SDGs.The 2030 Agenda and its SDGs is the successor of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The SDGs set out 17 development goals on various 
thematic areas, including clean water and sanitation (SDG 6) and climate action (SDG 13). 
Each individual goal delineates a set of specific targets, with 169 targets in total, all attached to 
indicators measuring the progress of the fulfilment of targets. While the 2030 Agenda is not 
necessarily a human rights agenda in its entirety, there are certainly human rights influences 
throughout the Agenda in terms of what issues are addressed such as food, health, education, 
and, as mentioned above, water. The Agenda also addresses human rights explicitly by 
recognising the realisation of human rights as the ultimate objective of the goals and targets,485 
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holding that human rights are to be protected,486 and specifying that the Agenda is guided by 
human rights principles and standards,487 among other human rights-related provisions.488 This 
approach essentially utilizes human rights as a yard stick for interpretation, as the Agenda must 
be implemented in line with international law and human rights, demanding that states realise 
and do not violate human rights when implementing the Agenda.489 The Agenda also addresses 
issues traditionally considered human rights concepts such as equality and non-discrimination, 
particularly in regards to gender490 and inequality in and between countries.491 Given the heavy 
feature of human rights throughout the Agenda, it is gathered that the human right to water is 
integrated into the Agenda itself.  
The climate change regime also features in the 2030 Agenda, albeit to a lesser degree 
than the human rights regime. SDG 13 specifically outlines the importance of climate action in 
terms of resilience and adaptation in particular. The Agenda primarily refers to climate change 
in terms of adaptation and less in terms of mitigation, although it does refer to “climate change 
measures”,492 which presumably also encompasses mitigation measures. The Agenda also 
defers to the authority of the UNFCCC in SDG 13, recognising that it is the “primary 
international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate 
change”.493 Despite this deference, SDG 13 requires implementation of climate change 
obligations in accordance with the human rights principles under which the entire Agenda is 
bound. This accordingly provides an authoritative source of soft law which integrates human 
rights obligations into climate change obligations. State action under SDG 13, which focuses 
on climate change action, must aim to realise human rights and must not violate human rights, 
as that is a condition for the application of the Agenda in general. The Agenda as such provides 
an optimal method of implementation of human rights and climate change simultaneously as it 
is written into the instrument itself, which states have voluntarily acceded to. Moreover given 
the heavy focus on development programmes in Tuvalu, the adoption of such programmes may 
be done under the SDGs in the future, which would require adherence to human rights and 
climate change principles, particularly when implementing SDG 13.  
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Interestingly SDG 6 on water and sanitation does not contain any reference to 
climate change in particular and as such it appears that climate change obligations are not 
integrated into human rights notions through the Agenda. Thus when implementing SDG 6 
states are not explicitly required to take climate change action in pursuit of the mitigation of 
water scarcity. Reference is made to the prevention of pollution of freshwater resources in SDG 
6.3, which, as discussed above, has clear linkages with climate change. As such there may be 
some inherent climate change obligations in the pursuit of enhanced water availability under 
the Agenda. Furthermore the SDGs are inter-connected494 and as such the implementation and 
fulfilment of SDG 13 targets will likely also have positive impacts on the SDG 6 concerns and 
consequently the right to water.  
The use of the SDGs to implement human rights and climate change might, in light 
of the above, be the avenue available to states which entails the least amount of work in terms 
of integration. Both sets of obligations are accounted for in the SDGs and as such concerted 
action under the SDGs would likely satisfy both human rights and climate change obligations. 
Adopting development assistance under the SDGs in accordance with human rights principles, 
as required by the Agenda itself, would likely prevent many of the issues faced by Tuvaluans 
following the development assistance previously provided, such as those issues which arose in 
relation to equality in rights enjoyment. States would also be able to go further than the SDG 
demands should they so please so as to ensure satisfaction of their obligations under the human 
rights and climate change regimes, as this is not prevented by the Agenda. States would likely 
need to take action beyond that demanded by the Agenda to satisfy their obligations under the 
other two regimes, but that action could be concerted under their action adopted in pursuit of 
satisfaction of the SDGs, particularly in regards to developed states in their assistance efforts 
carried out in Tuvalu.  
The 2030 Agenda does not resolve the norm conflict at regime level; however the 
question arises as to whether this would matter in relation to the situation in Tuvalu. As 
discussed above, should states refrain from carbon outsourcing and biofuel production as well 
as balancing mitigation and adaptation resources, the potential conflict could be avoided. If 
states avoid such action and implement the SDGs as they are outlined in the Agenda itself and 
the respective regimes, then the enjoyment of the right to water would likely increase in small 
island states like Tuvalu regardless of the existence of a potential conflict at the regime level. 
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Moreover there appears to be no production of biofuels or any GHG trade programmes 
underway in Tuvalu and as such the likelihood of these conflicts arising on the ground in Tuvalu 
seems low. Ultimately human rights are intended to secure human welfare and if water scarcity 
is adequately addressed through the SDGs and water supply is secured for all, then the existence 
of a theoretical norm conflict will not matter in practice. As such, the implementation of the 
SDGs along with compliance with human rights and climate change obligations may indeed be 
the optimal solution in terms of water scarcity in Tuvalu and likely other similar SIDS.  
The likelihood of states adopting the SDG approach appears relatively high. The 
MDGs were overall considered very successful495 and given that the SDGs are the intended to 
replace the MDGs, it does appear likely that the new Agenda will encourage mobilization of 
states in their development efforts. The Agenda is not legally binding and as such states cannot 
be held legally accountable for their failure to satisfy the SDGs, but such failure might warrant 
social and political pressure or criticism. The MDGs were not legally binding either, as they 
also stemmed from a Declaration like the SDGs, yet their implementation was generally 
successful in terms of states rallying behind them. This indicates that states may be equally 
enthusiastic regarding the SDGs. The SDGs also appear to be an optimal method of integration 
as there is already some integration read into the Agenda which indicates the level of integration 
that states are currently willing to accept and implement. It may further act as a stepping stone 
to further integration of obligations as one single set of obligations in the future rather than two 
sets of obligations influencing a third genre. 
 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
It is clear that Tuvalu suffers in a particularly challenging way from water scarcity 
due to its limited availability of water and that this challenge will be exacerbated by climate 
change. It is moreover apparent that something must be done in order to ensure the enjoyment 
of water for all in Tuvalu regardless of economic status or place of residence. Many actors, 
including the Tuvaluan state, have attempted to address the issues of water scarcity in the state 
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territory through the adoption of adaptation projects as well as assisting Tuvalu in its mitigation 
efforts. These have nonetheless not resolved the issues of inequality, nor have they actually 
secured a physical increase in water availability in the state. This may be attributed to the fact 
that the actors have not taken a human rights approach or adopted their activities under the 
human rights regime, but have rather adopted them under development commitments. Tuvalu 
clearly needs assistance at present in resolving its struggle in ensuring sufficient water quantity, 
however this assistance could be optimized so as to ensure equal enjoyment of benefits of the 
projects, which could be done through the adoption of a human rights approach which places 
significant weight on non-discrimination and attention to vulnerable groups. Nevertheless the 
obligations stemming from international human rights law are not being implemented in the 
assistance provided by the external actors. Climate change obligations, which partially seek to 
secure water supply in the long-term, are not being implemented to a great degree either. The 
lack of implementation of the two laws indicates that an enhanced synergy of the two regimes 
would have little impact on the actual enjoyment of water in Tuvalu and as such may not be a 
worthwhile avenue to pursue, if the ultimate objective is indeed to secure water enjoyment in 
Tuvalu and other SIDS. Rather a greater human rights and climate change focus could be 
adopted in development work, to ensure both long-term and short-term solutions for securing 
water supply in Tuvalu for all without inequality. This could be done through a variety of 
avenues, although the SDGs in particular appear to encapsulate these concerns to a relatively 
extensive degree. As such, in future development assistance work, external actors could adopt 
the SDG approach by adopting human rights-oriented goals, ensuring that indeed no one is left 
behind.496 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
 In light of the foregoing discussion, we must now turn back to the research 
question itself and consider its answer. So, in what ways might a closer integration of the 
international human rights and climate change legal fields facilitate the enjoyment of water in 
an era of climate change impacts? The answer to this is, as displayed by the above, complex. It 
seems that the question must be answered in two ways: through integration at the regime level 
and integration at the implementation level. However, this integration does not look the same 
at both levels and the avenues of integration would need to be different at the respective levels 
to facilitate enjoyment of water. 
Integration of the two fields at the regime level may be beneficial, necessary, and 
possible. Integration would be beneficial as it would adopt a human rights approach to climate 
change which may result in greater implementation of climate change law as well as guiding 
the adoption and implementation of such law in a way that benefits individuals, rather than 
overall populations. Human rights law focuses on the individual in a way that many other areas 
of the law might fail to do. Adopting a human rights approach to climate change law would 
allow states to hear from stakeholders through principles of participation, ensuring that the 
ground-level issues is that which is addressed through the laws. Moreover it would secure 
considerations of non-discrimination and inequality, allowing the laws to address issues that 
may go unnoticed under the radar as disadvantaged groups might not be seen by other 
approaches in the same way. Moreover human rights law has appeared to have coded the sense 
of morality and entitlement/duty into a set of defined and detailed laws given the massive 
acceptance of the regime by the international collectivity of states.497 Integration of the two 
regimes would also allow for the avoidance of norm conflict, a few examples of which are 
already apparent.498 This is beneficial for the general project of international law as the 
avoidance of fragmentation of the law is desirable. This is expressed not only in the VCLT but 
has been subsequently studied by scholars.499 As such the avoidance of norm conflict appears 
to indicate a need for integration. Furthermore integration would create a unified set of 
obligations which already address the same issue, namely that of water scarcity, in a coherent 
manner. The coherent overlaps between the regimes indicates that there is the possibility for 
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closer integration of the two regimes as the two do not appear to be so fundamentally at odds 
with each other, that those differences which do exist cannot be overcome.500  
The advantages of integration at the regime level thus suggest that perhaps this is 
the fundamental issue in regards to the right to water not being enjoyed in SIDS. As such 
considerations were made regarding the possible means of integration. The adoption of a new 
treaty would be very beneficial in this regard. A treaty would require that states agree on the 
interpretation and contents of the respective obligations from the two regimes which conflict or 
run parallel to each other but do not actually interact. Moreover it would provide the right to 
water with a solid treaty basis, with the right conferred to all rather than specified beneficiaries 
like the approach of the CEDAW, CRC, and CRPD. The likelihood of such a treaty being 
adopted, however, appears low. In light of the intense and large scale advocacy that went into 
the achieving the inclusion of the ‘human rights’ references in the Paris Agreement, which does 
not impose legally binding commitments, it appears unlikely that states would be willing to 
adopt a treaty solidifying state climate change obligations owed to individuals in the form of a 
human right.501 A second option for further integration is through the issuance of authoritative 
interpretation of the obligations. This could be done in conjunction between the bodies of the 
two regimes or separately. The human rights regime has already pursued and issued such 
interpretations, yet with what appears to be little state heed. This option appears to have some 
advantages to the treaty-option, as it requires less effort in terms of negotiation and gaining 
state acceptance. However, it is not an ideal solution as it would not grant the right to water a 
more solid legal basis under international law as it would merely be reinforced by additional 
soft law instruments. Moreover the likelihood of the adoption of such an approach seems low. 
Again, in light of the state resistance to integration in the Paris Agreement, the COP would 
likely be wary of issuing such an interpretation as it may cause upset among the collectivity of 
states. Furthermore, such an approach might require one of the authorities to subordinate itself 
to the other which might entail an undesirable loss of power.502 As such it appears that, while 
regime level integration is desirable for the general coherence of international law achieving 
such integration would be challenging. Such integration depends on the good will of states to 
achieve coherence and is by any means not impossible, but does seem unlikely in light of the 
recent developments in relation to the Paris Agreement.  
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While these limited actual possibilities for integration are disadvantageous at 
regime level, it appears to have little impact on the implementation level. In examining the 
situation of water scarcity in Tuvalu as an example of the situation of SIDS at present it became 
clear that, while human rights are being and will be seriously affected by the adverse impacts 
of climate change, the two sets of laws are not being implemented almost whatsoever. This is 
striking given that the two regimes are intended, in part, to address issues of water scarcity, yet 
in a country context like Tuvalu where water scarcity is a significant challenge the laws are not 
being implemented. This indicates that there is some issue in relation to the laws overall, be it 
the fragmentation, that they are not considered helpful in addressing water scarcity in Tuvalu, 
resistance to extra-territorial obligations, or something else. What the issue is remains unknown 
without consultation with the relevant actors. Regardless, given that the laws are not being 
implemented, this suggests that regime level integration, as was argued for in Part One, would 
not actually facilitate the enjoyment of water in practice. Instead it appears that the integration 
of human rights and climate change into development commitments may be more beneficial in 
terms of practical enjoyment of water. In this regard more options are available than for regime 
level integration, as it could be achieved through integration in the right to development, the 
HRBAD, or the SDGs. The SDGs appear to be an optimal avenue to pursue in this regard, as a 
great deal of both climate change and human rights considerations have been included 
throughout the SDGs, as well as specific considerations on water supply. As such, when states 
undertake development projects in Tuvalu in the future, implementing these through the SDG 
approach could prevent issues of inequality arising again. Adopting the human rights approach 
of the SDGs would encourage states to focus on the individual in their development 
programming in a way that has not been done in Tuvalu previously. This has resulted in 
inequality in enjoyment of water in the state, with differences in financial status as well as 
residence location determining the individual level of rights enjoyment. Adopting a human 
rights approach could circumvent the perpetuation of these issues, as the populations would be 
consulted regarding the primary issues in relation to water supply in a way that might not be 
apparent to states. This would ensure that water could be enjoyed equally by all, regardless of 
any differentiating qualities. Moreover, states could go beyond the requirements set out by the 
SDGs and implement the extra-territorial aspects of their human rights obligations under the 
same programmes. It is thus determined that in order for there to be realisation of the enjoyment 
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of water in Tuvalu, a human rights approach to development must be adopted in a way which 
takes climate change impacts into consideration, as that done by the SDGs.503 
In order to facilitate the enjoyment of water in practice, then, implementation-
level integration must be adopted. This is at least the case in Tuvalu, which one may be able to 
extrapolate to other SIDS and even other climate vulnerable states, although further study is 
required to know this definitively. The pursuit of regime level integration is nevertheless not 
futile. Coherence at the regime level has significant advantages for the implementation of law 
as it would clarify the content of obligations, ensuring that states do not avoid implementation 
due to confusion or concerns of norm conflict. Given that the reason behind the lack of 
implementation of the laws in Tuvalu remains unknown, it is possible that the fragmentation of 
international law on this topic is one of the reasons. Regardless, for the general project of 
international law, coherence is something to be strived for, as displayed by its inclusion in the 
VCLT. Yet, if one turns back once again to the research question itself, we must conclude that 
implementation-level integration is the key way in which greater enjoyment of water can be 
secured. This should be achieved through the implementation of development programmes 
through human rights and climate change lenses. This is, at the very least, what would likely 
facilitate the enjoyment of water for those living in Tuvalu at present. Regime level integration 
also has significant benefits and may resolve issues of water scarcity in other national contexts. 
However, in light of the focus of this thesis, one can only answer that closer integration at the 
regime level might facilitate greater enjoyment of water, but this remains unknown and appears 
somewhat unlikely in the Tuvaluan context.  
In light of these conclusions one can turn back to the Atlantis analogy and 
consider whether its cautionary tale can be one to guide the ways in which the plight of SIDS 
in an era of climate change is to be dealt with. The tale tells of a utopian and powerful 
civilisation that disappears into the sea following the onset of natural disasters. Whether or not 
an Atlantis-like scenario materialises in SIDS in the future could be avoided should the impacts 
of climate change be sufficiently mitigated so as to prevent such great sea level rise, ensuring 
that state territories are not entirely submerged. This may be avoidable, should climate change 
mitigation efforts be achieved. However, this may not mean that civilisations will not 
necessarily be lost. Prior to entire submergence of SIDS, the states risk becoming uninhabitable 
due to the adverse impacts that climate change will have on water scarcity. Thus if states are 
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unable to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and secure water supply the 
populations residing there will have to abandon the territory. This may, depending on the nature 
of resettlement, lead to the loss of the characteristics that made up those civilisations, such as 
culture and language. The impacts of climate change that affect water supply in SIDS are not 
entirely sudden, like those which destroyed Atlantis, and as such may allow populations on 
SIDS to adapt, and in the worst case scenario where the territory becomes uninhabitable, 
relocate. There appears to be a slew of issues in regards to inhabitability that will arise and must 
be addressed prior to concerns of territory disappearance. Thus, while the story of Atlantis itself 
may not be repeated in relation to SIDS, there may still be disappearance of civilisation akin to 
that exemplified by the tale of Atlantis should the adverse impacts of climate change not be 
addressed and adapted to, possibly through integration of the international human rights and 
climate change legal fields.  
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